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The Warren Court’s Regulatory                    
Revolution in Criminal Procedure 
ERIC J. MILLER 
The standard story taught to American lawyers, purporting to describe the Warren 
Court’s criminal procedure “revolution,” is mostly wrong.  The story claims that the Court, 
motivated by liberal egalitarianism, engaged in a rights-expanding jurisprudence that made 
it harder for the police to search, seize, and interrogate criminal defendants.  But 
frightened by the popular backlash against high crime rates, and in particular the passage 
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, in Terry v. Ohio a cowed 
Court shifted from its rights-expanding to a rights-constricting phase, making it easier for 
the police to search and seize criminal suspects.  Measured by this rights revolution, there 
were, in fact, two Warren Courts, a liberal and a more conservative one, emblematically 
separated by Terry. 
The two-Warren-Courts hypothesis, at least as applied to Fourth Amendment law, 
results from a tendentious liberal re-reading of the Court’s jurisprudence.  The dominant 
theme in the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was not liberal, but civic 
republican, one that emphasized inter-branch regulation of the police over the right to 
privacy.  Rather than a rights-expanding and a rights-contracting Warren Court, from the 
early 1960s onwards, the Court mounted a consistent attack on the pre-existing versions of 
the right to privacy.  Rather than a liberal egalitarian, or privacy-protecting rights regime, 
the central Fourth Amendment right under the Warren Court was the republican interest in 
personal security.  Extending personal security into areas hitherto unregulated by the law 
was a major concern of the Terry Court.  An expansionist Terry cannot be squared with a 
Court in retreat in response to public outcry over crime rates. 
Worse, the liberal story has produced a barren doctrinal and political account of the 
Fourth Amendment.  Focusing on privacy as the means of generating equality and anti-
discrimination ill fits Fourth Amendment doctrine and ignores major developments in the 
substantive criminal law that include Terry and culminate with Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville.  An obsession with privacy too easily paints law enforcement as a repressive 
force whose power and numbers should be severely limited.  This narrow liberalism has 
turned progressive attention away from the vital and difficult task of generating a doctrinal 






I.  INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 3 
II. OUTLINE OF THE ARGUMENTS: 
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL ............................................................ 8 
A.  HISTORICAL ARGUMENT:  
KAMISAR’S TWO-WARREN-COURTS THESIS ...................................... 9 
B.  POLITICAL ARGUMENT:  
REPUBLICAN REGULATION VERSUS LIBERAL IMMUNITIES ............... 14 
C.  REPUBLICAN PRECEDENTS .................................................................... 18 
III.  LIBERAL MISDESCRIPTIONS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT 
DOCTRINE............................................................................................. 20 
A.  EQUALITY: THE WRONG RIGHT ............................................................ 21 
B.  THE COURT AND RACE: EQUALITY AS ANTI-DISCRIMINATION ............. 23 
C.  FOUR VERSIONS OF PRIVACY:  
PROPERTY, LIBERTY, PROTECTED SPACES, AND SECURITY .............. 26 
IV.  TERRY: EXPANDING REGULATION ................................................. 48 
A.  NOT A BOLT FROM THE BLUE:  
PRE-TERRY LAW OF STOP AND FRISK ................................................ 50 
B.  SAFETY, PROFESSIONALISM, AND TERRY’S  
EXPANSIVE REGULATION OF THE POLICE ......................................... 60 
C.  REGULATING PREVENTATIVE POLICING OUTSIDE THE  
WARRANT REQUIREMENT ................................................................. 62 
V.  SIBRON, VAGRANCY, AND VAGUENESS ......................................... 65 
A.  SIBRON’S FORGOTTEN IMPORTANCE ..................................................... 66 
B.  VAGRANCY AND RACIAL EQUALITY ..................................................... 71 
C.  THE REAL RIGHTS REVOLUTION ........................................................... 76 
VI.  POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE THEORIES OF POLICING................... 76 




The Warren Court’s Regulatory                     
Revolution in Criminal Procedure 
ERIC J. MILLER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There is a standard story taught to American lawyers that purports to 
describe the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions as a rights 
“revolution.”1  Between Mapp v. Ohio2 and Miranda v. Arizona,3 the story 
goes, the Court—motivated by an emphasis on political, social, and 
economic equality for racial minorities4—engaged in a rights-expanding 
jurisprudence that made it harder for police to search, seize, and interrogate 
criminal defendants.5  The Fourth Amendment right most emblematic of 
the Court’s expansionist jurisprudence was its newly-minted right to 
privacy.  Frightened, however, by the popular backlash against high crime 
rates, and in particular the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968,6 a cowed Court shifted from its rights-expanding to a 
rights-constricting phase in Terry v. Ohio,7 making it easier for the police 
                                                                                                                          
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University Law School.  My thanks to the following people for 
their support in the writing of this Article: Alfred Brophy, G. Jack Chin, Frank Rudy Cooper, Adrienne 
D. Davis, Jelani Jefferson Exum, Naomi Goodno, Kaaryn Gustafson, Arthur Leavens, Charles 
Ogletree, Eve Brensike Primus, Mae Quinn, and Carol Steiker.  Thanks also to my colleagues at Saint 
Louis University Law School: Matthew Bodie, Joel Goldstein, Samuel Jordan, Kerry Ryan, Molly 
Walker Wilson, and Anders Walker. 
1 Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It 
Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE 
COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 62 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) [hereinafter Kamisar, Warren 
Court]; Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31 
TULSA L.J. 1, 2–3 (1995) [hereinafter Kamisar, Retrospective]. 
2 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  In his earlier article, Kamisar appears willing to push back the beginning 
of the rights revolution to the 1956 case, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).  See Kamisar, Warren 
Court, supra note 1, at 62–63.  
3 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
4 Kamisar, Retrospective, supra note 1, at 6; see also A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and 
Criminal Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REV. 249, 256 (1968) (emphasizing the Warren Court’s 
jurisprudence guaranteeing disadvantaged minority groups equality before the law). 
5 E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654–55.  
6 See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 407–11 (2000) 
(discussing the impact of public sentiment on crime on Warren Court criminal procedure); Kamisar, 
Retrospective, supra note 1, at 3 (“[T]he strong criticism of the Court by many members of Congress 
and by presidential candidate Richard Nixon and the obviously retaliatory provisions of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 contributed further to an atmosphere that was unfavorable 
to the continued vitality of the Warren Court’s mission in criminal cases.”).  
7 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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to search and seize criminal suspects.8  For proponents of the rights 
revolution theory, this meant that there were in fact two Warren Courts9— 
one liberal and the other more conservative10—emblematically separated 
by Terry.11   
Almost everything about this story is wrong.  Contrary to prevailing 
opinion, the Warren Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence cannot be 
separated into historically distinct rights-expanding and rights-contracting 
phases, but rather constituted one single regulation-promoting continuum.  
Similarly, the Warren Court did not introduce a new privacy right in the 
1960s, so much as mount a consistent attack on three pre-existing versions 
of the right to privacy.12  Rather than a left-liberal egalitarian,13 or privacy-
protecting rights regime, the central concern of the Warren Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence was the republican interest in personal 
security,14 understood as non-domination.15  Extending security into areas 
                                                                                                                          
8 See Kamisar, Warren Court, supra note 1, at 64 (describing how the Court “legitimated the 
police practice of stopping and frisking persons on less than probable cause”); Peter Arenella, 
Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing 
Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 232–34 (1983); Donald A. Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its 
Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 591, 621–22 (1990) (explaining the overarching search and seizure rules); Jerold H. Israel, 
Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 
1388 (1977); Kamisar, Retrospective, supra note 1, at 35 (discussing different court interpretations that 
create a diminished security against searches and seizures); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow 
and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151, 
153 (1980). 
9 “[W]hen we speak of the Warren Court’s ‘revolution’ in American criminal procedure we mean 
the Warren Court that lasted from 1961 . . . to 1966 or 1967.  In its final years, the Warren Court was 
not the same Court that had handed down Mapp or Miranda v. Arizona.”  Kamisar, Retrospective, 
supra note 1, at 2–3 (footnotes omitted). 
10 See POWE, supra note 6, at 408 (listing the Warren Court’s more “conservative” decisions and 
discussing the conservative/liberal split).  For definitions of these labels, as used in this Article, see 
infra Part II.B.  
11 Kamisar, Retrospective, supra note 1, at 5 (“The Chief Justice’s majority opinion in Terry v. 
Ohio, an important 1968 ‘stop and frisk’ case, is a dramatic demonstration of the Warren Court’s 
change in tone and attitude. . . .  I truly believe that if say, in 1971, the Burger Court had written the 
same opinion in the “stop and frisk” cases that the Warren Court wrote in 1968 . . . its opinion would 
have been considered solid evidence of the emerging counterrevolution in criminal procedure.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
12 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (rejecting Brandeis’s liberty-
protecting version of privacy and the “protected spaces” understanding of privacy propounded in 
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1925)); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301–07 (1967) 
(overruling Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), and in so doing, rejecting property-based 
view of privacy and so permitting search and seizure of “mere evidence”); Hoffa v. United States, 387 
U.S. 231, 233–34 (1967) (permitting undercover wires); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211–12 
(1966) (permitting undercover wires). 
13 See POWE, supra note 6, at 446 (claiming that Warren Court criminal procedure was a series of 
“barely disguised poverty cases”); Kamisar, Retrospective, supra note 1, at 6 (identifying as central the 
Warren Court’s value of equality). 
14 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 358–59 (bypassing warrant requirement leaves people “secure from 
Fourth Amendment violations ‘only in the discretion of the police.’” (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 
89, 97 (1964))); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647 (1961); see also infra notes 21–32 and 
accompanying text.   
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hitherto unregulated by the law was a major concern of the Warren Court 
throughout its tenure, exemplified by its decision in Terry. 
Worse, the rights revolution story produced a barren doctrinal and 
political account of the Fourth Amendment.16  For example, Yale Kamisar, 
a major exponent of the “two-Warren-Courts” analysis, claims the rights 
revolution was essentially an equality revolution,17 and in particular, an 
anti-discrimination revolution.18  For others, the Fourth Amendment 
revolution was a privacy revolution, promoting the negative liberty right to 
exclude the government from certain places.19  Both stories are doctrinally 
and politically barren.  Focusing on equality, anti-discrimination, and 
privacy too easily paints law enforcement in negative liberty terms as a 
repressive force whose power and numbers should be severely limited.  On 
this view, almost any police activity relying upon the exercise of discretion 
appears to undermine the immunity of the public in general and criminal 
defendants in particular.20  This narrow liberalism has turned progressive 
                                                                                                                          
15 PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 51–78 (1997); 
HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE ENDS OF POLICY 
28–36 (2002).  
16 In other words, I subscribe to the critique leveled against Fourth Amendment scholarship by 
Robert Weisberg: 
Hampered by boring models of crime control and due process masked as practical 
reasoning, scholarship has given way to both imprecise empiricism and shallow 
deontology.  The doctrine has been typically cast by the scholars as a political 
melodrama with a scripted dramatic story—a pattern of expanded constitutional 
protection under the Warren Court followed by the retrenchment of the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts. The process leads to mechanical outcome counting and 
evaluation, and assumes the opinions are effectual and significant in the terms in 
which they are written.  
Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law, Criminology, and the Small World of Legal Scholars, 63 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 521, 530 (1992). 
17 Kamisar, Warren Court, supra note 1, at 62; see also Michal R. Belknap, The Real Significance 
of Brown v. Board of Education: The Genesis of the Warren Court’s Quest for Equality, 50 WAYNE L. 
REV. 863, 889 (2004) (describing the “close link” between concern with substantive rights and criminal 
procedure revolution’s “imposi[tion of] national standards on law enforcement”); Kamisar, 
Retrospective, supra note 1, at 6.  A rights regime also justifies federal review of the decisions authored 
by state-court judges, another way in which the Court can ensure uniformity across jurisdictions.  See, 
e.g., David J. Garrow, Bad Behavior Makes Big Law: Southern Malfeasance and the Expansion of 
Federal Judicial Power, 1954–1968, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 25 (2008) (discussing the Court’s loss of 
faith in the Southern judiciary in the context of the criminal justice rights revolution). 
18 In addition to Kamisar’s scholarship, other works promoting the anti-discrimination view 
include: DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 7–9, 43–47 (1999) (discussing anti-egalitarian tenor of much policing); Frank Rudy Cooper, 
Cultural Context Matters: Terry’s “Seesaw Effect,” 56 OKLA. L. REV. 833, 840 (2003); Tracey Maclin, 
Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
1271, 1276 (1998). 
19 See Samuel C. Rickless, The Coherence of Orthodox Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 15 
GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 261, 264–65 (2005) (“Since the loss of dignity or security consequent upon a 
search or seizure conducted by a government agent is a direct function of loss of privacy, the Court, 
when applying the Fourth Amendment, has understandably focused its efforts on protecting privacy 
from unreasonable searches and protecting liberty and property from unreasonable seizures.”). 
20 See, e.g., David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to 
the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1072 (1999) (“These rules allow the police 
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attention away from the vital and difficult task of generating a positive 
doctrinal and political account of policing: its justification, intrinsic limits, 
and proper means of regulation. 
The liberal emphasis on the protection of fundamental rights has 
obscured the Warren Court’s civic republican focus on regulation through 
the diffusion of power.21  Republicanism, in addition, promotes security 
over privacy, the rule of law over freedom from law, non-arbitrariness over 
immunity, and competition between government agents over exclusion of 
government agents.  While the liberal emphasis on rights and the 
exclusionary remedy superficially mimics the republican interest in 
regulation, that impression hides deeper differences between the theories 
and hidden problems within liberalism. 
The Warren Court’s republican, regulatory agenda has passed mostly 
without comment, swallowed up within the myth of the rights revolution.22  
To gain a proper understanding of criminal procedure’s evolution during 
the 1960s, however, requires paying more attention to the Court’s 
regulatory revolution.  Understanding the Warren Court’s Fourth 
Amendment regulatory agenda as a form of republicanism produces three 
interrelated insights.   
First, emphasizing regulation allows us to see the Warren Court’s 
major Fourth Amendment cases from Mapp to Terry, particularly the 
privacy ones, in their true colors: not, as Kamisar claims, the ebb and flow 
of the rights revolution, but as extending the Court’s scrutiny of the police 
through inter-branch review of law-enforcement activity.23 
Second, a regulatory approach permits us to revisit and reclaim a 
variety of other late Warren Court and early Burger Court cases as central 
                                                                                                                          
to approach and investigate people for any reason or none at all; the officer’s discretion is wholly 
unregulated.  In other settings, the officer’s discretion is subject only to the most deferential oversight, 
as in ‘stop and frisk’ encounters, which may be predicated on ‘reasonable suspicion,’ a standard that 
itself defers substantially to the officer’s on-the-scene judgment and experience.”). 
21 The Court’s dual emphasis on promoting warrants as an inter-branch check on the police, and 
restricting arbitrary intrusions on privacy-as-security are typically republican.  See, e.g.,  Katz, 389 U.S. 
at 358–59 (requiring inter-branch scrutiny of proposed police action through warrant process); Beck v. 
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964) (same); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647 (1961) (discussing security 
from arbitrary police intrusions); cf. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A 
REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 56–57, 87–88 (1990) (arguing that liberal notions of 
liberty require freedom from restraints or interference with others, but that liberty requires checks on 
the power of criminal authorities); PETTIT, supra note 15, at 4–9; RICHARDSON, supra note 15, at 9 
(discussing administrative agencies and impacts on individual liberties; Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli 
on Virtù and the Maintenance of Liberty, in 2 VISIONS OF POLITICS 160, 160–85 (2002).  
22 And not without reason.  See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657, 660 (1961) (discussing the 
Court’s exclusionary remedy and the warrant requirement as part of the Fourth Amendment right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures).   
23 As I shall argue, infra Part III.C.3, Katz’s protection of “people, not places,” fits this republican 
interest in security rather than exclusion from particular locations by expressly rejecting the sort of 
liberal emphasis on privacy popularized by John Stewart Mill’s On Liberty or Justice Brandeis’s 
Olmstead dissent. 
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to the regulation revolution: Katz v. United States,24 Camara v. Municipal 
Court of San Francisco,25 and Terry and its twin, Sibron v. New York.26 
Perhaps most importantly, the regulatory approach places these decisions 
within a line of cases rejecting the criminalization of low-level dissent and 
nonconformity, vagrancy, and public disorder, culminating in Papachrisou 
v. City of Jacksonville.27  Drawing on some recent scholarship, I shall 
argue that these cases are the ones that truly represent the Court’s 
egalitarian and anti-discriminatory politics, but in a republican, regulatory 
manner.  The public-order and public-protest cases, I shall argue, are 
closely related to the sort of regulation promoted in Terry,28 a style that 
embraces racial and “lifestyle” diversity29—including the sexual 
connotations of the latter phrase30—in spaces that are essentially “public” 
and so outside the liberal realm of protection.31 
Third, an emphasis on regulation reveals the Court’s alternative theory 
of legitimate law enforcement activity as republican and most strongly 
justified when premised on joint action by separate branches of 
government—rather than simply the avoidance of discrimination by state 
law enforcement agencies.32  Republicanism thus provides a theory of 
government regulation independent of rights, and a positive account of the 
nature and limits of policing.   
While I focus on such republican elements as security, non-
arbitrariness, and the diffusion of power through inter-branch checks, I 
shall suggest that these need not provide the only alternative political or 
doctrinal theory of justified police authority to liberalism’s emphasis on 
negative liberty and immunity from police activity.  For example, populist 
theories of direct participation in government decision-making may have a 
strong political and doctrinal appeal.  Nonetheless, republicanism points in 
                                                                                                                          
24 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
25 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
26 392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
27 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
28 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 
44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 559–62 (1992) [hereinafter Stuntz, Bargains] (discussing the relationship 
between the Court’s regulation of vagrancy laws and stop and frisk statutes). 
29 See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 170; Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971); 
Risa L. Goluboff, Dispatch from the Supreme Court Archives: Vagrancy, Abortion, and What the Links 
Between Them Reveal About the History of Fundamental Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1369 (2010) 
(discussing the Court’s use of the language of lifestyle in its vagrancy opinions). 
30 See David Alan Sklansky, “One Train May Hide Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret 
Subtext of Criminal Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 896–97 (2008) [hereinafter Sklansky, One 
Train] (drawing links between Katz, Papachristou, and the policing of gay men in the 1960s). 
31 See Goluboff, supra note 29, at 1368–69 (describing vagrancy as occurring in public rather than 
in private). 
32 I shall argue in Part II that this republican theory of legitimacy has its roots in, among other 
cases, Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., making just this 
argument.  See 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (discussing three situations in 
which the executive branch can garner more or less support for the exercise of its powers). 
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a direction that other progressive Fourth Amendment theorists would do 
well to consider if they want to participate in a positive agenda engaged in 
the directing of police power. 
Part II briefly outlines the historical and doctrinal or philosophical 
arguments and the Warren Court’s regulatory regime of inter-branch 
constraint, dependent upon pre-clearance of police activity by a member of 
the judiciary.  Part III elaborates the ways in which the orthodox story of 
the Warren Court’s rights revolution is wrong about the rights at issue.  
The Fourth Amendment does not deal with equality; to the extent that 
privacy has become the core Fourth Amendment right, it was under siege 
during the Warren Court.  Part IV demonstrates that Terry extended, rather 
than contracted, the Court’s Fourth Amendment criminal justice 
jurisprudence by increasing regulation of the police.  Part V argues that the 
Warren Court, rather than retreating from its criminal justice jurisprudence 
in the face of civil unrest and congressional action, continued to expand 
regulation of the police.  Finally, Part VI suggests one way in which a 
political theory of police authority is needed to energize a broadly 
progressive approach to the Fourth Amendment. 
II.  OUTLINE OF THE ARGUMENTS: HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL 
In this first section I shall briefly set out two arguments, one historical 
and one derived from political theory, both of which provide reasons for 
rejecting the two-Warren-Courts thesis.  My central claim is that the thesis 
promotes a liberal reading of the Court’s jurisprudence that fundamentally 
mistakes central aspects of the Court’s operation, and so distorts the 
historical and doctrinal record.  In place of the liberal two-Warren-Courts 
thesis, I propose the existence of a unitary, republican Warren Court, one 
that extended throughout the 1960s and whose legacy was felt even into 
the 1970s.33 
My claim is that the two-Warren-Courts thesis (and a famous variant, 
Herbert Packer’s claim that criminal procedure jurisprudence oscillates 
between a “crime control” model promoting law-enforcement interests and 
a “due process” model protecting defendants’ rights)34 is not simply some 
                                                                                                                          
33 Intriguingly, Justice Stewart makes a similar-sounding argument in his concurrence in Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167–68 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring), arguing that the Court abandoned the 
jurisprudence of fundamental rights from 1963–1973. 
34 Packer famously views the criminal justice system as a struggle between two value systems: 
due process and crime control.  See, e.g., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
SANCTION 149–53 (1968) [hereinafter PACKER, LIMITS]; Herbert L. Packer, The Courts, the Police, 
and the Rest of Us, 57 J. CRIM L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 238, 239 (1966) [hereinafter Packer, 
Courts, Police]; Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1–23 
(1964) [hereinafter Packer, Two Models].  He characterizes these value systems as representing a 
“normative antinomy at the heart of the criminal law,” and “polar extremes” between which criminal 
doctrine veers through “almost infinite modulation and compromise.”  PACKER, LIMITS, supra, at 153; 
Packer, Courts, Police, supra, at 239. 
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neutral, descriptive, historical reconstruction of Warren Court doctrine.  
Rather, liberals like Kamisar and Packer sought to re-interpret the Warren 
Court as advancing a particular political project.  It is with that description 
and that project I wish to quibble. 
A.  Historical Argument: Kamisar’s Two-Warren-Courts Thesis 
Kamisar advances two, slightly different, two-Warren-Court theses to 
support his claim that there was an egalitarian rights revolution in criminal 
procedure.  The first, in The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That 
Wasn’t, presents the Warren Court as advancing a complex and conflicted 
set of decisions, particularly in the Fourth Amendment context.35  The 
second, in the Tulsa Law Journal, is somewhat shorter and less 
circumspect about the jurisprudence (omitting much of the Fourth 
Amendment discussion), and so expresses with greater certainty the two- 
Warren-Courts thesis.36  Since I believe, on either account, there were not 
two Warren Courts—and that any egalitarian revolution occurred outside 
the Fourth Amendment—my analysis applies to both.37  
                                                                                                                          
35 Kamisar, Warren Court, supra note 1, at  63–65, 67. 
36 Kamisar, Retrospective, supra note 1, at  4–5.  
37 In each article, Kamisar sums up the two-Warren-Courts thesis.  Here is the first: 
In its final years “the Warren Court,” I think it may be argued, was not the same 
Court that had produced Miranda or Mapp.  One might say there were two Warren 
Courts: (1) the one most of us think of when we talk about that Court, and (2) the 
one that so peremptorily sustained the informer’s privilege in 1967 and so gropingly 
upheld stop and frisk practices in 1968.  Before it disbanded, the second (and less 
publicized) Warren Court had begun a process many associate only with its 
successor—a process of reexamination, correction, consolidation, erosion, or retreat, 
depending upon your viewpoint. 
Kamisar, Warren Court, supra note 1, at 67.  And the second: 
[W]hen we speak of the Warren Court’s “revolution” in American criminal 
procedure we mean the Warren Court that lasted from 1961 (when the landmark 
case of Mapp v. Ohio was decided) to 1966 or 1967.  In its final years, the Warren 
Court was not the same Court that had handed down Mapp or Miranda v.  
Arizona. . . .  I think that, in the main, the revolution ended a couple of years before 
Earl Warren stepped down as Chief Justice. . . .  The Chief Justice’s majority 
opinion in Terry v. Ohio, an important 1968 “stop and frisk” case, is a dramatic 
demonstration of the Warren Court’s change in tone and attitude.  
Kamisar, Retrospective, supra note 1, at 2–5 (internal citations omitted).  Kamisar offers an explanation 
for the Court’s dramatic volte face.  Again, here it is as presented in each of the articles, the earlier first: 
The change does seem attributable to “the buffeting of rapid historical developments 
that incessantly place unprecedented strains upon the Court.”  The last years of the 
Warren Court’s “criminal procedure ‘revolution’” constituted a period of social 
upheaval, marked by urban riots, violence in the ghettoes, and disorders on the 
campuses . . . .  [P]residential candidate Richard Nixon’s strong criticism of the 
Court, the “obviously retaliatory” provisions of the Crime Control Act of 1968, and 
the ever-soaring crime statistics and ever-spreading fears of the breakdown of public 
order “combined to create an atmosphere that, to say the least, was unfavorable to 
the continued vitality of the Warren Court’s mission in criminal cases.” 
Kamisar, Warren Court, supra note 1, at 67 (internal citations omitted).  And the later: 
The last years of the Warren Court constituted a period of social upheaval 
marked by urban riots, disorders on college campuses, ever-soaring crime statistics, 
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The two-Warren-Courts argument is itself two arguments: (1) a rights 
revolution argument and (2) a rights-contraction argument.  The rights 
revolution argument proposes that the Warren Court introduced a series of 
fundamental rights directed towards establishing either equality or liberty 
or both in its criminal justice jurisprudence primarily in the 1960s.38  The 
rights-contraction argument asserts that, in response to populist reaction to 
the rights revolution, and in particular to Miranda v. Arizona,39 the Court 
changed sides from due process to crime control, subverting its prior 
emphasis on fundamental rights by becoming much more open to law-
enforcement interests in criminal justice.40  The two-Warren-Courts 
argument thus depends upon showing that (1) there was a rights revolution, 
and (2) the Court engaged in (a) a rights-contracting reaction caused by (b) 
a populist backlash to the rights revolution, and specifically Miranda.  The 
argument thus proposes a historically specific chain of causation: a rights 
revolution beginning in 1961 with Mapp v. Ohio,41 a populist backlash in 
response to the rights revolution, normally dated around 1968 (the era of 
increasing violence around America and the passage of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968), and then the Court’s own response 
to that backlash, expressed primarily in Terry v. Ohio.42  There are good 
reasons for rejecting both prongs of this argument and the two-Warren-
Courts theory that it supports.    
1.  The First Prong 
The first prong of the argument makes a strong assumption about the 
doctrinal character of the rights revolution, claiming that it was about 
fundamental rights, either equality rights or liberty rights.  I shall argue that 
this fundamental rights approach cannot account for the Warren Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  There was no Fourth Amendment 
fundamental rights revolution; there was a republican, regulatory 
revolution.   
As I shall argue in the next section, the right to privacy, surely the 
paradigmatic right of the Warren Court’s Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                                          
ever-spreading fears of the breakdown of public order, and assassinations and near-
assassinations of public figures.  Moreover, the strong criticism of the Court by 
many members of Congress and by presidential candidate Richard Nixon and the 
obviously retaliatory provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
of 1968 contributed further to an atmosphere that was unfavorable to the continued 
vitality of the Warren Court’s mission in criminal cases. 
Kamisar, Retrospective, supra note 1, at 3. 
38 Kamisar, Retrospective, supra note 1, at 6–8. 
39 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
40 Kamisar, Retrospective, supra note 1, at 5 (describing Terry as “cause for celebration in a 
goodly number of police stations”). 
41 367 U.S. 643 (1961).  The start of the rights revolution has also been placed in 1956, with the 
decision in Griffin v. Illinois, 350 U.S. 12 (1956).  See Kamisar, Retrospective, supra note 1, at 3 n.3. 
42 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
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jurisprudence, was not invented by the Warren Court.  Instead, there was a 
right to privacy that pre-dated the Warren Court by almost seventy years, 
and its central privacy cases by eighty.43  The pre-existing privacy right 
rested upon a liberal, Lockean version of privacy, one that emphasized 
immunity from government interference as grounded in property rights,44 
and one applied, though controversially so, in Olmstead v. United States.45  
This is the right to privacy championed by Justice Douglas in Griswold v. 
Connecticut,46 but in the Fourth Amendment context and often in dissent.47  
Expanding rights would require adopting or expanding this liberal, 
fundamental rights view of privacy.  Instead, the Court—as Kamisar 
briefly notes48—repeatedly contracted the right to privacy. 
If the Court did not expand privacy rights, then the first prong of the 
argument misfires.  Without a rights-expanding Court, there was no Fourth 
Amendment privacy revolution or a Fourth Amendment equality 
revolution; instead, as this Article argues, there was a Fourth Amendment 
regulatory revolution, epitomized by the Court’s emphasis on security 
rather than immunity.   
2.  The Second Prong 
The second argument is also flawed.  That argument depends upon the 
claim that Terry—a Fourth Amendment case—signals a move from a 
rights-expanding Court to a rights-contracting one.  Whatever the merits of 
egalitarianism and rights-expansion for the other amendments, Kamisar’s 
rights-contracting argument depends primarily upon Fourth Amendment 
                                                                                                                          
43 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (discussing the right to privacy in the 
context of the Fourth Amendment); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309 (1967) (same); Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886) (same).  
44 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 171 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 
Hackett Publishing Co. 1980) (1690).  
45 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347. 
46 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“Various guarantees create zones of privacy.”). 
47 Douglas dissents on privacy-as-immunity grounds in a number of cases.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 38–39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 286 (1967) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 313 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(defending “a zone of privacy that may not be invaded by the police through raids, by the legislators 
through laws, or by magistrates through the issuance of warrants”); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 
65 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing “protecti[on] [for] . . . zone of privacy of the individual 
as prescribed by the Fourth Amendment”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 778 (1966) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (defending “‘a zone of privacy’ which the Government may not force a person 
to surrender”).  He also dissented in Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 340–41, 46 (1967) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting), a wiretap case, without giving a reason, and in Hoffa v. United States, 385 
U.S. 293, 321–22 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting), another wiretap case, as improvidently granting 
certiorari.  In Berger v. New York, he concurred, but only to restate his dissenting opinion from 
Hayden, that there was an absolute privacy right against wiretapping, “no matter with what nicety and 
precision a warrant may be drawn.”  388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
48 Kamisar, Warren Court, supra note 1, at 63–64 (“Despite its public reputation as a bold, 
crusading court, more often than not [the Warren Court’s] criminal procedure decisions reflected a 
pattern of moderation and compromise.”); Kamisar, Retrospective, supra note 1, at 4 (“The Warren 
Court’s performance in the field of criminal procedure does not fall into neat categories.”). 
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cases as signaling the era of rights-contraction.   
But the two-Warren-Courts argument also cannot rely on Terry 
because that case is an expansionist, not a contractionist one.  Even if one 
understands the jurisprudence in rights-terms, the Warren Court’s Fourth 
Amendment regulatory jurisprudence remained consistently expansionist.  
Terry may take that expansion in a new direction—in part because the 
Court was expanding regulation into uncharted waters and in part because 
it is best understood as an adjunct to the Court’s cases dealing with public-
order offenses.  Nonetheless, it is a regulation-expanding case.49  
The claim that Terry signals the end of a rights-expanding Court is 
thus doubly mistaken because the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence was not about expanding privacy or equality rights.  Terry, 
its sister case Sibron, and Papachristou expanded regulation, and with it 
expanded the core Fourth Amendment interest under the Warren Court:  
security.  In Terry, as with the earlier regulation expanding cases, the Court 
again expanded regulation.  If the two-Warren-Courts argument is to bite, 
it cannot rely on Terry—or, I would claim, any Fourth Amendment case—
to signal a contraction.   
Furthermore, as we shall see, Kamisar has a problem dating the end of 
the rights revolution in a manner consistent with the rights-contraction 
thesis.  The Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence places rights-
contraction on the table almost from the outset, and certainly before Katz 
or the informer cases.  In the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it looks 
like the end occurred in 1963,50 1966,51 1967,52 or the official end date, 
1968.53  On each of these occasions, the Court issued important decisions 
limiting, if not eviscerating, a pre-existing right to privacy.  To the extent 
the rights revolution is about privacy, the causal aspect of the backlash 
argument fails.   
Put differently, using Terry, or any Fourth Amendment case, to date 
the end of the rights revolution is somewhat odd because, as both Kamisar 
and, among others, Carol Steiker acknowledge,54 the Court never properly 
                                                                                                                          
49 See infra Part IV (discussing Terry as a regulation-expanding case). 
50 See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439–40 (1963) (asserting that there is no Fourth 
Amendment violation where a government agent recorded a conversation without probable cause or 
warrant). 
51 See Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (concluding that there is no Fourth Amendment violation where an 
undercover agent wearing a wire recorded a conversation without probable cause or warrant); Lewis v. 
United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (same); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772 (allowing the government 
to take a blood sample from a suspect without a warrant under the emergency exception to the Fourth 
Amendment). 
52 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 312 (1967). 
53 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
54 See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two 
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2472 (1996) [hereinafter Steiker, Counter-
Revolution] (“It is a bit harder to identify in any neat and simple way the germ of the Warren Court’s 
Fourth Amendment norms.”). 
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undertook its own rights revolution in the Fourth Amendment context.  The 
Court was always somewhat internally divided between entrenching 
fundamental rights and trampling on them, always granting some 
concessions to the police.55   
The earlier Kamisar two-Warren-Courts thesis, embracing a 
doctrinally bipolar Warren Court, accepts and seeks to accommodate this 
conflict.  In so doing, the argument fits comfortably with another central 
liberal reading of the Court’s criminal justice jurisprudence advanced by 
Herbert Packer.  Packer was a central apologist of the Warren Court’s 
rights revolution, someone who was concerned to defend the Court’s 
fundamental rights jurisprudence in terms of a set of due process rights 
possessed by criminal defendants and available to block the efficiency 
arguments of law enforcement officials and supporters.56  Packer’s 
argument is essentially doctrinal and ahistorical, and so not subject to the 
sort of causal falsification that Kamisar’s historical argument invites.  
Nonetheless, it presents an important gloss on the two-Warren-Courts 
thesis. 
Packer bifurcates criminal procedure into two sets of values: one 
oriented towards “crime control” and the other toward “due process.”  
Each “polar extreme[]”57 or “normative antinomy”58 itself represents a set 
of values lying on what may loosely be termed the conservative and liberal 
ends of the political spectrum.  Crime control values “the efficient, 
expeditious, and reliable screening and disposition of persons suspected of 
crime as the central value[s] to be served by the criminal process.  The Due 
Process model sees that function as limited by and subordinate to the 
maintenance of the dignity and autonomy of the individual.”59  These 
competing values are broadly conservative and liberal in their outlook.60   
Packer intends the two-model organization of criminal justice as a 
heuristic device to orient our discussion of criminal procedure.61  His point 
is both descriptive and normative.  Descriptively, he claims the Warren 
Court’s regime of criminal procedure rights is fleshed out using the 
intermediate values captured by the crime control and due process 
                                                                                                                          
55 See, e.g., Kamisar, Warren Court, supra note 1, at 63 (“Despite its public reputation as a bold, 
crusading court, more often than not [the Warren Court’s] criminal procedure decisions reflected a 
pattern of moderation and compromise.”); id. at 67 (“[M]y view [is] that even Miranda, ‘the high-water 
mark of the due process revolution,’ reflects considerable moderation and compromise.” (quoting FRED 
P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 157 (1970))). 
56 Packer, Two Models, supra note 34 at 13–22 (discussing the due process model). 
57 Packer, Courts, Police, supra note 34, at 239. 
58 PACKER, LIMITS, supra note 34, at 153. 
59 Packer, Courts, Police, supra note 34, at 239.  For a more detailed treatment of the underlying 
values, see Packer, Two Models, supra note 34, at 6–23. 
60 See Packer, Two Models, supra note 34, at 6–23 (providing an overview of the elements of the 
models). 
61 Id. at 6. 
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models.62  Normatively, he believes the two models ought to structure the 
manner in which jurists and practitioners derive values from the 
Constitution.63  Each model provides a specification of legislation and 
constitutional norms that attempts to legitimize the Court’s decision to 
intervene in the process of criminal investigation or to let well alone.   
Packer’s due process pole operates as a justification of the Warren 
Court’s innovations in criminal procedure.64  While the crime control 
model simply restates values that were commonly assumed to structure 
criminal procedure before the rights revolution in criminal justice, Packer 
introduces liberal notions of dignity and autonomy into the concepts of 
reasonableness and constraint.  These are, however, the values associated 
with the Warren Court, and in particular its decisions in Miranda65 and 
Gideon v. Wainwright.66  
But, neither version of liberalism—Packer’s ahistorical polarities or 
Kamisar’s historical rights revolution—can account for the parts of the 
Court’s criminal justice jurisprudence I wish most forcefully to focus 
upon—that is, its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Accordingly, if 
Kamisar is to have his rights revolution in criminal procedure, it must be 
without the Fourth Amendment or without privacy (or both), and if he is to 
have his two-Warren-Courts, he must come up with some other case than 
Terry to demonstrate rights-contraction.  There may be some cases outside 
the Fourth Amendment context that would suffice, but the onus is on him 
to demonstrate which cases these are. 
B.  Political Argument: Republican Regulation Versus Liberal Immunities 
The historical thrust of my argument has been to suggest that the 
                                                                                                                          
62 While the values are ideals, they are useful heuristic devices, Packer believes, because they do 
approach, even if they slightly distort, the real approach taken by judges, attorneys, and academics 
when discussing the Constitution.  See id. (describing the due process and crime control models). 
63 Id.  
64 While in The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us Packer suggests that the Supreme Court’s 
filling the legal “vacuum” with rules that are somewhat “awkward and inept” is a “move[] of 
desperation,” nonetheless, his advice to the police “is simply this: calm down” and engage in 
“[c]onstructive participation” in the debate over the nature and scope of criminal justice norms and 
values.  Packer, Courts, Police, supra note 34, at 240–41.  Furthermore, he defends both the claim that 
a legal vacuum exists, and the necessity for some increased regulation of the police by the courts, based 
upon the problems of racial class inequality that so concerned the Warren Court.  Id. at 240; see also 
Tracey L. Meares, Everything Old Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and the Legitimacy of 
Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 105, 106–07 (2005) (arguing that Warren Court criminal 
justice jurisprudence is best understood as motivated by racial issues even when the Court did not 
expressly base decisions on racial grounds).  Packer additionally points out that the experience of 
African Americans in the South is that “law enforcement unchecked by law is tyrannous,” and that the 
“problem of urban poverty” in the North and West had seriously compromised public confidence in the 
police.  Packer, Courts, Police, supra note 34, at 240. 
65 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966) (finding that interrogation practices used by 
police are “destructive of human dignity”). 
66 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963) (concluding that the right to assistance of counsel ensures that  
“every defendant stands equal before the law”). 
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Warren Court’s decisions cannot be understood as advancing a liberal 
rights revolution.  The political theory aspect of the argument suggests that 
the Court instead adopted a republican regulatory revolution and teases out 
the implications of the republican and liberal positions for the Warren 
Court and its critics.  The Court’s liberal critics missed the implications of 
its republicanism and appropriated the Court’s jurisprudence for their own, 
liberal ends.   
Liberalism asks what immunities citizens have,67 and seeks to protect 
them as fundamental rights indemnified from government interference.68  
The fundamental rights approach thus rejects, as interfering with 
individuals’ rights, crime control arguments that trench upon individuals’ 
privacy rights.  Instead, liberalism adopts a blanket prohibition on 
government interference with fundamental rights, encapsulated in the 
concept of negative liberty.69   
Republicanism, on the other hand, asks what duties individuals are 
under as citizens of a commonwealth, and seeks to regulate the state’s 
authority to enforce those duties.70  To the extent republicanism embraces a 
norm of non-interference, it is a limited one that precludes arbitrary 
government invasions of personal security.  The police can interfere, but 
cannot do so without good reason, and usually only with the authorization 
of some other branch of government.  Republicans enforce non-
arbitrariness by regulating government conduct through public, prospective 
norms (the rule of law, not the whims of men),71 the diffusion of power 
across the different branches of government, and promoting competition 
among government agents.  
While liberalism emphasizes some of the same concerns as 
republicanism, it does so with a much different emphasis.  Of particular 
importance here is the different understandings of the importance of 
personal security from government interference.  For liberals, who by 
definition emphasize personal freedom, and so the separation of society 
into public and private spheres, the right to security is primarily what 
Hobbes called an “immunity”: the absence of impediments upon or 
constraints upon action.72  What is secured is government non-interference 
in the private realm.  For republicans, on the other hand, security provides, 
                                                                                                                          
67 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 149 (Richard Tuck, ed., 2000) (1651) (explaining that 
freedom consists of an “immunitie” from government interference).  
68 RICHARDSON, supra note 15, at 23–24 (describing the liberal’s concerns with government 
action that “undercut[s] or violate[s] fundamental rights”). 
69 PETTIT, supra note 15, at 17–19. 
70 See RICHARDSON, supra note 15, at 25–27, 34–36 (discussing the republican concern about 
government creation of new duties, especially when such creation is arbitrary). 
71 See PETTIT, supra note 15, at 172–76 (discussing the centrality of the rule of law to republican 
thinking); Skinner, supra note 21, at 173–76 (discussing Machicavelli’s claim that people achieve 
freedom only if chained by law).  
72 HOBBES, supra note 67, at 149 (describing the immunity theory of liberty).  
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not an absolute prohibition of the government from the private realm, but 
instead non-arbitrary interference, understood in modern terms by Philip 
Pettit as “non-domination.”73  The language of security and arbitrariness, 
along with its cognates such as whim or irrationality, permeate the Warren 
Court’s decisions not only at the supposed end of the supposed rights 
revolution, but also continuing into the Burger Court.74  
Understanding the political theory behind the Warren Court’s 
emphasis on the warrant regime—and on Terry’s attempt to regulate 
practices falling outside the warrant—can reinvigorate progressive theories 
of policing.  The republican Warren Court’s preferred method for political 
regulation of the police was inter-branch limitation on executive and 
legislative activity.  The Court’s warrant jurisprudence repeatedly 
emphasized the benefits of external review of executive investigative 
activity and, thus, diffusion of power among the branches of government.75 
The republican adoption of inter-branch limitations on, primarily, 
executive power is a constant theme of the Warren Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, and in particular the opinions authored by 
                                                                                                                          
73 PETTIT, supra note 15, at 21–27, 92–97.   
74 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) (“Where, as here, there are no 
standards governing the exercise of the discretion granted by the ordinance, the scheme permits and 
encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law.  It furnishes a convenient tool for 
‘harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed 
to merit their displeasure.’  It results in a regime in which the poor and the unpopular are permitted to 
‘stand on a public sidewalk . . . only at the whim of any police officer.’” (quoting Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97–98 (1940); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965))); Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968) (“[The] inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the 
citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret 
affairs.”); id. at 15 (“[C]ourts still retain their traditional responsibility to guard against police conduct 
which is over-bearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security without the objective 
evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires.”);  id. at 37 n.3 (“To allow less [than search 
on probable cause] would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers’ whim or 
caprice.”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358–59 (1967) (“[B]ypassing a neutral 
predetermination of the scope of a search leaves individuals secure from Fourth Amendment violations 
‘only in the discretion of the police.’” (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)); Stanford v. 
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 512 (1965) (“The constitutional impossibility of leaving the protection of those 
freedoms to the whim of the officers charged with executing the warrant is dramatically underscored by 
what the officers saw fit to seize under the warrant in this case.”); Beck, 379 U.S. at 91 (“To allow less 
would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers’ whim or caprice.” (quoting 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949))); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (“[T]he 
right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers . . . can no longer . . . be revocable 
at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its 
enjoyment.”). 
75 See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 758 (1969) (justifying the warrant process in 
terms of “the desirability of having magistrates rather than police officers determine when searches and 
seizures are permissible and what limitations should be placed upon such activities”); Katz, 389 U.S. at 
358–59 (“Omission of such authorization ‘bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective 
predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-
the-event justification for the . . . search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings 
of hindsight judgment.’  And bypassing a neutral predetermination of the scope of a search leaves 
individuals secure from Fourth Amendment violations ‘only in the discretion of the police.’” (quoting 
Beck, 379 U.S. at 96, 97)); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 482 (1963). 
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Justice Stewart.76  On the one hand, the Court recognizes that warrants 
make policing more costly; on the other, the Court seeks to impose this 
cost as a means of making the police more professional and more 
accountable to the public through its officials in other branches of 
government.77   
My political-theory claim is that the Warren Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence advanced the theory of political republicanism 
historically exemplified by Machiavelli,78 Montesquieu,79 Madison,80 and 
Jefferson, but most recently contained in the works of Philip Pettit,81 Cass 
Sunstein,82 and Frank Michelman.83  While there are many different styles 
of political republicanism, these writers, to a greater or lesser extent, 
emphasize a divided government of checks and balances, inter-branch 
limitation, and factional competition—a radically different vision from 
liberalism.  The Warren Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence adopted 
a republican approach to political theory, centered around the warrant 
clause as the central tool for regulating government agents and diffusing 
power among the different branches.   
The Court’s liberal critics are also concerned—at least in the context of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—with the impact of the warrant clause, 
primarily through the exclusionary remedy that follows from its 
violation.84  Liberals concerned with carving out a private space of 
immunity from government interference would naturally gravitate to a 
legal rule emphasizing exclusion, even if only the exclusion of evidence 
from use at trial.  I shall suggest, however, that while the Court and its 
liberal critics attend to the exclusionary remedy, the liberal link between 
right and remedy is much more attenuated than the republican one.85  
Republican and liberal critiques and rationalizations of government 
                                                                                                                          
76 See, e.g., Chimel, 395 U.S. at 759 (“To provide the necessary security against unreasonable 
intrusions upon the private lives of individuals, the framers of the Fourth Amendment required 
adherence to judicial processes wherever possible.  And subsequent history has confirmed the wisdom 
of that requirement.”); Katz, 389 U.S. at 358–59 (“[B]ypassing a neutral predetermination of the scope 
of a search leaves individuals secure from Fourth Amendment violations only in the discretion of the 
police.”); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966) (“What the Fourth Amendment protects is 
the security a man relies upon . . . from unwarranted governmental intrusion.”); Stanford, 379 U.S. at 
512. 
77
 See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 358–59. 
78 See generally NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES (Bernard Crick ed., 1998) (c. 1515). 
79 See generally CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 
(1989) (1748). 
80 See generally THE FEDERALIST (James Madison).  
81 See generally PETTIT, supra note 15.  
82 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). 
83 See generally Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1998). 
84 See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, In Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 119, 126–27 (2003). 
85 See infra Part III.C.5.  
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power are bound to overlap at various points.86  Nonetheless, those 
critiques and rationalizations diverge in important ways, both as a matter of 
legal doctrine and political theory.  One of my central goals is to ask 
whether the Court’s doctrine fit within the current understandings and 
traditions of political liberalism, or whether—consciously or 
unconsciously—the Court drew upon republican rationales. 
C.  Republican Precedents 
Two fruitful doctrinal precedents for the Court’s republicanism appear 
in opinions that exerted a major sway over the Warren Court’s criminal 
justice jurisprudence: Justice Jackson’s opinion in Johnson v. United 
States87 and Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. United States.88  
Justice Jackson might be called a hero of the Warren Court’s criminal 
justice jurisprudence.  His language was cited repeatedly by the Warren 
Court,89 and progressively less by subsequent courts.  In Johnson, and in 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer,90 Justice Jackson advances the 
quintessentially republican tropes of diffusion of power and the 
productivity of competition as ways of limiting executive power.91  In each 
case, Justice Jackson identified the political and constitutional problems 
presented by an unregulated, sovereign executive engaged in an attempt to 
arrogate power to itself and exclude others from the field.92  Sovereign 
power need not automatically worry liberals, so long as the sovereign 
continues to protect fundamental rights.  The Hobbesian tradition of 
liberalism depends on just this view.  But Justice Jackson is not only 
worried about the result—immunity or non-immunity—but the means, a 
circumstance reflected in some of the major Warren Court Fourth 
Amendment cases, including Mapp, Katz, and Terry.    
Justice Jackson’s chosen means was the warrant clause.  In Johnson, 
he lauded its utility as a regulatory device in strikingly republican terms: 
promoting non-arbitrariness in the exercise of police discretion through the 
diffusion of power among the different branches of governments, while 
                                                                                                                          
86 Sunstein, supra note 82, at 1566–71 (discussing “liberal republicanism” as a merging of the two 
traditions). 
87 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
88 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
89 E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966); 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 497–98 (1963) 
(Douglas, J., concurring).   
90 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
91 See id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“While the Constitution diffuses power the better to 
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable 
government.  It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.  
Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with 
those of Congress.”). 
92 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587–88; Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14, 17 n.8. 
 
2010] WARREN COURT’S REGULATORY REVOLUTION IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 19 
recognizing that the self-interested, competitive nature of government 
agents might impinge upon the security of the public.93 
Justice Brandeis’s most famous criminal law opinion, his dissent in 
Olmstead, is rarely acknowledged as republican.  Instead—and rightly 
so—it is celebrated as one of the great liberal paeans to privacy as 
immunity from government interference.94  Brandeis, one of the architects 
of the legal concept of privacy, argued that, though nowhere appearing in 
the texts of the Constitution, nonetheless, the founders sought to protect 
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their 
sensations.  They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let 
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men.  To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the 
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means 
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.95 
What is less well understood is that the opinion had two elements, one 
seeking to constitutionalize the right of privacy, and one chiding the 
government for acting contrary to the laws of the state of Washington—
laws that prohibited the sort of wiretapping engaged in by the federal 
                                                                                                                          
93 It is worth quoting the language in full: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous 
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences 
which reasonable men draw from evidence.  Its protection consists in requiring that 
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being 
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime.  Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s 
disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in 
making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and 
leave the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.  Crime, 
even in the privacy of one’s own quarters, is, of course, of grave concern to society, 
and the law allows such crime to be reached on proper showing.  The right of 
officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the 
individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and 
freedom from surveillance.  When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the 
right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or 
government enforcement agent.  
Johnson, 333 U.S. at 10, 13–14 (footnotes omitted). 
94 Christopher A. Bracey, Louis Brandeis and the Race Question, 52 ALA. L. REV. 859, 908 
(2001) (“Brandeis rejected the Court’s formalistic approaches in Whitney and Olmstead, and offered an 
alternative conceptualization of the issues presented in those cases in accordance with a liberal 
interpretation both of the Constitution and its normative underpinnings.”); Robert Post, Federalism, 
Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court 
Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 10 (2006) (“In his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 
Brandeis sketched constitutional protections for privacy that would foreshadow the subsequent 
emergence of a liberal communitarianism dedicated to using essential social norms to check the 
potential abuses of government administration.” (footnote omitted));  Paul M. Secunda, The 
(Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence: The Constitutionalization of Public Employee Rights to 
Decisional Non-Interference in Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 109 (2006) “([T]his very 
idea of the unencumbered individual sprang directly from more generic forms of classical liberalism. In 
turn, classical liberalism finds its root in John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty and its most vivid expression in 
Justice Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead v. United States . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).  
95 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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agents in Olmstead.96  In fact, Brandeis initially envisaged the opinion as 
beginning with or making only the lawlessness argument; it was his law 
clerk, Henry J. Friendly, who helped make the privacy argument the 
constitutional centerpiece of the decision.97  
The lawlessness argument is deeply republican, and strikes a note 
picked up by Justice Jackson’s similar worry about well-meaning law-
enforcement.  Justice Brandeis wrote that:  
[I]t is . . . immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law 
enforcement.  Experience should teach us to be most on our 
guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are 
beneficent.  Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel 
invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers.  The greatest 
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of 
zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.98 
While the liberty language has strong, liberal overtones, it is not 
incompatible with republicanism.  Certainly, the worry over zealous-but-
well-meaning state officials is a staple of republicanism; so also is the 
claim that “security” is a value best protected by “a government of  
laws . . . .  If the government becomes a lawbreaker . . . it invites every 
man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.”99  The tropes of 
security and the rule of law as a protection from anarchy or arbitrariness 
are all republican.100  As I shall later argue, these are the aspects of the 
Olmstead dissent that were taken up by the Warren Court majorities in 
Mapp and Katz. 
III.  LIBERAL MISDESCRIPTIONS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE 
Modern liberalism comes in two major forms: an egalitarian 
liberalism, in which equality is the “sovereign virtue,”101 and a libertarian-
liberalism, in which freedom from government interference is the primary 
value.102  While theorists such as Yale Kamisar and Kenneth Pye identify 
equality as a Fourth Amendment value,103 a more natural candidate, given 
the text and predominant interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, is some 
                                                                                                                          
96 See, e.g., LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS 311–12 (1983); MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: 
A LIFE 629–30 (2009). 
97 See PAPER, supra note 96, at 311–12; UROFSKY, supra note 96, at 629–30.  I am indebted to my 
colleague, Joel Goldstein, for bringing this to my attention. 
98 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
99 Id. at 485. 
100 See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.  
101 See generally  RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE (2002).  
102 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 42–45 & 45 n.23 (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, 
THEORY OF JUSTICE] (stating that liberty is “lexically prior” to equality and other values). 
103 See Kamisar, Retrospective, supra note 1, at 6; Pye, supra note 4, at 256 (examining criminal 
procedure and the Fourth Amendment in the context of civil rights).   
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version of liberty understood as freedom from government interference.  
Non-interference, however, may be protected in various ways.  Privacy 
(negative liberty) is one way, security (non-domination) another.104  
Throughout the Warren Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
privacy—even in its libertarian form—is consistently ignored or sacrificed 
in favor of personal security.   
In what follows, I shall argue that characterizing the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence as an anti-poverty or anti-discrimination 
manifesto for equality fails to understand the nature of the Fourth 
Amendment and its protection from government interference.  I shall then 
argue that, while that protection is most naturally characterized as a liberty 
right, the Warren Court specifically rejected characterizing it as a privacy 
right to be free from government interference.  Moreover, the Court 
consistently attacked other, property-based and geographical 
understandings of privacy.  What emerges, I believe, is a jurisprudence 
concerned with protecting personal security and limiting police discretion. 
A.  Equality: The Wrong Right 
The rights-revolution analysis suggests that the Warren Court’s 
criminal procedure was strongly egalitarian, expanding the scope of rights 
available to the defendant until chastened by a strong public reaction to its 
emphasis on the rights of criminal defendants, resulting in the passage of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.105  What truth 
there is in this story lies outside the Fourth Amendment, and primarily in 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendment cases captured in what Kamisar identifies 
as the emblematic Warren Court “equal justice” cases106: Gideon v. 
Wainwright,107 Miranda v. Arizona,108 and Escobedo v. Illinois.109 
Kamisar’s exemplary equality cases are thus not Fourth Amendment 
cases, but are primarily Sixth Amendment cases discussing access to 
counsel.110  Alongside these cases stands a similar line of cases ensuring 
financial constraints do not preclude access to the critical stages of the 
                                                                                                                          
104 PETTIT, supra note 15, at 24, 173–83.  
105 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, & 42 U.S.C.). 
106 Kamisar, Retrospective, supra note 1, at 7. 
107 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
108 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
109 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
110 Though Miranda is also a Fifth Amendment case, it includes a reference to the Sixth 
Amendment within its warnings.  384 U.S. at 472.  Requiring the presence or absence of counsel during 
an interrogation was a central part of the Miranda discussion, which eventually came down on the side 
of advertising the right to counsel rather than requiring her presence.  See Charles J. Ogletree, Are 
Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826, 
1842–45 (1987). 
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adversarial process.111  A core justification of each right is economic 
equality—that is, the poor should have the same chance at representation 
as the rich.  Both strands fit within the claim that the Warren Court 
expressed its liberal egalitarianism through a criminal procedure aimed at 
ameliorating the obstacles to justice faced by the poor, and in particular, 
poor minorities.112  
Equality operates in both these circumstances as what Wesley Hohfeld 
might have called a claim-right.113  Hohfeld’s famous account of legal 
rights is primarily concerned with distinguishing legal rights from liberties 
which Hohfeld calls “privileges.”114  He famously distinguishes between 
different colloquial uses of “rights” and their opposites, and claims that all 
legal relations may be characterized in terms of them.115  The liberal 
egalitarian equal treatment argument identifies what might be called a 
“positive claim-right to specific goods and services”116: either the Sixth 
Amendment right to be represented by counsel or the Fourteenth 
Amendment right to receive a trial transcript or its equivalent on appeal.  
The positive claim-right imposes a correlative duty upon the government to 
provide counsel or a transcript to the indigent.  In other words, the 
argument from equality demands that indigents access the same services 
available to the well-off.   
The Fourth Amendment right is not a positive claim-right, but a 
negative one117: the right to be free from government interference.  
                                                                                                                          
111 See, e.g., Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 370 (1969) (finding that “so long as transcripts 
are available for preparation of appellate hearings in habeas corpus cases, they may not be furnished 
those who can afford them and denied those who are paupers”); Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 
288 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (mandating the provision of transcripts to indigents for appeal as 
of right); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 496 (1963) (“[T]he duty of the State is to provide the 
indigent as adequate and effective an appellate review as that given appellants with funds—the State 
must provide the indigent defendant with means of presenting his contentions to the appellate court 
which are as good as those available to a nonindigent defendant with similar contentions.”); Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (requiring indigents be provided with counsel on appeal “[f]or 
there can be no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys ‘depends on the amount of 
money he has’” (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956))); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 
(requiring provision of a lawyer to indigent defendants under the Sixth Amendment, reasoning that “in 
our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, 
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him”); Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18–19 (holding 
that the state may not deny appellate review to indigents while permitting review for those who can 
afford it). 
112 See POWE, supra note 6, at 445–46; Kamisar, Retrospective, supra note 1, at 6–7. 
113 WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS xiii (David Campbell & 
Philip Thomas eds., 2001).  
114 Id. at xiii–xiv. 
115 Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to 
Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 986. (“‘Rights’ are claims, enforceable by state power, that others act 
in a certain manner in relation to the rightholder.  ‘Privileges’ are permissions to act in a certain manner 
without being liable for damages to others and without others being able to summon state power to 
prevent those acts.  ‘Powers’ are state-enforced abilities to change legal entitlements held by oneself or 
others, and ‘immunities’ are security from having one’s own entitlements changed by others.”). 
116 PETER JONES, RIGHTS 15 (1994).  
117 For further discussion of negative claim-rights, see id. at 15, 19–20. 
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Negative claim-rights are often treated, in a non-Hohfeldian sense,118 as 
liberties or immunities.119  In the Fourth Amendment context, the central 
liberal right is liberty from government interference: the right to privacy.120  
Liberty presents a fundamentally different, negative type of claim than that 
presented by equality. 
The difference is illustrated by a feature of the Sixth Amendment right-
to-counsel debate that is mostly absent from the Fourth Amendment 
discussion: whether to demand equality of opportunity or equality of 
outcome.121  The Court’s egalitarian jurisprudence never applied to the 
Fourth Amendment in this way.  In fact it could not because the sort of 
distributional equality of outcome or opportunity applicable to increased 
access to counsel or transcripts through the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments makes no sense under the Fourth Amendment.  Rather than 
increasing access to goods under conditions of relative scarcity, the Fourth 
Amendment, if it promotes equality, promotes political equality of respect 
among citizens.122   
B.  The Court and Race: Equality as Anti-Discrimination 
The orthodox account, emphasizing Warren Court jurisprudence as 
focused on equal justice, and linking equal justice to race, arose towards 
the end of the Warren Court,123 and has continued to influence much recent 
scholarship.124  Scholars have consistently argued that much of the 
                                                                                                                          
118 Hohfeldian liberties or “privileges” are simply permissions to do as one pleases.  Their 
correlate is “no right,” not a duty.  Hohfeldian liberties can, however, be protected by negative claim-
rights.  See HOHFELD, supra note 113, at 36, 38–39; JONES, supra note 116, at 15, 19–20.  
119 See, e.g., RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 102, at 171–79.  
120 The right to privacy, according to William Stuntz, “protects the [individual’s] interest in 
keeping information out of the government’s hands.”  William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the 
Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1017 (1995) [hereinafter Stuntz, Privacy’s 
Problem].  He also emphasizes the (republican) right to personal security.  Id. at 1020–21. 
121 The right to counsel, which can be justified on equal opportunity grounds, does not mandate a 
particular outcome, measured as a particular standard of representation.  See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, 
Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1169–70 
(2003); Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting Effective 
Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 
31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 77–78 (1993).  On the difference between equality of opportunity and 
equality of outcome, see, for example, DWORKIN, supra note 101, at 2, 181–88 (discussing equality of 
opportunity versus equality of outcome).  
122 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 122–23, 217–19 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter 
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM] (discussing the duty of civility as duty of mutual respect). 
123 See, e.g., Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the 
Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 518–19; Packer, Courts, Police, supra note 34, at 240; Pye, 
supra note 4, at 256. 
124 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 2001, 2001–14 (1998); Maclin, supra note 18, at 1271; Tracey L. Meares, Terry and the 
Relevance of Politics, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1343, 1343 (1998); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, 
Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 271 
[hereinafter Sklansky, Traffic Stops]; Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 820, 841–44 (1994) [hereinafter Steiker, Second Thoughts]. 
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Supreme Court’s “revolution in criminal procedure”125 was its explicit and 
implicit focus on race- and class-biases in the criminal law126:  
It is almost commonplace by now that much of the 
Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence during the middle 
part of this century was a form of race jurisprudence, 
prompted largely by the treatment of black suspects and 
black defendants in the South.  The Court’s concern with race 
relations served as the unspoken subtext of many of its 
significant criminal procedure decisions . . . .127 
Legal liberalism’s target is precisely this sort of discriminatory 
policing.  Liberals sought to promote “the values of individual autonomy 
and equality among persons,”128 and to establish “a fair and dignified legal 
process,”129 one that “treat[s] all criminal suspects with dignity and 
respect.”130  
                                                                                                                          
125 Kamisar, Retrospective, supra note 1, at 4 (dating the revolution as lasting from 1961 to 1967 
at the latest).  
126 COLE, supra note 18, at 7–9, 43–47 (discussing the anti-egalitarian tenor of much policing). 
127 Sklansky, Traffic Stops, supra note 124, at 316 (citing Robert M. Cover, The Origins of 
Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1305–06 (1982)); see also Allen, 
supra note 123, at 523 (stating that although charges of inequality have not been confined to the 
criminal law, but have encompassed nearly every aspect of society, such charges “possess an even 
sharper bite when they are hurled at a system that employs as its sanctions the deprivation of property, 
of liberty, and, on occasion, of life itself”); Packer, Courts, Police, supra note 34, at 240 (“What we 
have seen in the South is the perversion of the criminal process into an instrument of official 
oppression.  The discretion which, we are reminded so often, is essential to the healthy operation of law 
enforcement agencies has been repeatedly abused in the South: by police, by prosecutors, by judges and 
juries. . . . We have had many reminders from abroad that law enforcement may be used for evil as well 
as for beneficent purposes; but the experience in the South during the last decade has driven home the 
lesson that law enforcement unchecked by law is tyrannous.”); Pye, supra note 4, at 256; Sklansky, 
One Train, supra note 30, at 877–78, 898, 922–23; Steiker, Counter-Revolution, supra note 54, at 
2472; Steiker, Second Thoughts, supra note 124, at 841–44.  
128 Dripps, supra note 8, at 592. 
129 H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the 
Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1987).  Professor Arenella 
asserts that “[a] public trial, if fairly conducted, sends its own message about dignity, fairness, and 
justice that contributes to the moral force of the criminal sanction.”  Arenella, supra note 8, at 219.  
Arenella cites Justice Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent to support the point:  
If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites 
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.  To declare that in the 
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means—to declare that the 
Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of the private 
criminal—would bring terrible retribution.    
Id. at 203 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
130 Arenella, supra note 8, at 190; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (“[T]he 
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege [against self-incrimination] is the respect a 
government—state or federal—must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.”).  As I have 
mentioned in an earlier article,  
Professor William Stuntz seems to suggest that “dignit[y]” may not be a significant 
interest in criminal procedure, especially when compared with defendant’s privacy 
rights.  Instead, he suggests, courts generally do not focus on “the indignity of being 
publicly singled out as a criminal suspect” or the “stigma” of being publicly targeted 
by the police.  Rather, the courts focus on privacy and information-gathering, to the 
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What is less consistent—indeed almost absent—from the Court’s 
Fourth Amendment discussions, is any mention of an anti-discrimination 
principle derived from the right to equal treatment in terms of dignity or 
political equality.  Equality speaks, in Kamisar’s terms, primarily to race 
and class distinctions, and could—and David Sklansky has persuasively 
argued, does and should in the Fourth Amendment context—include 
distinctions based on sexual orientation.131     
Indeed, that is the force of his endorsement of A. Kenneth Pye’s 
characterization of the Warren Court.  Pye insists that “[t]he Court’s 
concern with criminal procedure can be understood only in the context of 
the struggle for civil rights. . . .  Concern with civil rights almost inevitably 
required attention to the rights of defendants in civil rights cases.”132  Yet, 
with the exception of Terry, discussion of the rights of minorities as 
defendants is absent from the Fourth Amendment cases.  Indeed, the issues 
that preoccupied the Court in the Fourth Amendment context—informants, 
under-cover agents, and wiretaps133—are more the sorts of issues that one 
would associate with infiltration of un-American organizations in the 
1950s than racial inequality in the 1960s.   
But, as before, the distinction between the Fourth Amendment and the 
Court’s other criminal procedure jurisprudence is profound.  In the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment context, cases like Miranda and Escobedo—liberal 
egalitarianism’s exemplary Warren Court cases—along with, for example, 
Duncan v. Louisiana,134 do feature minority and economically 
disadvantaged defendants.  Because the claim is for a right of access to 
services, such as lawyers and transcripts, available to other more 
advantaged defendants, individuals precluded from these services are 
perhaps likely to be those least likely to afford them.   
In case I should be misunderstood, my point is not to claim that liberal 
egalitarianism, or egalitarianism more generally, is irrelevant to critiques 
of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  My primary point is that 
liberalism does not describe the Warren Court’s motivation in Fourth 
                                                                                                                          
exclusion of other dignitary interests.   
Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial Interventionism, 
65 OHIO ST. L. J. 1479, 1569 n.463 (2004) (internal citations omitted) (citing Stuntz, Privacy’s 
Problem, supra note 120, at 1037 (suggesting that a consistent protection of dignity rights would 
undermine the present system of criminal procedure)).    
131 Sklansky, One Train, supra note 30, at 896–97. 
132 Pye, supra note 4, at 256. 
133 See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 414 (1969), overruled by Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213 (1983); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 
41, 45 (1967); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 302 (1967);  Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 
325 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 295 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 
207 (1966); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 (1964), overruled by Gates, 462 U.S. 213; Lopez v. 
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 428–29 (1963); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 473 (1963); 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961). 
134 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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Amendment cases.  I shall argue in Part IV that the republican regulation 
of public space, of which Terry is a prominent part, does feature 
egalitarian, albeit republican egalitarian interests in racial discrimination 
and the regulation of disapproved “lifestyles” more generally.135 
A secondary point, however, is that, to the extent that anti-
discrimination provides a critique of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
that critique is politically limited.  Liberal egalitarianism presents a 
powerful challenge to racially targeted practices like racial profiling or 
pretextual policing.  Furthermore, it correctly emphasizes that criminal 
procedure burdens the poor and minorities more than other members of our 
society.136  Nonetheless, anti-discrimination—and liberal egalitarianism 
more generally—is not an accurate diagnosis of a large chunk of the Fourth 
Amendment, and in particular, is under-inclusive of those people who are 
not minorities.  This is perhaps the greatest failure of liberal Fourth 
Amendment theory—it is the one identified by Weisberg as leading to the 
dead end of modern rights theorizing.137  Regulation offers a way out. 
Thus, while the model of egalitarianism is broadly correct when 
applied to the Court’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, it fails to 
bite in the Fourth Amendment context.  Kamisar and the other egalitarians 
argue for something more than the claim that we should treat people with 
dignity138 for the equal worth of persons,139 or some “duty of civility.”140  
Thus, the two-Warren-Courts theory, dependant upon Fourth Amendment 
cases for its rights-contraction thesis, must be talking about some other set 
of rights, or rights more generally, in discussing the Fourth Amendment. 
C.  Four Versions of Privacy: Property, Liberty, Protected Spaces, and 
Security 
If egalitarian liberalism fails to explain the Warren Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, then perhaps libertarian-liberalism, with its 
emphasis on freedom from government interference, can fare better.  
Libertarian-liberals emphasize privacy rather than equality, drawing 
                                                                                                                          
135 For a discussion of the Court’s regulation of “lifestyle,” see Goluboff, supra note 29, at 1369.  
Accordingly, while Sklansky may be correct to emphasize Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz as 
interested in the protection of gay rights, he might also wish to include Justice Stewart’s republican 
interest in security as protecting “people, not places,” Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, as similarly motivated. 
136 Accordingly, a critical-race-theory or anti-discrimination approach provide powerful critiques 
of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  I am simply skeptical that they provide a universal 
account of the Court’s jurisprudence.  There is more to criticize than the Court’s racial performance. 
137 Weisberg, supra note 16, at 532.   
138 See, e.g., RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 102, at 289 (discussing the savings 
principle).  
139 See TOM CAMPBELL, JUSTICE 37, 39, 52 (1998) (discussing rights and equality in the context 
of the equal worth of persons). 
140 See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 122, at 217–18 (stating that the duty to explain 
how one advocates political values is justifiable by public reasons). 
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broadly on Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. United States,141 in 
which he argued that the founders intended to 
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their 
emotions and their sensations.  They conferred, as against the 
Government, the right to be let alone—the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men.  To protect that right, every unjustifiable 
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the 
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.142 
Conventional wisdom insists that privacy interests structure the law of 
criminal investigation.143  There are, however, a variety of ways to describe 
privacy in the law of criminal procedure.  Nowadays, privacy reflects 
Brandeis’s definition, which in turn smacks of John Stuart Mill’s argument 
in On Liberty, for the negative liberty of freedom from government 
intrusion.144  Privacy, that is, essentially consists of an immunity145: the 
individual’s right to exclude government from accessing certain areas or 
interfering in certain activities.146  However, it was not always so. 
                                                                                                                          
141 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (1967). 
142 Id. at 478; see also Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 205 (1891). 
143 “Since Katz v. United States . . . the touchstone of [Fourth] Amendment analysis has been the 
question whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’”  Oliver 
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)); 
see also Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504 
(2007) (“The reasonable expectation of privacy test is the central mystery of Fourth Amendment law.  
According to the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment regulates government conduct that violates an 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”); Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: 
Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1756 (1994) 
(stating that the Court embraced “privacy as the Fourth Amendment’s core value”); Stuntz, Privacy’s 
Problem, supra note 120, at 1016 (“Almost all talk about the law of criminal procedure . . .  
assum[es] . . . [that] one [value or interest]—privacy—tops the list. . . . Fourth Amendment cases talk 
about whether evidence is . . . hidden from the world . . . and whether particular places tend to be the 
locus of activities that most people like to keep secret. . . .  Fifth Amendment cases talk about . . . the 
defendant’s interest in keeping the information to himself.  Privacy language and privacy arguments are 
rampant in criminal procedure.”).  
144 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 48 (1997) (1859) (discussing the prevention of harm as “the 
only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized community”); 
see also Jamal Greene, Beyond Lawrence: Metaprivacy and Punishment, 115 YALE L.J. 1862, 1886–87 
(2006) (“Like Mill’s, Brandeis’s individualism was civic-minded; he believed that the political 
dialogue necessary for a healthy democratic state presupposed a respect for individual liberty.”). 
145 HOBBES, supra note 67, at 149 (discussing the immunity theory of liberty). 
146 See Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem, supra note 120, at 1016.  Professor Stuntz indicates: 
In the law of criminal procedure, two kinds of privacy seem to matter.  The first is 
fairly definite: privacy interests as interests in keeping information and activities 
secret from the government.  The focus here is on what government officials can see 
and hear, what they can find out. . . .  The second kind of privacy . . . is about 
preventing invasions of dignitary interests, as when a police officer publicly accosts 
someone and treats him as a suspect.  Arrests or street stops infringe privacy in this 
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In what follows, I shall describe four different theories of privacy: 
privacy as property, privacy as protected spaces, privacy as liberty, and 
privacy as security.  All of these theories predate the Warren Court, and 
two of them—liberty and protected spaces—re-emerged at its conclusion.  
The only type of privacy, however, consistently protected by the Warren 
Court was privacy as security.   
1.  Privacy as Property: Boyd v. United States’ Categorical Protection 
of Privacy 
The first type of privacy—privacy as property—gains support from the 
text of the Fourth Amendment itself—protecting “persons, houses, papers, 
and effects”147—but is most famously expounded in two Fourth 
Amendment cases, Boyd v. United States148 and United States v. Gouled.149  
Although the introduction of privacy into Fourth Amendment law is often 
attributed to Katz, “Boyd v. United States, decided in 1886, first 
specifically wed the notion of privacy to the guarantee against 
unreasonable searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment.”150  While 
some aspects of Boyd’s vaulting rhetoric would be embraced by the 
Warren Court, its definition of privacy in terms of property rights would 
not withstand the Court’s withering scrutiny. 
In Boyd,151 the Court “held that the seizure of documents is inherently 
‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of the first clause of the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment . . . whenever the government’s sole claim to them is based 
on their possible utility as evidence in a criminal proceeding against the 
individual who both owns and possesses them.”152  The Boyd Court 
advances two arguments to justify this position.  The first is that a person 
cannot be convicted using his own private property against him.153  The 
Court claims that there is an “intimate relation” between the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments, such that they operate together to render the use of a 
person’s property against him in a criminal trial inherently unreasonable.154 
                                                                                                                          
sense because they stigmatize the individual, single him out, and deprive him of 
freedom.  
Id. at 1021. 
147 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
148 116 U.S. 616, 624–26 (1886). 
149 255 U.S. 298, 305 (1921). 
150 Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1359 (footnote 
omitted). 
151 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623. 
152 Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886–1976), 76 MICH. L. REV. 184, 185 
(1978) (footnote omitted). 
153 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633–34.   
154 Id. at 633 (“For the ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ condemned in the Fourth 
Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against 
himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man ‘in a 
criminal case to be a witness against himself,’ which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws 
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The second argument considers who has the superior interest in the 
property.  The Court acknowledges that the government has a property 
interest in certain goods: duties, taxes, and so on, as well as stolen goods, 
in which the possessor by definition has no property interest.  However, a 
person’s papers are “the owner’s goods[,] . . . his dearest property.”155  
Here, the person searched possesses the superior interest and governmental 
searches of mere evidence, in which it has no property right, are always 
unreasonable under Boyd.156  Accordingly, even if the state does not break 
down the door of a house,157 the act of forcing a person to hand over their 
property to the state—and then attempting to convict him in a criminal trial 
using that property—is inherently unreasonable.158  “Consequently . . . the 
scope of the privilege embodied in the unreasonable search clause came to 
be defined in terms of the law of property.  In that respect, the doctrine 
contained the seeds of its own destruction.”159 
The Boyd decision advanced, however, two other strands of privacy 
analysis that were conceptually distinct from the property argument.  These 
are the claim that privacy operates as a categorical exclusion of the 
government from certain places, and the argument from personal security, 
quoted with approval by Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States.160  Though 
property justification was to fail in both Justice Brandeis’s Olmstead 
dissent and the Warren Court’s cases, the separate security rational 
remained firm throughout those decisions, so much so that Justice Brandeis 
could characterize the security-protecting Boyd as “a case that will be 
remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the United States.”161 
Boyd thus provided a four-pronged, expansive protection of privacy.  
                                                                                                                          
light on the question as to what is an ‘unreasonable search and seizure’ within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.”). 
155 Id. at 627–28. 
156 Id. at 623.  “This was the essence of the mere evidence rule, which provided that the fourth 
amendment permitted searches and seizures only if the government had a superior claim of title to the 
objects seized.”  Note, supra note 152, at 185 n.9.  Gouled, following Boyd, formalized the distinction 
between superior interests and mere evidence.  United States v. Gouled, 255 U.S. 298, 308–09 (1921).  
Under Gouled, collecting certain types of data—another’s property—is always wrong when taken for 
use as mere evidence.  Id. at 309.  Instead, the state must have superior interest in the property in order 
to assert title to it.  If the state does not have a superior interest to the defendant, then the state engages 
in an unreasonable trespass. 
157 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. 
158 Id. at 623.    
159 Note, supra note 152, at 189. 
160 277 U.S. 438, 474–75 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is not the breaking of his doors, and 
the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his 
indefeasible right of personal security . . . .” (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630)). 
161 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474.  Morgan Cloud argues that Boyd’s formalism and Brandeis’s 
pragmatism shared the same underlying presupposition: that privacy operates as a categorical exclusion 
of the government from certain places.  Both decisions reflect the view that personality is inviable, but 
differ over the proper grounds for its protection.  Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the 
Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 560–61, 
624–25 (1996) (discussing Brandeis’s invocation of Boyd). 
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First, the Court’s “intimate relation”162 argument integrated Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment protections, so that the Fourth Amendment right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures linked to the Fifth 
Amendment protection against self-incrimination.  Second, and as a 
consequence of the intimate relationship argument, Boyd extended a 
categorical protection to those items identified as private.  Third, Boyd 
identified those items denominated private on the basis of the defendant’s 
property right in them.  Fourth, Boyd characterized the categorical 
protection of privacy-as-property as promoting an underlying value: the 
protection of individual security from intrusion by the government.163  
The Warren Court undermined the first three of those prongs: the 
intimate relation prong in Schmerber,164 and the categorical protection and 
privacy-as-property prongs in Hayden165 and in Katz.166  Accordingly, 
while a rights revolution argument might try to accommodate these cases 
by arguing that this privacy contraction occurs towards the end of Warren 
Court, in 1966–67, that argument would further shrink the lifespan of the 
revolutionary Warren Court by two years.  Put differently, if the rights-
constricting counter-revolution began with Schmerber, then the backlash to 
Miranda and the Court’s reaction to that backlash took place remarkably 
quickly: Schmerber was decided one week after Miranda.167 
Furthermore, the rights-revolution argument has to explain Mapp’s 
embarrassing indifference to the orthodox version of privacy.  Whereas the 
right to be secure from arbitrary government interference inaugurated the 
Warren Court’s modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in 1961—and 
continued until the end of the Warren Court—the protection of 
informational privacy became a live issue only after the end of the Warren 
Court. 
Of the three major Warren Court cases that repudiated Boyd—
Schmerber, Hayden, and Katz—Schmerber broke the intimate relation 
between Fourth and Fifth Amendments, requiring that the testimonial 
aspects of evidence be protected by the right against self-incrimination 
rather than the right against search and seizure.  The Schmerber Court 
adopted a procedural interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.  No longer 
was the government to be categorically excluded from some inviolable 
zone of privacy and no longer was privacy defined in substantive terms as 
a set of items or places to be protected. 168  Rather, the “overriding function 
                                                                                                                          
162 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633. 
163 Id. at 618, 630. 
164 Schmerber v. United States, 384 U.S. 757, 766–68 (1966). 
165 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967). 
166 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (citing Hayden, 387 U.S. at 304). 
167 Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (decided June 20, 1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
(decided June 13, 1966). 
168 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767–68.  
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of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against 
unwarranted intrusion by the State,”169 where the opinion meant what it 
said quite literally: those procedures are unjustified that fail to obtain a 
warrant unless “special facts” permit otherwise.  While the procedural 
notion of security adopted by Mapp survives, the rest of the Boyd privacy 
rights have been eviscerated and contracted, through a process continued 
by Warden v. Hayden.170 
In Hayden, officers in hot pursuit of an armed robber entered and 
searched a house, discovering among other things a shotgun and a pistol, as 
well as clothing matching the description of those worn by the robber.171  
While the guns and ammunition were, under the Boyd analysis, 
instrumentalities of the crime that the government could seize, Hayden 
argued that the clothing was “mere evidence,” and so subject to 
exclusion.172  The Court rejected Boyd’s property-based analysis, instead 
reformulating the relation between privacy and police searches to expand 
the range of items subject to governmental search and seizure.173  
In Hayden, the Court expressly embraced a “shift in emphasis from 
property to privacy.”174  No longer would privacy protect some inviolate 
set of things or places to which the police could never gain access.  Instead, 
the traditional use of “property interests” to delimit “the right of the 
Government to search and seize” was “discredited” and “discarded.”175  So 
long as the police obtained a valid warrant or acted under an exception to 
the warrant requirement, they could search and seize private property, even 
“mere evidence” of crimes.176  Accordingly, “the role of the Fourth 
Amendment was . . . to protect privacy from unreasonable invasions.”177   
Under the orthodox view of privacy, Hayden sought to modernize the 
right to privacy by re-conceiving it in terms divorced from property 
interests.178  Hayden expanded the zone of searchable things and places 
while nonetheless invoking the concept of privacy.  The Hayden Court, in 
delivering privacy from property—and a literal reading of the Fourth 
Amendment—rendered privacy in further and urgent need of definition 
and elaboration, yet stopped short of providing a precise articulation of the 
concept.  In Hayden, the property interest “obscure[d],” not privacy, but 
                                                                                                                          
169 Id. at 767. 
170 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967). 
171 Id. at 298. 
172 Id. at 301–02. 
173 Id. at 304. 
174 Id.  
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 309. 
177 Id. at 305.  
178 See, e.g., Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem, supra note 120, at 1030–34 (discussing the pre-Hayden 
regime that equated privacy with property). 
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“the reality that the government has an interest in solving crime.”179  This 
reality required, not a new right, but a new approach to police regulation, 
dependent upon the use of warrants to scrutinize and control searches and 
seizures.180  The concept of privacy was transformed precisely to permit 
this style of policing and the new regulatory regime that seeks to control it. 
Privacy was transformed, but not without a fight.  Justice Douglas 
dissented in Schmerber and Hayden, and did so in the former case citing 
Griswold in favor of a right to privacy phrased in terms of “‘a zone of 
privacy’ which the Government may not force a person to surrender”;181 
and in the latter case, citing Boyd and Gouled,182 and arguing that “the 
Fourth Amendment . . . creates a zone of privacy which no government 
official may enter.”183  Indeed, the losing privacy argument precisely 
challenged the triumphant republican warrant argument—that the debates 
over the Bill of Rights “nowhere suggest that [the Fourth Amendment] was 
concerned only with regulating the form of warrants.”184 
Accordingly, Schmerber, Hayden, and, as we shall see, Katz, each 
strike blows that aim at the privacy-as-property argument.  To the extent 
that Boyd is cited, it is mentioned by the majority primarily in the context 
of personal security.  While the security rationale draws on the inviability 
of property or personality argument, the Warren Court repeatedly stops 
short of it, preferring a less categorical approach to privacy, and in the 
process, undermining a relatively progressive, pre-existing privacy regime. 
2.  Privacy as Protected Spaces: Hester v. United States 
Another challenge to Boyd is the “protected spaces” argument 
attributed to United States v. Hester.185  The idea, affirmed in Oliver v. 
United States, is that certain places, though the property of the suspect, 
deserve less Fourth Amendment protection than others.186  Hester, thus, 
apparently places a limit on Boyd’s reach, which is now split into lessened 
and heightened property interests.  Nonetheless, Hester maintains a focus 
on privacy-as-property; it is just that some property interests receive 
                                                                                                                          
179 387 U.S. at 306.  It is perhaps worth noting that this property interest is Boyd’s version of 
privacy.  Accordingly, a focus on one sort of privacy obscured the government’s interest in solving 
crime. 
180 Id. at 309–10. 
181 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 778 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 484 (1964)). 
182 Hayden, 387 U.S. at 318–20 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
183 Id. at 315. 
184 Id. at 316. 
185 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 n.8 (1967) (rejecting 
the protected spaces argument noted in Hester).  
186 466 U.S. 170, 182–84 (1984). 
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heightened protection.  Katz rejects this approach,187 most expressly by the 
claim that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”188 
Perhaps the most prominent case following Hester’s logic, prior to 
Katz’s reversal, was Silverman v. United States,189 a wiretap case that 
sought to distinguish Olmstead on the grounds that the government did, in 
fact, invade a property right in the defendant’s home.190  In Silverman, the 
Court relied upon a Boyd-style liberal immunity argument: “The Fourth 
Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long history.  
At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and 
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”191 
Silverman was decided, however, some three months before Mapp, and 
managed to avoid “consider[ing] the large questions which have been 
argued,”192 and which would be raised again in the other wiretap cases, and 
most particularly in Katz.  Nonetheless, Silverman is cold comfort for 
rights-expansionists: to the extent that it expanded (or maintained) the 
property-based rights-regime available under Boyd, as somewhat limited 
by Hester, it did so on grounds that were to be minimized or rejected by 
Justice Stewart in Katz, and predates the era of Fourth Amendment 
expansionism inaugurated by Mapp. 
3.  Privacy as Liberty: Brandeis and Olmstead 
Perhaps the central liberal appropriation of Boyd was Justice 
Brandeis’s use of it in Olmstead to advance arguments he developed in the 
famous Harvard Law Review article he co-authored with Samuel Warren, 
equating the right to privacy with “the right to be let alone.”193  That article 
expressly distinguishes the right to privacy from some property right.194  
Instead, they locate the right to privacy in the principle of personal 
autonomy: “the principle . . . of an inviolate personality.”195   
                                                                                                                          
187 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 n.8 (“In support of their respective claims, the parties have compiled 
competing lists of ‘protected areas’ for our consideration.  It appears to be common ground that a 
private home is such an area but that an open field is not.” (internal citations omitted)).  
188 Id.; see also Oliver, 466 U.S. at 187 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“In Katz v. United States, we 
expressly rejected a proffered locational theory of the coverage of the Amendment, holding that it 
‘protects people, not places.’”). 
189 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (citing Hester).  Hester is cited in Katz, but its vitality is contested.  
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (positively referencing Hester); id. at 351 n.8 
(majority opinion) (negatively referencing Hester). 
190 Hester was cited in another wiretap case.  See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 766 
(1952) (Burton, J., dissenting) (citing Hester for its holding that “in a federal criminal trial, a federal 
officer may testify to what he sees or hears take place within a house or room which he has no warrant 
or permission to enter, provided he sees or hears it outside of those premises”).  Hester’s importance, 
then, is in identifying the permissible limits of eavesdropping: permissible where there is no physical 
intrusion; impermissible where there is some physical intrusion.  See id. at 765–66. 
191 Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511. 
192 Id. at 509. 
193 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 142, at 193. 
194 Id. at 200–05. 
195 Id. at 205. 
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Three aspects of this right link it to the fundamental rights, privacy-as-
property “formalism” of Boyd: its emphasis on (1) a categorical protection 
for (2) all items identified as private, (3) in the name of personal security.  
Two features separate Brandeis and Warren’s Fourth Amendment 
understanding from Boyd’s: first, the absence, in Olmstead, of some 
intimate relation between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, animating the 
categorical treatment of privacy and second, the non-appearance of 
property to denominate those items to be categorized private.  Instead, 
Brandeis and Warren ground privacy in the protection of personal 
autonomy—“a general right to privacy for thoughts, emotions, and 
sensations . . . [that] should receive the same protection, whether expressed 
in writing, or in conduct, in conversation, in attitudes”196—that receives 
protection as a negative right “against the world.”197 
It is important not to underestimate the stringency of Brandeis’s 
conception of privacy.  For example, Jed Rubenfeld has recently attacked 
the Brandeisian concept of privacy as a right not to be annoyed.  Rubenfeld 
correctly notes the distinction between security and secrecy in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, a distinction most forcefully articulated by 
William Stuntz.198  Rubenfeld, however, gives it an awkward twist:   
To privatize the Fourth Amendment is to understand its 
purposes increasingly in terms of values that, instead of 
speaking to the distinctive dangers of state surveillance and 
detention, speak rather to an individual’s comfort, dignity, 
tranquility, respectability, and fear of embarrassment.  These 
are of course important interests, and they happen—not 
coincidentally—to be precisely the same interests that chiefly 
motivated Brandeis and Warren’s seminal essay, which had 
nothing to do with the Fourth Amendment, but dealt instead 
with invasions of privacy by gossip columnists and other 
                                                                                                                          
196 Id. at 206. 
197 Id. at 213; see also Carol S. Steiker, Brandeis in Olmstead: “Our Government Is the Potent, 
the Omnipresent Teacher,” 79 MISS. L.J. 149, 157–58 (2009) [hereinafter Steiker, Brandeis].  In a 
passage Steiker describes as one of the “most famous of his dissent,” Brandeis developed his view of 
Fourth Amendment privacy:  
“The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the 
pursuit of happiness.  They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of 
his feelings and of his intellect.  They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and 
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.  They sought to protect 
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.  They 
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.  To protect that 
right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the 
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.” 
Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478–79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).  
198 See, e.g., Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem, supra note 120, at 1020–21, 1068–77 (discussing 
privacy-protecting and security-protecting interpretations of the Fourth Amendment). 
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private actors.199 
Lacking clarity, Rubenfeld’s reading of Brandeis is both right and 
wrong.  The Brandeisian notion of privacy, and certainly the one that made 
it into the Fourth Amendment, does not warrant the extension that Richard 
Posner gave it, and which Rubenfeld appears to endorse, to include 
“‘unwanted telephone solicitation’ or ‘the blare of a sound truck.’”200  
Identifying privacy as the sort of “‘solitude’ . . . ‘valued because it 
enhances the quality of one’s work or leisure,’”201 trivializes the right to be 
let alone into a much broader and much less defensible right not to be 
annoyed.202 
Brandeis and Warren had in mind a much more weighty right.  They 
sought to make a Millian point about the value of personal autonomy, 
understood primarily in a principle of personal authenticity, which they 
called “the principle . . . of an inviolate personality.”203  It is precisely this 
idea of personality that Rubenfeld and Posner, in cheapening the right, 
miss.  Brandeis and Warren’s goal was to identify within the pre-existing 
(and Boyd-style) civil property understanding of privacy a negative claim-
right “against the world.”204  Their “general right to privacy” seeks to 
protect “thoughts, emotions, and sensations . . . whether expressed in 
writing, or in conduct, in conversation, in attitudes,”205 language that is 
effectively repeated in his Olmstead dissent.206      
                                                                                                                          
199 Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 117 (2008). 
200 Id. (quoting Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 
1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 190). 
201 Id. at 117–18 (quoting Posner, supra note 200, at 190, 193). 
202 It renders inexplicable why Brandeis would cite Boyd in his Olmstead dissent.  See Olmstead, 
277 U.S. at 473–78 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (referencing Boyd multiple times); Cloud, supra note 161, 
at 560–61, 624–25 (discussing Brandeis’s invocation of Boyd). 
203 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 142, at 205.  
204 Id. at 213; see also JONES, supra note 116, at 15, 19–20 (explaining that negative claim rights 
are generally in rem rights against the world).  Brandeis and Warren’s civil discussion of privacy-over-
property thus fits with the orthodox Fourth Amendment rejection of Boyd’s pre-existing property 
notion of privacy.  As Professor Cloud persuasively argues, however, both Boyd’s and Brandeis’s 
“arguments were based upon the same constellation of values, values derived from natural law concepts 
inherited from the eighteenth century.  And Brandeis’s focus upon ‘beliefs, thoughts, and emotions’ 
comported with the formalist recognition that papers deserved added protection because they embody 
ideas.”  Cloud, supra note 161, at 625.  Brandeis’s argument in Olmstead, however, mirrors that in his 
Right to Privacy article, because, according to Cloud,  
Brandeis did not base his argument upon property rights.  As he had nearly forty 
years earlier, Brandeis argued for the protection of privacy.  Indeed, in 1890 he had 
argued that in some cases involving the publication of private letters, common law 
judges had erred by asserting that property law defined the sender’s rights when, in 
fact, it was privacy that was at stake.  In those opinions, he contended, property law 
served as an awkward and inadequate surrogate for privacy. 
Id.  
205 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 142, at 206. 
206 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Framers “sought to 
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations [and] conferred, as 
against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men”). 
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Accordingly, the Brandeis right to privacy-as-liberty, the one that 
subsequent Fourth Amendment scholars have endorsed, is the more robust 
liberty right that Rubenfeld, like Brandeis, derives from Mill.207  Rubenfeld 
calls it the right to  
personal life . . . that sphere of activity and relations where 
people are supposed to be free from the strictures of public 
norms, free to be their own men and women, free to say what 
they actually think, and to act on their actual desires or 
principles, even if doing so defies public norms.208   
If the Brandeisian liberty-right was a general right to be left alone by 
the government, that was not the right identified by the Warren Court in 
Katz, its quintessential privacy case.209  The orthodox, rights-expanding 
libertarian-liberal version dominates current understandings of the Warren 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, so that privacy scholars 
typically espouse the view that “[i]n Katz v. United States, the Court 
adopted Brandeis’s view, overruling Olmstead.”210   
The libertarian-liberal rights-expanding thesis is easily stated: in 
overruling Olmstead, Katz affirmed the broader and more protective 
Brandeisian concept of privacy.  Since the Olmstead majority excluded 
informational privacy from the scope of constitutional protection, Katz’s 
regulation of wiretapping looks like a major victory.   
Katz is one of the few “watershed” criminal procedure decisions that 
has managed to retain its status as “one of the most important Fourth 
Amendment cases ever decided.”211  As David Sklansky describes, the 
orthodox or canonical reading of Katz presents a simple and unitary 
account of the case: “[It] changed the Fourth Amendment from a 
protection against trespass to a protection of ‘reasonable expectations of 
privacy.’”212  The defendant, Charlie Katz, made a living calling in bets to 
out-of-state bookmakers from a set of telephone booths on Los Angeles’s 
                                                                                                                          
207 Rubenfeld notes: 
This was John Stuart Mill’s theme in On Liberty, where he repeatedly stressed 
the vital importance not only to personal but social and political being of 
“individuality,” of “nonconformity,” of a space for personal life well insulated from 
the eye of “public opinion.”  Particularly in a democracy, Mill warned, where 
majority will and public opinion loom so large politically, people must be free in 
their personal lives to defy public norms—to speak what they think and act as they 
choose.  For if people fear to say what they think or act on their principles in 
personal life, they are most unlikely to do so in public life. 
Rubenfeld, supra note 199, at 128 (internal citations omitted). 
208 Id. 
209 Accordingly, Daniel Solove, among others, is incorrect when he makes this assertion. See 
Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1101 (2002). 
210 Id.  Only the second half of this statement is true. 
211 Sklansky, Traffic Stops, supra note 124, at 223. 
212 Id. 
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Sunset Strip.213  Federal law enforcement agents, without obtaining a 
search warrant, placed a stereophonic tape recorder on the outside of the 
phone booth to record Katz’s conversations and obtained incriminating 
evidence used to convict him at trial.  The Supreme Court found that the 
police recording violated Katz’s right to privacy and reversed his 
conviction.214  
Commentators mostly overlook the fact that left-libertarian and anti-
discriminatory privacy interests do not explain either the result or the 
reasoning in Katz.  Justice Stewart’s articulation of the relation between the 
Fourth Amendment and the right to privacy is a distracted and obscure 
survey of the constitutional significance of privacy.215  At best, Stewart 
mounts a surprising (for left-libertarians) attack on the Brandeis and Mill 
model of privacy-as-negative-liberty.  To the extent the Court considers 
Justice Brandeis’s famous discussion of privacy, it is not to embrace 
negative liberty but to leave “the protection of [a person’s] property and of 
his very life . . . largely to the law of the individual States.”216 
To the extent that “privacy” is protected, it is not protected as a general 
claim right against the world, but a particular claim right against certain 
government agents, in particular the police.  To the extent the Court 
embraces a privacy jurisprudence, it does not protect property, under 
Boyd’s privacy scheme, nor places, under Hester’s “protected spaces 
scheme,”217 but the people’s security from certain types of unauthorized 
government interference.  The categorical schemes of privacy protection 
envisaged by Boyd, Hester, and Brandeis in Olmstead, as well as in his 
Right to Privacy article, all fall before the security-based concept of 
privacy. 
Given the emphasis on police regulation through the warrant regime, 
the idea of privacy as anti-arbitrary fits with the majority’s emphasis on 
“people, not places.”218 A liberal emphasis on privacy results in this phrase 
being treated mostly as a metaphor at best, and obscure at worst.  Yet a 
republican interest in privacy-as-security—rather than as personality or 
property—permits a more literal understanding of Justice Stewart’s famous 
                                                                                                                          
213 Id. at 224; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967) (describing the evidence at 
issue). 
214 Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.  
215 See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 
SUP. CT. REV. 133, 135 (describing the majority opinion as “inattentive to the . . . task of articulating 
and applying” a principled account of privacy). 
216 Katz, 389 U.S. at 350–51. 
217 Although Justice Harlan does affirm Hester in the opening sentence of his concurring opinion 
in Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (Harlan, J., concurring), Justice Stewart includes it in his dismissal of the 
government’s privacy argument.  Id. at 351 n.8 (majority opinion).  Accordingly, Hester’s status in 
Katz is precarious, and depends upon whether one selects Justice Stewart’s republican reading, or 
Justice Harlan’s liberal one.  
218 Id. at 351. 
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phrase.219  Indeed, the person-not-place formulation, with its indifference 
to the sorts of spatial concerns liberal readings tend to invoke, seems 
compatible with the sort of public protection the Court would announce in 
Terry, which, citing Katz’s people-not-places language, held that “[t]his 
inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the 
streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of 
his secret affairs.”220  Leaving the libertarian embrace of privacy to Justice 
Harlan’s concurrence, Justice Stewart’s majority opinion in Katz appears 
more concerned with re-emphasizing the regulatory use of warrants as a 
limitation on police activity than endorsing its novel privacy doctrine.  The 
clear, central purpose of Katz was to emphasize a particular style of 
regulation as constitutionally mandated.   
The warrant requirement, so central to the Court in Katz, provides a 
theory of justified government invasion of privacy interests—whatever 
they are.  The Court’s procedure emphasizes republican, interbranch 
competition; it interposes an impartial judicial officer between citizens and 
police.  The Court, quoting Justice Jackson, held that the goal was to 
provide a “neutral predetermination of the scope of a search,”221 than the 
sort of “competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,”222 that places the 
                                                                                                                          
219 In an extremely odd reading of the majority opinion in Katz, Orin Kerr attempts to demonstrate 
that Justice Stewart embraced a property-conception of privacy.  See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth 
Amendment and New Technologies, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 820–22 (2004).  Had Kerr limited his 
privacy-as-property claim to Justice Harlan’s concurrence, I might have been in full agreement.  Kerr, 
however, thinks that the Katz Court protects property interests—indistinct and abstract property 
interests—primarily because the Court says that “[t]he ‘narrow view’ of property rights simply could 
‘no longer be regarded as controlling.’”  Id. at 821 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 353).  He then reads the 
rejection of the narrow view to implicitly sanction some “broader approach.”  Id.  As proof, he 
observes that the Court allowed “a person in a telephone booth [to] rely upon the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment.”  Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 352).  Also cited as proof is Justice Stewart’s 
statement that “[o]ne who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll 
that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece 
will not be broadcast to the world.”  Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 352).  This is a slender reed on 
which to hang a property-based defense of Katz.  While Kerr cites to Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 
257 (1960), a case more notable for its discussion of standing than privacy, the property regime Kerr 
describes is much closer to that of Hester and the logic of protected spaces, one that the Government 
sought to rely upon in Katz, and which Justice Stewart, citing Hester, firmly rejected in the passages 
immediately preceding and superseding Kerr’s tendentious selections.  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 & n.8.  
Justice Harlan does cite Hester approvingly in the first sentence of his concurrence.  Id. at 360 (Harlan, 
J., concurring).  If a property-based theory of privacy is to be found in Katz, it is there and there alone.  
220 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968).  Here is the place from which a discussion of the 
protection of public or quasi-public spaces, including activity conducted inside public restroom stalls, 
could be fitted.  Accordingly, security as much as privacy could provide the starting point for 
discussions of the Fourth Amendment and the policing of homosexuality, and put flesh on the bones of 
Justice Stewart’s now-misunderstood emphasis on “people, not places.”  See, e.g., Sklansky, One 
Train, supra note 30, at 895–96 (discussing Katz and the policing of gay men). 
221 Katz, 389 U.S. at 358. 
222 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); see also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 
410, 415 (1969) (applying the “ferreting out crime” standard to reject informant testimony as falling 
below probable cause), overruled by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
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Constitution’s protections “‘only in the discretion of the police.’”223  
Authorization occurs by means of an official who is part of a separate 
branch of government, through the magistrate’s “objective 
predetermination of probable cause.”224 
Accordingly, privacy does not determine the result in Katz.225  It is the 
failure to accede to the required method of regulation, rather than a failure 
to properly evaluate the suspect’s privacy expectations, that dooms the 
federal agent’s activity as unlawful.  The Court mandates a procedure that 
requires independent authorization before the police can act.  The warrant 
requirement thus necessitates joint action by the judicial and executive 
branches if the procedure is to be authorized by the Constitution.  Here, the 
Court’s worry is not just rogue cops, but also determining what counts as a 
legitimate justification for state action in a government of limited powers.  
The Court thus provides, through its warrant clause, a robust, positive 
solution to the problem of official arbitrariness, one that may incidentally, 
not directly, promote equality and anti-discrimination. 
Furthermore, Justice Stewart’s opinion promotes the idea that there can 
be good policing.  He endorses the “the Government’s position . . . that its 
agents acted in a[] . . . defensible manner.”226  The agents correctly judged 
the presence of probable cause and the permitted range of police 
monitoring, both based on prior case law and under the Court’s new 
privacy standard.227  The Supreme Court after the fact validated each of 
these judgments228 and agreed that the agents did not act overzealously: 
                                                                                                                          
223 Katz, 389 U.S. at 358–59 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)). 
224 Id. at 358 (quoting Beck, 379 U.S. at 96).  Note that while a warrant is always required, 
according to Katz, scrutiny occurs on a case-by-case basis.  Id. at 356–57.  
225 Indeed, the emphasis on people-not-places could be read as applying in public in the same 
manner as the Court’s regulation of public order statutes.  See Goluboff, supra note 29, at 1369.  Here, 
the Court’s jurisprudence may be responding, as David Sklansky suggests, to contemporary worries 
about the policing of gay men.  Sklansky, One Train, supra note 30, at 896.  Sklansky reads Justice 
Harlan’s Katz concurrence as animated by this issue, but Justice Stewart’s majority opinion may deal 
with the policing of gay men as a problem of personal security in public view (visible through the walls 
of a cubicle, the door of which is closed) rather than privacy. 
226 Katz, 389 U.S. at 354.  The opinion does not, however, agree with the Government that the 
agents’ conduct was “entirely” defensible.  Id. at 358–59. 
227 See id. at 354–56 (listing their procedures and comparing them to the Olmstead and Goldman 
cases). 
228 The Court stated: 
They did not begin their electronic surveillance until investigation of the petitioner’s 
activities had established a strong probability that he was using the telephone in 
question to transmit gambling information to persons in other States, in violation of 
federal law.  Moreover, the surveillance was limited, both in scope and in duration, 
to the specific purpose of establishing the contents of the petitioner’s unlawful 
telephonic communications.  The agents confined their surveillance to the brief 
periods during which he used the telephone booth, and they took great care to 
overhear only the conversations of the petitioner himself.  
Id. at 354.  The Court further stated: 
Based upon their previous visual observations of the petitioner, the agents 
correctly predicted that he would use the telephone booth for several minutes at 
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rather, “[i]t is apparent that the agents in this case acted with restraint.”229  
The agents did make, however, one critical error: they failed to follow the 
Court’s newly-minted Fourth Amendment regulatory scheme, which 
required obtaining judicial pre-authorization of the search through the 
warrant process.  Accordingly, “the inescapable fact is that th[e] restraint 
was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial officer.”230  The 
agents’ only mistake was a regulatory one.  Misjudging the regulatory 
regime, not privacy, was the operative issue determining the outcome of 
Katz.231 
Justice Stewart’s opinion for the majority is thus inattentive to privacy, 
but quite precise about regulation.  The Court goes to great lengths to 
require law enforcement to pre-clear investigation through a magistrate 
rather than judge the propriety of the search themselves.  If the Warren 
Court was a rights-expanding court rather than a rights-constricting, or 
even rights-maintaining one, we would expect the court to embrace more 
than just the security argument requiring some appropriate process.  
Instead, we would expect the Court to embrace some form of the pre-
existing categorical protection argument advanced (in different ways) in 
Boyd, Hester, or Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent.  But Justice Stewart never 
wraps his arms around any version of categorical protection.  Instead, Katz 
is best understood as a case about regulation rather than rights—a massive 
defeat for the libertarian notion of privacy as categorically protecting 
certain aspects of individual autonomy, such as property, spaces, 
personality.  Understood as a regulatory case, Katz facilitates wiretaps so 
long as the government follows the correct pre-clearance procedure. 
Indeed, perhaps the reason why Justice Stewart’s opinion is so 
“striking[ly] . . . vague and ambiguous”232 is precisely because Justice 
Stewart was not interested in privacy: he was one of two dissenters in 
Griswold v. Connecticut,233 where he claimed that he could “find no . . .  
general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other part of the 
Constitution, or in any case ever before decided by this Court.”234  This 
                                                                                                                          
approximately the same time each morning.  The petitioner was subjected to 
electronic surveillance only during this predetermined period.  Six recordings, 
averaging some three minutes each, were obtained and admitted in evidence.  They 
preserved the petitioner’s end of conversations concerning the placing of bets and 
the receipt of wagering information. . . .  On the single occasion when the statements 
of another person were inadvertently intercepted, the agents refrained from listening 
to them.  
Id. at 354 nn.14–15. 
229 Id. at 356. 
230 Id. 
231 Accordingly, had a warrant been issued prior to the agents’ interception of Katz’s comments, 
those comments would still have been admissible under the new standard announced by the Court. 
232 David Sklansky, Katz v. United States and the Limits of Aphorism, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
STORIES 223, 247 (Carol Steiker ed., 2006) [hereinafter Sklansky, Limits]. 
233 381 U.S. 479, 530 (1965).  I owe this insight to my colleague, Joel Goldstein. 
234 Id. at 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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language would resurface, almost verbatim, in Katz,235 aimed even more 
precisely at the sort of Brandeisian liberal legalism endorsed in 
Griswold.236 
4.  The Court’s Privacy-Constricting Jurisprudence 
The libertarian-liberal celebration of Katz is either misplaced or 
tendentious.  Katz is a warrant case,237 not some rights-expanding 
libertarian-liberal opinion about the right to be left alone.238  While it 
protects certain conversations, Katz undermines the categorical protection 
of property or personality proposed by the majority (property) and Justice 
Brandeis (personality) in Olmstead, by permitting wiretapping so long as 
the police follow the right process.  Put differently, the notion of privacy at 
issue in the prior major Fourth Amendment privacy cases—Boyd v. United 
States, Olmstead, and Hester v. United States239—was more categorical 
and protective than the one in Katz.240 
Katz replaced the pre-existing privacy concepts—all of which were 
premised upon an absolute exclusion of the government from gathering or 
using certain sorts of information—with a relatively porous understanding 
of privacy as security.  Accordingly, rather than enlarging privacy 
protection and contracting the police authority to search, the Warren 
                                                                                                                          
235 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350–51 (“[T]he protection of a person’s general right to privacy—his 
right to be let alone by other people—is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left 
largely to the law of the individual States.” (footnote omitted)).  
236 Hence, Justice Stewart dismissed the Brandeisian “right to be let alone.”  Compare id. at 350–
51 with Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing 
privacy in terms of a right to be let alone). 
237 See discussion infra notes 280–81. 
238 Recently, a number of commentators have noted this fact.  See, e.g., THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 59 (2008) (observing that the Katz Court’s 
“embrace of privacy was not without reservation and [Justice] Stewart did little to explain what he 
meant by the term”); Catherine Hancock, Warrants for Wearing a Wire: Fourth Amendment Privacy 
and Justice Harlan’s Dissent in United States v. White, 79 MISS. L.J. 35, 52 (2009) (noting that “‘the 
most striking thing’ about the Katz Court’s reasoning ‘was how vague and ambiguous it was,’ and that 
the ‘affirmative case’ for the holding ‘was left largely unstated’” (citing Sklansky, Limits, supra note 
232, at 248; Kitch, supra note 215, at 137–38)).  
239 265 U.S. 57 (1924).  
240 Carol Steiker, in a recent article on Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent, emphasizes the categorical 
nature of his privacy argument: 
This view of wiretapping—as just another garden-variety search and seizure that 
can be deemed reasonable (or not constitutionally “unreasonable”) when authorized 
by a judicial warrant—is wholly out of sync with Brandeis’s view that wiretapping 
was fundamentally inconsistent with the preservation of Fourth Amendment 
freedoms.  Recall that in Brandeis’s view, “writs of assistance and general warrants 
are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire 
tapping.”  Such writs would not be rendered acceptable if issued by a neutral 
magistrate; rather, their sweeping nature and scope make them so great a threat to 
liberty that they are constitutionally anathema whatever their source of issuance. 
Steiker, Brandeis, supra note 197, at 165 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 476 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).  Steiker argues that the warrant regime contemplated under Katz, permitting 
wiretapping when pre-approved by a judicial magistrate, would not have been endorsed by Brandeis.  
Id. 
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Court’s triple whammy of Schmerber v. California,241 Warden v. 
Hayden,242 and Katz served, in the words of Justice Brennan, to “enlarge 
the area of permissible searches,”243 and so contract the concept of privacy.  
In return, the search target received the small comfort of knowing that “the 
intrusions are . . . made after fulfilling the probable cause and particularity 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment and after the intervention of a 
‘neutral and detached magistrate.’”244 
Katz is a regulation-expanding opinion, demonstrating the steps that 
even the most professional police must go through in order to follow the 
correct procedure for lawful investigative activity.  Where libertarian 
privacy is categorical and substantive, Warren Court security is conditional 
and procedural.  Privacy as security does not protect “personality,”245 (as 
Brandeis terms Mill’s “individuality”).246  Rather, security is concerned 
with regulating the police through the warrant requirement.  As Anthony 
Amsterdam points out, “[a] paramount purpose of the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment is to prohibit arbitrary searches and seizures as well as 
unjustified searches and seizures.  The warrant requirement was the 
framers’ chosen instrument to achieve both purposes . . . .”247  
The Warren Court’s interest in avoiding arbitrariness and non-
domination—as a means of protecting personal security—dates to the 
beginning of its Fourth Amendment revolution.  Avoiding arbitrariness is 
one half of the concept of privacy articulated by Mapp v. Ohio.  In that 
case, the Court sought to protect the “security of one’s privacy against 
arbitrary intrusion by the police,”248 where arbitrariness involves the sort of 
discretionary or lawless249 policing targeted by Amsterdam.250 This is what 
the Court in Katz identified as law enforcement “only in the discretion of 
the police”251 and what the Mapp Court characterized as a Fourth 
Amendment “revocable at the whim of any police officer.”252  The other 
half is non-domination—what the Mapp Court called the “right to be 
secure from rude invasions of privacy by . . . [police] officers”253 engaged 
                                                                                                                          
241 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
242 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
243 Id. at 309. 
244 Id. at 309–10 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). 
245 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 142, at 205. 
246 For an example of a similar sort of concern, see MILL, supra note 144, at 85, which associated 
liberty with the “free development of human individuality.” 
247 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 417 
(1974) (footnote omitted). 
248 Mapp, 367 U.S. 643, 650 (1961) (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–29 (1949)). 
249 Id. at 655  (discussing “official lawlessness”). 
250 What I call lawless, Amsterdam calls “ruleless searches.” Amsterdam, supra note 247, at 417. 
251 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 
(1964)). 
252 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660. 
253 Id. 
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in “brutish means of coercing evidence.”254  
If the orthodox, rights-based concern with privacy identifies where the 
police can and cannot go, the Court’s regulation-based concern with 
security identifies how the public is treated.  Rather than defending the 
orthodox version of privacy, in other words, the Warren Court launched an 
all-out assault upon it, often at the expense of criminal defendants or at the 
cost of “enlarg[ing] the area of permissible searches.”255  Accordingly, not 
only did the Court have a pre-existing privacy jurisprudence, but that 
jurisprudence came under attack well before the Court’s supposed volte 
face in Terry, or Katz, or informant cases such as McCray v. Illinois—in 
fact, it dates to the inception of the Fourth Amendment’s regulatory 
revolution in Mapp v. Ohio.  
5.  Mapp’s Republicanism 
If Mapp is the inaugural case in the Warren Court’s rights 
revolution,256 then it is worth remembering that its innovation was not to 
apply a right to the states, but a remedy.  Twelve years before Mapp, in 
Wolf v. Colorado,257 the Court first applied the Fourth Amendment—and 
its concomitant right to privacy—to the states.258  Accordingly, the central 
problem in Mapp is how we are to understand the relation between right 
and remedy.   
In Mapp, the Court was more concerned with the remedy as part of the 
right, rather than the contours of “the right to privacy free from 
unreasonable state intrusion.”259  The Court returned to a theory of the 
relationship between right and remedy that accepted the remedy of 
exclusion as “part and parcel” of the Fourth Amendment rights regime.260  
In re-evaluating the relationship, the Court held that privacy-as-security—
the right to be free from arbitrary government intrusions261—entails the 
“privilege” of exclusion.262  The Court’s argument was that unless the right 
is enforceable, it does not meaningfully exist—it is an “empty promise.”263 
                                                                                                                          
254 Id. at 655. 
255 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309 (1967). 
256 See Kamisar, Retrospective, supra note 1, at 5–6 (discussing the rights revolution as starting 
with Mapp and ending by Terry). 
257 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
258 See id. at 27–28 (“The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—
which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free society.  It is therefore implicit in ‘the 
concept of ordered liberty’ and as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process 
Clause.”). 
259 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654. 
260 See id. at 651, 678 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
261 See id. at 650 (majority opinion).  
262 Id. at 656.  (“[T]he admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently 
tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence 
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure.  To hold otherwise is to 
grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.”). 
263 Id. at 660. 
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Mapp translates portions of both Boyd and Brandeis’s Olmstead 
dissent into republican terms, both in emphasizing security and in devising 
a regime to regulate the police.  From Boyd the Court takes, among other 
things, the need to protect the “indefeasible right of personal security” 
from “stealthy encroachments.”264  Furthermore, the Court relied upon 
Boyd, among other cases, to reinstate the intimate relation between remedy 
and right or the worry that the right would not exist without the remedy—
“[t]he right to privacy . . . was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of 
the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been 
deemed dependent under . . . Boyd”265—and so insisted upon the “logical[] 
and constitutional[] necess[ity of] the exclusion doctrine.” 266 
From Olmstead the Court integrates what Carol Steiker has identified 
as the “greatest” part of that dissent267: “his at once lyrical and indignant 
call for the repudiation of government lawbreaking in the pursuit of its own 
enforcement goals.”268  What the Mapp Court takes from Brandeis, then, is 
not an emphasis on privacy, but upon “judicial integrity”269: being 
governed by legal rules applicable to everyone rather than the arbitrary 
“whim of any police officer who . . . chooses to suspend [the 
Constitution’s] enjoyment.”270  Put differently, rather than regarding the 
                                                                                                                          
264 Id. at 647 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 639, 635 (1886)). 
265 Id. at 655.  
266 Id. at 656.  In the law of criminal investigation, some liberal theorists endorse the more 
extreme position that rights correlate with not only a duty, but also a specific remedy and style of 
regulation.  The thought is that rights, regulation, and remediation come as a conceptually linked 
package, in which the style of regulation and type of remedy are determined by the nature and scope of 
the right or value at issue.  In other words, liberal arguments justifying judicial review of police activity 
by the courts use the exclusionary rule to tie regulation to rights in a manner republicans—who regard 
rights as a product of law, not an immunity from it—take for granted.  This relation between right and 
remedy is unsupported, however, by the Hohfeldian analysis. 
Nowhere in Hohfeld’s analysis is there any justification for tying the exclusionary remedy to the 
privacy right.  For Hohfeld, only the right and duty are logically related; he does not correlate duties 
with remedies for breach of the right.  See JONES, supra note 116, at 17 (comparing Alan White’s 
conception of the relationship between claim-rights and duties—that while no right logically implies a 
duty, some rights are “accompanied” by or “associated” with various duties—with that of Hohfeld) 
(citing ALAN R. WHITE, RIGHTS 70–73 (1984)). Applying Hohfeld, the sort of government duty 
correlated with the right does not in turn correlate with any particular style of regulation or remedy.  
The choice of regulatory scheme and remedy is, instead, pragmatic or prudential.  Accordingly, a range 
of regulatory methods or remedies would be equally compatible with protecting the individual’s right. 
If the right to equality entails a Hohfeldian positive claim—access to the same resources as others 
or a negative claim—to be free to maintain a sphere of personal expression free from intervention by 
others or the government—then it is not altogether clear that the warrant regime and exclusionary 
remedy are entailed by the right.  But if we look at things primarily from a regulatory rather than a 
rights perspective, and ask what right is most directly protected by the Warren Court’s regulatory 
regime, it is neither privacy nor equality, but the distinctively republican concern with security from 
“rude” government intrusions.   
267 Steiker, Brandeis, supra note 197, at 167. 
268 Id. 
269 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659–60; see also Steiker, Brandeis, supra note 197, at 168–69 (discussing 
Brandeis’s government integrity argument). 
270 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660. 
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executive in general, or the police in particular, as some Hobbesian 
sovereign or Austinian “uncommanded commander” unconstrained by the 
rules it applies to others, the Court adopts a more republican insistence 
upon of the rule of law in the face of “official lawlessness.”271 
If the central republican problem is that identified by Brandeis—in 
“fail[ing] to observe its own laws . . . ‘the Government becomes a 
lawbreaker’”272—then the Mapp Court reframes it as a separation of 
powers issue.  Just as the Department of Justice, by associating itself with 
unlawful police work, endorses lawbreaking, so the judiciary, as a separate 
branch of government cannot endorse lawbreaking by the executive 
branch.  The Warren Court adopts Brandeis’s implied solution: a “more 
robust use of courts’ inherent, non-constitutional supervisory powers to 
refuse to participate in government wrongdoing and to sanction 
government actors for law breaking by excluding evidence obtained 
unlawfully from court.”273  The cure for arbitrariness or lawlessness is thus 
a court-sponsored regulatory regime—a warrant process that permits 
external judicial review of police conduct.   
In Mapp, the warrant regime is powerfully regulatory—it permits 
monitoring of the police at all stages of investigation.  The warrant requires 
external review through antecedent monitoring by a magistrate who would 
determine that the police have sufficient evidence to search and prescribe 
the scope of the search.274  Furthermore, a warrant detailing what is sought 
and where to search permits the target of the search to engage in 
contemporaneous monitoring.  Finally, the warrant permits a court, as well 
                                                                                                                          
271 Id. at 655.  In fact Mapp quotes this aspect of Brandeis’s dissent at length: “Our government is 
the potent, the omnipresent teacher.  For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. . . . 
If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a 
law unto himself; it invites anarchy.”  Id. at 659 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
272 Id. (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
273 Steiker, Brandeis, supra note 197, at 169. 
274 In Eric J. Miller, Putting the Practice into Theory, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 31, 40 (2009), I 
erroneously suggested that the warrant did not enforce contemporaneous monitoring.  While it is true 
that, under United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 98–99 (2006), the Court rejected the claim that “the 
executing officer must present the property owner with a copy of the warrant before conducting his 
search.”  Nonetheless, were the officer to present the target with a copy of the search warrant, such a 
process would permit contemporaneous monitoring by the target of the search.  It is worth noting that if 
Grubbs were applied to Mapp, Dollree Mapp may have had no way of asserting that there was a 
constitutional violation.  The problem in Mapp was, in part, a warrantless search: the government could 
not produce the warrant.  See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644–45.  The Mapp Court noted: 
[T]he officers knocked on the door and demanded entrance but appellant, after 
telephoning her attorney, refused to admit them without a search warrant. . . .  A 
paper, claimed to be a warrant, was held up by one of the officers.  [Dollree Mapp] 
grabbed the “warrant” and placed it in her bosom.  A struggle ensued in which the 
officers recovered the piece of paper . . . .  At the trial no search warrant was 
produced by the prosecution, nor was the failure to produce one explained or 
accounted for.  At best, “[t]here is, in the record, considerable doubt as to whether 
there ever was any warrant for the search of defendant’s home.” 
Id.  
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as the target of the search, to determine, after the fact, whether the police 
followed the terms of the warrant.  The warrant regime thus serves two 
functions: first, inter-branch integrity through judicial review and 
authorization of the warrant process; second, it ensures policing by 
consent—not only consent of the judiciary, but of the target of the search. 
The republican regulatory regime established in Mapp and derived 
from Brandeis and Boyd was consistently enforced throughout the Warren 
Court.275  The whole point of inter-branch scrutiny through the “warrant 
procedure [is] to insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial 
officer will be interposed between the citizen and the police . . . .  To hold 
that an officer may act in his own, unchecked discretion . . . would subvert 
this fundamental policy.”276  Adopting the current preference for 
retrospective review by a judge277 “bypasses the safeguards provided by an 
objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the 
far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the arrest or 
search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of 
hindsight judgment.”278  This language is quoted verbatim in Katz’s strong 
statement in favor of the warrant regime.279  
The security worry and its regulatory fix—a republican regime of 
inter-branch scrutiny—is at the heart of Katz’s rejection of law 
enforcement “only in the discretion of the police.”280  Where Katz rejects 
Boyd, Hester, and Olmstead’s libertarian-liberal conception of privacy, it 
too adopts Brandeis’s regulatory regime: a unitary government of inter-
branch cooperation.  Katz’s regulatory approach—pre-clearance of police 
investigation after external review by a judicial officer—is consistently 
adopted by the Warren Court, from Mapp onwards.  Accordingly, Carol 
Steiker is somewhat pessimistic in arguing that “Brandeis’s government 
integrity argument did not win in Olmstead, nor has it triumphed in the 
                                                                                                                          
275 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966); 
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105–07 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110–11 
(1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1963). 
276 Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 481–82. 
277 The current regime arises from a preference for freestanding reasonableness rather than a 
warrant requirement.  The freestanding reasonableness analysis gained its major impetus from United 
States v. Leon’s good faith exception to the warrant requirement.  468 U.S. 897, 919–23 (1984).   The 
Warren Court had considered and rejected the good faith argument:  
We may assume that the officers acted in good faith in arresting the petitioner.  But 
“good faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough.”  If subjective good 
faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, 
and the people would be “secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,” only 
in the discretion of the police. 
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964) (citing Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959)). 
278 Beck, 379 U.S. at 96. 
279 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
280 Id. at 359 (quoting Beck, 379 U.S. at 97).  This language is similar to the Mapp claim that the 
Fourth Amendment was “revocable at the whim of the police officer.”  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
660 (1961). 
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succeeding eighty years.”281  On the contrary, from 1961 until 1974, the 
judicial integrity argument ruled the roost, with a strong warrant 
requirement as the principle evidence of its dominance.  Furthermore, 
although Steiker is correct to suggest that the right and remedy are 
conceptually distinct, the Court joins them in Mapp, and only formally 
separates the remedy in United States v. Calandra,282 and the regulatory 
regime in United States v. Leon.283 
*** 
If the foregoing argument is even partially correct, then the first plank 
of the rights revolution argument has fallen away.  The argument depends 
upon there being two phases of the Warren Court, a rights-expanding phase 
that lasts until 1967 or 1968, and a rights-contracting phase evidenced by 
the Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio.  To this point, my argument has been 
that there was no rights expansion through the right to privacy.  Instead, 
the Court contracted the right to privacy, while simultaneously expanding a 
particular form of regulatory regime.  That regulatory expansion did not 
stop at, but continued through Terry.   
Schmerber, Hayden, and Katz reveal a different type of Warren Court 
than that imagined by the rights revolutionaries.  Rather than promoting 
equality or anti-discrimination through privacy, the Warren Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence from Mapp v. Ohio to Katz v. United States 
ignored the sorts of egalitarian liberal concerns addressed under its Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence, and eviscerated libertarian-liberal 
jurisprudence under its privacy-as-security jurisprudence.  In simple terms, 
the Warren Court was a rights-maintaining court at best, and a rights-
contracting court at worst.   
Without the rights-expanding argument, the first prong of the rights 
revolution thesis disappears.  If the Court was contracting the pre-existing 
rights regime in 1966 and 1967, then it could not have been motivated by 
the 1968 Act.  A regulation-expanding reading of the Warren Court 
decisions, epitomized by Terry and Sibron, undermines the second prong 
of the rights-revolution argument—a politically cowed Warren Court. 
                                                                                                                          
281 Steiker, Brandeis, supra note 197, at 168–69. 
282 414 U.S. 338 (1974).  The Calandra Court dismissed the exclusionary “rule [as] a judicially 
created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, 
rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.”  Id. at 348.  Justice Brennan’s dissent 
was prescient.  Rejecting the claim that the exclusionary rule is no more than a “‘judicially created 
remedy,’” Brennan reiterated the Court’s holding in Mapp that the exclusionary rule is “‘part and 
parcel of the Fourth Amendment’s limitation upon [governmental] encroachment of individual 
privacy.’”  Calandra, 414 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651).  
Brennan also quoted Warren’s language in Terry arguing that “‘[c]ourts which sit under our 
Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of 
citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.’”  Id. at 359 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968)). 
283 468 U.S. 897, 919–23 (1984) (introducing the good faith exception to the warrant 
requirement). 
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Throughout the Warren Court’s Fourth Amendment regime, from 
Mapp to Terry, what remains of Boyd and Brandeis’s Olmstead dissent is 
the right to security.  Security is the quintessential Fourth Amendment 
interest.  It is, after all, “the right of the people to be secure” that the Fourth 
Amendment protects.284  Accordingly, the Warren Court’s central Fourth 
Amendment innovation is not inventing a new right—privacy—that 
expands its ability to protect criminal defendants in general, and minorities 
in particular.  The central innovation is establishing, or insisting upon, a 
particular mode of regulating the police—through the warrant—and 
remedying police misconduct using exclusion. 
IV.  TERRY: EXPANDING REGULATION 
In the following two sections I shall highlight two aspects arising out 
of Terry: expanding regulation and preventing arbitrariness.  The latter 
aspect, which I reserve for Part V, is best brought out by considering 
Terry’s sister cases, Sibron and Peters v. New York,285 as consolidated in 
Sibron, in the context of the Court’s regulation of low-level public-order 
ordinances.  Terry and Sibron should thus be understood against the 
backdrop of a line of cases in which the Court regulates public, not private, 
spaces.286 
In this section, I shall reclaim the thought that Terry does not contract 
an already-existing privacy or probable-cause doctrine that was then 
applicable, in principle or in fact, to police encounters.  The liberal claim—
epitomized by Justice Douglas’s dissent—that the Fourth Amendment 
distinction between what was a seizure and what was not drew the line 
between encounters and arrests, did (and does) not state the legal doctrine 
as it existed prior to Terry.  Terry resolved this issue in a manner that 
counfounded the government’s arguments about the scope of privacy 
rights, and Sibron did the same for state legislation.  Both cases did so by 
expanding regulation into an area in which privacy and probable cause 
applied equivocally, if at all.287 
Current readings of Terry are often colored by one or both of two 
factors: (1) the lens of hindsight, which has distorted the case because of 
the “reasonable suspicion” doctrine it is alleged to have spawned;288 and 
                                                                                                                          
284 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
285 392 U.S. 40 (1968).  
286 See, e.g., Goluboff, supra note 29, at 1369 (describing the Court as protecting interests 
exercised in public rather than private spaces, such as picketing and protesting). 
287 And did so, I shall argue, in terms reminiscent of Justice Jackson’s republican-sounding 
dissent in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
288 Chief Justice Warren’s majority opinion never uses the term “reasonable suspicion.”  Rather, 
“the opinion carefully employs and adapts the language of Brinegar v. United States, the classical 
statement of the probable cause standard, while recognizing that officers may conduct protective 
searches when possessed of a lesser quantum of information.”  Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, the 
Warren Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A Law Clerk’s Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 891, 
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(2) the lens of privacy, which picks out a particular interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment as protecting individuals from government regulation 
while obscuring the way in which the courts sought to regulate the police.  
The orthodox account can certainly fit Terry within its affirmation of 
privacy’s central place in criminal investigation doctrine.  In establishing 
that the Fourth Amendment applies to this sort of search, the Court quotes 
the language of Katz: the constitution “protects people, not places,”289 and 
“reasonable ‘expectation[s] of privacy.’”290  The republican thrust of 
Justice Stewart’s language gains traction from the Court’s claim that 
individuals have an “inestimable right of personal security”291 and are 
“entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”292  In fact, 
over and over again, the Terry Court uses the languages of personal 
security to emphasize the regulatory interest rather than the privacy one.293  
Accordingly, Terry fits within the line of republican cases stretching back 
through Katz to Mapp that equate privacy-as-security with non-arbitrary 
government conduct. 
The egalitarian and libertarian-liberal anti-discrimination or privacy-
prioritizing approach to the Fourth Amendment regards Terry as a 
significant increase in the police power to search and seize: “Terry’s 
analytical framework . . . reshaped Fourth Amendment doctrine in 
important respects and led to a significant expansion of police investigative 
power and discretion.”294  Under the orthodox, expansionist view, if the 
Fourth Amendment protects privacy, then any decision that enables the 
police to invade a subjectively manifested reasonable expectation of 
privacy on less than probable cause and without warrant expands the 
state’s law enforcement power.  
Often missed in discussions of Terry is the then-controversial nature of 
seizures under the Fourth Amendment.  The orthodox approach contends 
that encounters defined the nature of a seizure, such that everything that 
was not an encounter is a seizure.  That is the approach taken by Justice 
Douglas in his celebrated dissent: 
In other words, police officers up to today have been 
                                                                                                                          
896 (1998).  The reasonable suspicion standard is, in fact, codified in Justice Harlan’s concurrence 
rather than the majority opinion.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(linking the reasonableness of a stop to an “articulable suspicion of a crime of violence”).  The phrase 
“reasonable suspicion” only appears in Justice Douglas’s dissent.  See id. at 37 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
289 Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (majority opinion) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 
(1967)). 
290 Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
291 Id. at 8–9.  
292 Id. at 9. 
293 See, e.g., id. at 8–9, 11–12, 24–25. 
294 Russell L. Weaver, Investigation and Discretion: The Terry Revolution at Forty (Almost), 109 
PENN ST. L. REV. 1205, 1206 (2005). 
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permitted to effect arrests or searches without warrants only 
when the facts within their personal knowledge would satisfy 
the constitutional standard of probable cause.  At the time of 
their “seizure” without a warrant they must possess facts 
concerning the person arrested that would have satisfied a 
magistrate that “probable cause” was indeed present.295 
I shall call this the “bolt-from-the-blue” argument—that the reasonable 
suspicion standard inaugurated in Terry is completely novel.  Like other 
aspects of the liberal case, the bolt-from-the-blue argument is substantially 
misleading.   
A.  Not a Bolt from the Blue: Pre-Terry Law of Stop and Frisk 
A central aspect of the egalitarian or libertarian-liberal bolt-from-the-
blue argument is the claim that Chief Justice Warren’s regulatory 
approach, which is dependant upon the novel “reasonable suspicion” 
standard, appeared out of nowhere to remake the Fourth Amendment law 
of search and seizure.296  If there was any cloud on the horizon, it could 
only have been the almost contemporaneous decision one term earlier in 
Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, which also applied a 
reasonableness standard.297  Under the bolt-from-the-blue argument, 
Justice Douglas’s dissent straightforwardly represents the pre-existing 
legal regime as it was presented to the Court: every encounter that was 
more than a simple exchange of words was a seizure, and every seizure 
was governed by the Fourth Amendment, thus implicating the Court’s 
regulatory regime of probable cause and warrants. 
For example, Professor Tracey Maclin has argued that, prior to Terry, 
and by analogy to the context of car searches, the law governing stop and 
frisks “was settled,” “left [in] no doubt,” and “uncontroversial.”298  
Probable cause, he asserts, was the mandatory minimum quantum of 
evidence required to detain a suspect.  Citing the language in Terry, Maclin 
notes that, “[i]f probable cause was the constitutional minimum to justify a 
car search, then surely an equivalent degree of evidence is required before 
                                                                                                                          
295 Terry, 392 U.S. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
296 For a list of “civil libertarian critics” endorsing the bolt-from-the-blue argument, see Craig S. 
Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59 VAND. L. REV. 407, 424, 425 n.67 (2006) (listing 
works by the following civil libertarians: Cooper, supra note 18, at 852; Corinna Barrett Lain, 
Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure 
Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1439 (2004); Maclin, supra note 18, at 1308). 
297 Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528–29 (1967). 
298 Maclin, supra note 18, at 1286 n.44 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176–77 
(1949)) (noting that an individual who has engaged in behavior likely to involve the transportation of 
forbidden goods is not immune from searches while traveling on public highways); see also Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–54 (1925) (noting that if probable cause exists, vehicles may be 
searched for contraband).  
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that officer can undertake ‘a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a 
person’s clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find 
weapons.’”299  But the Court’s two major pre-Terry street detention-and-
search cases, Rios v. United States300 and Henry v. United States,301 both 
involved cars.  And each of them came out on a different side of the pre-
arrest detention debate, with some lower courts following Rios to 
legitimize pre-arrest detentions.302  Accordingly, the analogy to the car 
cases was not as simple as Professor Maclin suggests.303 
Similarly, Paul Butler’s recent celebration of Justice Douglas’s dissent 
adopts the liberal line, arguing that “[t]he majority opinion [in Terry] 
offered no settled jurisprudential reason for departing from the ‘warrant 
clause predominates’ rule that had governed Fourth Amendment analysis. 
Rather, the Court’s analysis was premised on its perception on the realities 
of police work in the mean months of 1967.”304  Butler argues that the 
police authority to stop and frisk was derived primarily from two sources: 
first, their training in the academy or on the street; and second, state law, 
because “[s]tate courts in New York were one of the few court systems that 
prior to 1967 had considered the constitutionality of stop and frisks, and 
[reasonable suspicion] is the standard that they developed.”305 
Like most of the liberal description of the Fourth Amendment rights 
revolution, almost everything about this story is misleading.306  For 
example, the Court had first determined that the probable cause standard 
applied to the states in Beck v. Ohio in 1964307—three years after Mapp 
and four years before Terry.308  And in Brinegar v. United States,309 Justice 
Jackson, in dissent, identified a central problem with judicial regulation of 
the police engaged in low-level harassment in similar terms to Justice 
Warren’s much-maligned speculations about the efficacy of the 
exclusionary remedy: 
                                                                                                                          
299 Maclin, supra note 18, at 1286 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 16).  
300 364 U.S. 253 (1960). 
301 361 U.S. 98 (1959). 
302 Comment, Police Power to Stop, Frisk, and Question Suspicious Persons, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 
848, 858 (1965). 
303 Paul Butler also cites to Henry to bolster the bolt-from-the-blue argument.  See Paul Butler, “A 
Long Step Down the Totalitarian Path”: Justice Douglas’s Great Dissent in Terry v. Ohio, 79 MISS. 
L.J. 9, 20 (2009). 
304 Id. at 24. 
305 Id. at 20. 
306 See Wayne R. LaFave, “Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and 
Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 43 (1969) (“Perhaps stop and frisk was a low-visibility procedure in one 
sense, but striking illustrations of the practice did reach trial and appellate courts with some frequency.  
Indeed, they arose in almost every context except that which would require a direct answer to the 
question of whether stop and frisk was constitutional.  This is because what the police viewed as a 
distinct procedure simply did not fit comfortably within any extant legal pigeonhole.”). 
307 379 U.S. 89 (1964); see also Stuntz, Bargains, supra note 28, at 560 n.29 (discussing Beck). 
308 See, e.g., Stuntz, Bargains, supra note 28, at 560 n.29. 
309 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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Only occasional and more flagrant abuses [of criminal 
suspects by the police] come to the attention of the courts, 
and then only those where the search and seizure yields 
incriminating evidence and the defendant is at least 
sufficiently compromised to be indicted.  If the officers raid a 
home, an office, or stop and search an automobile but find 
nothing incriminating, this invasion of the personal liberty of 
the innocent too often finds no practical redress.  There may 
be, and I am convinced that there are, many unlawful 
searches of homes and automobiles of innocent people which 
turn up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is made, 
about which courts do nothing, and about which we courts do 
nothing, an [sic] about which we never hear.310 
While it is true that the Supreme Court had made no definitive 
statement about the law of pre-arrest detention before 1968, it had decided 
two cases in 1959 and 1960 that sent conflicting messages to the lower 
courts about the propriety of stops and frisks.311  Furthermore, at the state 
level and through professional bodies such as the American Law 
Institute312 and the American Bar Foundation,313 a detailed set of statutes, 
cases, and administrative proposals had existed since 1942,314 and 
produced a law of pre-arrest detention far more permissive than the 
ultimate result in Terry.  Thus, Terry was not a bolt from the blue, but an 
effort to remake and constrain the far more expansive liberties granted to 
the police under state law and the advisory Uniform Arrest Act,315 and 
expansively documented in law reviews and treatises.316 
                                                                                                                          
310 Id. at 181. 
311 Comment, supra note 302, at 860 nn.82–83. 
312 See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 2.02 (Tenative Draft No. 1, 1966); 
Paul M. Bator & James Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and the Right to Counsel: Basic 
Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 62, 64 (1966) (discussing the impetus 
for the ALI Pre-Arraignment Code). 
313 LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY ET AL., DETECTION OF CRIME: STOPPING AND QUESTIONING, SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE, ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAPMENT 56 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1967) (citing both 
New York state law and the Uniform Arrest Act). 
314 See Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 343–47 (1942) (providing 
the text of the Uniform Arrest Act). 
315 The text of the Uniform Arrest Act appears in INTERSTATE COMM’N ON CRIME, INTERSTATE 
CRIME CONTROL 86–89 (1942).  The Uniform Arrest Act was “drafted under the auspices of the 
‘Interstate Commission on Crime,’ and enacted in a few jurisdictions in 1941. . . . It should be noted 
that this is not a ‘Uniform Act’ adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws.”  Dag E. Ytreberg, Right To Resist Excessive Force Used in Accomplishing Lawful Arrest, 
77 A.L.R.3d § 2(a) n.8 (1977).  The Interstate Commission on Crime was a body formed by several 
states under the auspices of a program enacted by Congress in 1934 to grant “consent . . . in  
advance . . . to compacts entered into by the states concerning crime and its control.”  Justin Miller, 
Crime Control as an Interstate Problem, 22 WASH. U. L.Q. 382, 386 (1937). 
316 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 342–56 
(Frank J. Remington ed., 1965); TIFFANY ET AL., supra note 313, at 6–10.  See generally Lawrence P. 
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The legislative, judicial, and academic debates preceding the Court’s 
decision in Terry sought to define the Fourth Amendment concept of 
seizure by drawing the line between the binary, non-constitutional 
alternatives of encounter and arrest.  For example, the Ohio Court of 
Appeals, in deciding State v. Terry, took the opposite approach, holding 
that arrest defined the nature of a seizure.317  Accordingly, everything that 
is not a “full-blown arrest”318 is an encounter, and so a brief investigatory 
detention that does not result in an arrest is not a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.  So even if the bolt-from-the-blue argument is literally true, 
the Court could have satisfied Justice Douglas’s desire to maintain the 
clarity of probable cause by denying that stop and frisks were seizures and 
searches, as many states had done up to that point. 
The final approach is that taken by the Terry majority—undermining 
the binary nature of the problem, so that an arrest is not the only type of 
seizure.  In that case, certain types of forcible encounter319 count as 
seizures as well.  In expanding the law of arrest to include pre-arrest 
detentions, the Court could include more types of police activity than 
hitherto regulated by the states or the federal government.  From a 
regulatory perspective, what emerges from Terry is a significant 
contraction of the police power to investigate criminal activity.  The 
regulatory approach reminds us that the judiciary controls and supervises 
law enforcement using the law governing pre-arrest detention and searches.  
The regulatory reading of Terry conflicts with the dominant, liberal 
views of the case.  Terry is about security: it concerns whether a police 
officer can interfere with the person of a suspect on less than probable 
cause where there is no illegal activity under way, but only some objective 
indication that dangerous and illegal activity is contemplated.320  It thus 
does concern a right to privacy, but not the immunity liberals are keen to 
promote.  Instead, the case is about personal security and police regulation: 
what standard the Court should use to regulate police activity at the borders 
of the Fourth Amendment, and what interests must be implicated for 
judicial regulation to become appropriate.321  In Terry, these two issues— 
security and immunity—not only overlap, but, unlike Katz, they conflict.  
The Court’s decision in Terry has the effect of expanding regulation while 
                                                                                                                          
Tiffany, Field Interrogation: Administrative, Judicial and Legislative Approaches, 43 DENVER L.J. 389 
(1966) (providing a detailed analysis of police practices under state law and the Uniform Arrest Act).  
317 See State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 121 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966). 
318 See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 316, at 340–56; Comment, supra note 302, at 853–54; Note, 
Stop and Frisk: A Perspective, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 907–08 (1968); Note, The Law of Arrest: 
Constitutionality of Detention and Frisk Acts, 59 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 647–48 (1965). 
319 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[I]f the frisk is justified in order 
to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional 
grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop.”). 
320 Id. at 27. 
321 Id. at 20. 
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it simultaneously constrains rights.   
Focusing on the regulatory aspects of the case requires placing Terry in 
the context of four major investigatory concerns: first, how the law of 
arrest and the Fourth Amendment operate to distinguish legitimate from 
illegitimate evidence gathering before and after an arrest;322 second, 
whether legislative attempts to pre-determine the standards permitting such 
evidence gathering legitimately alter the court-cop relation;323 third, what 
form legitimate police work should take, particularly in the context of a 
highly urbanized and racially diverse society;324 and fourth, how the 
newly-expanded reach of the exclusionary rule operates outside the 
warrant requirement as a judicial tool to regulate police.325 
1.  Law of Arrest  
“The basic issue [was] whether police have the right to frisk a suspect 
whom they have no right to arrest.”326  From a regulatory perspective, any 
appreciation of the Court’s holding in Terry depends upon how one 
chooses to characterize the law of arrest facing the Court.  The 
“monolithic” model of the Fourth Amendment327 proposes a strong 
distinction between encounters falling outside the Constitution’s ambit, 
and searches and seizures that fall within it.328  “It is only ‘searches’ or 
‘seizures’ that the [F]ourth [A]mendment requires to be reasonable: police 
activities of any other sort may be as unreasonable as the police please to 
make them.”329  After Mapp, some courts and legislatures began to 
contemplate whether field interrogations—questioning a suspect before 
arrest, sometimes leading to a detention and brief search of the suspect’s 
person—fell inside or outside the Fourth Amendment line.  Mostly, states 
simply did not regulate pre-arrest detentions and searches. 
Prior to Terry, stopping and searching through the pockets of passersby 
for evidence of crime could constitute a legitimate preventative strategy for 
on-the-street policing.330  States had adopted field interrogations as a tactic 
                                                                                                                          
322 Id. at 16–19. 
323 This is the central concern of Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), decided the same day as 
Terry.  
324 Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 (citing PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF 
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 183 (1967)); see also Sibron, 392 U.S. at 14 n.11. 
325 Terry, 392 U.S. at 12–14. 
326 Frank J. Remington, The Law Relating to “On the Street” Detention, Questioning and 
Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, 
& POLICE SCI. 386, 387 (1960). 
327 See Neil Ackerman, Considering the Two-Tier Model of The Fourth Amendment, 31 AM. U. L. 
REV. 85, 86 (1981) (citing Amsterdam, supra note 247, at 388). 
328 “To label any police activity a ‘search’ or ‘seizure’ within the ambit of the amendment is to 
impose those restrictions upon it.  On the other hand, if it is not labeled a ‘search’ or ‘seizure,’ it is 
subject to no significant restrictions of any kind.”  Amsterdam, supra note 247, at 388. 
329 Id. 
330 “These preventative practices include . . . search and seizure programs designed to confiscate 
dangerous weapons in order to lessen the incidence of serious, assaultative conduct on the streets by 
 
 
2010] WARREN COURT’S REGULATORY REVOLUTION IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 55 
in programs designed to confiscate drugs,331 “to get guns and knives off the 
street,”332 or simply to ensure order on urban streets or interrogate strangers 
in suburban neighborhoods.333  Law enforcement believed preventative 
policing depend upon the ability to question and search suspects, with or 
without probable cause, as a legitimate and necessary tool for ensuring 
urban order in high-crime neighborhoods.334  Where some form of criminal 
law footing was required, vagrancy statutes criminalizing street conduct 
aided this type of investigation.335  
Most jurisdictions that had decided the stop and frisk issue had done so 
in favor of the police.  For example, California had taken the lead in 
holding that pre-arrest detentions were permissible, and had re-affirmed the 
practice in light of Mapp’s application of the Fourth Amendment to the 
states,336 as had New York,337 Massachusetts,338 and Rhode Island.339  
Accordingly, the Ohio Appellate Court, in concluding that pre-arrest 
detention did not violate the Constitution, fell in line with the major 
jurisdictions to determine the matter post-Mapp.340 
By 1968, the Court had twice declined the opportunity to regulate pre-
                                                                                                                          
gang members and others.”  Tiffany, supra note 316, at 390.  The claim that “Terry opened the door for 
a host of police encounters that do not involve warrants or probable cause,” Stephen A. Saltzburg, 
Criminal Procedure in the 1960s: A Reality Check, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 179, 191 (1993), is just false.  
The door was already wide open.  Similarly, Tracey Maclin’s claim that stop and frisks were increasing 
is unsupported.  See Maclin, supra note 18, at 1278. 
331 See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 44–45, 67–68 (1968). 
332 TIFFANY ET AL., supra note 313, at 398. 
333 See Charles A. Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161, 1161–
62 (1966) (describing police questioning without probable cause or reasonable suspicion in suburban 
neighborhoods). 
334 See Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 614 
(1956). 
335 Id. 
336 See People v. Mickelson, 380 P.2d 658, 660 (Cal. 1963) (“We do not believe that our rule 
permitting temporary detention for questioning conflicts with the Fourth Amendment.  It strikes a 
balance between a person’s interest in immunity from police interference and the community’s interest 
in law enforcement.”); People v. Simon, 290 P.2d 531, 533 (Cal. 1955).  
337 See, e.g., People v. Taggart, 229 N.E.2d 581, 585–86, (N.Y. 1967); People v. Rivera, 201 
N.E.2d 32, 35 (N.Y. 1964).  
338 See Commonwealth v. Lehan, 196 N.E.2d 840, 845 (Mass. 1964) (“[A]n officer may act 
reasonably to assure that the inquiry can proceed in a manner consistent with the officer’s safety.” 
(citing UNIFORM ARREST ACT § 3 (1942))). 
339 Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, 174 A.2d 560, 562–63 (R.I. 1961), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 516 
(1962) (“If the period of detention is reasonably limited, is unaccompanied by unreasonable or 
unnecessary restraint, and is based upon circumstances reasonably suggestive of criminal involvement, 
the legislature may lawfully make a distinction between such mere detention and an arrest. . . .  [I]t 
seems to us that the general assembly exercised its police power on behalf of the individual member of 
society by protecting him against the ignominy or humiliation of a premature arrest where the detaining 
officer may have had reason to suspect that the person detained was guilty of wrongdoing. . . .  Further, 
we are of the opinion that the words ‘reason to suspect’ establish a just standard for detention as 
distinguished from arrest.”).  
340 State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 118 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966) (“[W]e hold, in line with the great 
weight of authority, that a policeman may, under appropriate circumstances such as exist in this case, 
reasonably inquire of a person concerning his suspicious on-the-street behavior in the absence of 
reasonable grounds to arrest.”), aff’d, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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arrest detention and searches of criminal suspects.341  It had, like most 
courts, entertained the issue as one of whether there were any grounds to 
make the arrest; either a valid arrest took place before the search, and so 
the search was legal, or there were no grounds to arrest, and so the search 
was illegal.342  For example, in Rios, two officers, in plain clothes and an 
unmarked car, observed the defendant look up and down the street before 
getting into a cab in a neighborhood known for drug activity.  The officers 
followed the cab and when it stopped, one of the officers opened Rios’s 
door, whereupon the suspect may have dropped a powder-filled condom on 
the floor of the cab.  Rather than decide what sort of detentions constituted 
a seizure, the Court remanded the case to the district court to determine 
when Rios was “arrested” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.343  As 
the constitutional law of criminal investigation began to define the 
quantum of evidence necessary to engage in a warrantless arrest, it became 
obvious that the Court would eventually consider the constitutionality of 
warrantless evidence-gathering prior to arrest.   
2.  Legislative Attempts to Pre-Determine Standards 
One reason for the Court’s interest in deciding the validity of pre-arrest 
searches, then, was not that they became any less private, but that they 
became codified and so regulated.  The states had sought either to preclude 
judicial regulation of low-level, on-the-street detentions and searches, or to 
legislate standards of regulation that minimalized the nature of the Fourth 
Amendment intrusion.  Their goal was to legislate a standard permitting a 
highly intrusive style of policing, justified by the realities of crime in an 
urban environment.  Some states adopted (verbatim or in modified form) 
the distinction between arrests and pre-arrest detentions advanced by the 
Interstate Commission on Crime’s Uniform Arrest Act or the American 
Law Institute’s Draft Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.344 
The Uniform Arrest Act, which applied in three states by the time 
Terry came before the Court, permitted a police officer to stop and detain 
an individual for up to two hours for questioning, during which time the 
individual could be searched for weapons.345  The New York version 
adopted sections 2(1) and (3) of the Act but somewhat broadened its scope 
by adding to the range of crimes, failing to specify the consequences of a 
failure to give a “name, address, and explanation of his actions,” and 
                                                                                                                          
341 See, e.g., Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 260–62 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 
98, 102 (1959).  
342 See Remington, supra note 326, at 386–87; Tiffany, supra note 316, at 390.    
343 Rios, 364 U.S. at 255–56, 261–62. 
344 See Warner, supra note 314, at 343–47; MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 
2.02(2) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1966).    
345 See Warner, supra note 314, at 316–17; see also Criminal Justice: The Arts of Arrest, TIME, 
Mar. 19, 1965, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,833571-2,00.html 
(stating that the UAA was adopted by Delaware, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island). 
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altering the Act’s permission to search for weapons when there are 
“reasonable grounds to believe” that physical danger exists to grant 
permission based upon “reasonabl[e] susp[icion].”346  Furthermore, while 
the Uniform Arrest Act and the New York stop and frisk law precluded 
searches for evidence prior to arrest, the Court, in Sibron v. New York,347 
found “substantial indications that the category of ‘search for a dangerous 
weapon’ may encompass conduct considerably broader in scope.”348  The 
New York Court of Appeals established a right to frisk whenever police 
officers engaged in conversation with a suspect on the street.  After all, the 
court reasoned, “[t]he answer to the question propounded by the policeman 
may be a bullet.”349  The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 
adopted a similarly broad view as the Uniform Arrest Act of the right to 
search upon questioning.350 
Compare, for example, Camara v. Municipal Court of San 
Francisco,351 in which, just one year before Terry, the Court had 
reconsidered and rejected similar attempts to rewrite probable cause out of 
the administrative sphere through legislative pre-clearance of domestic 
searches.352  That the Court chose a standard that equated the 
reasonableness of the policy to the existence of probable cause has caused 
some to doubt the value of Camara.353  Nonetheless, Camara adopted a 
warrant regime that increased regulation as compared to the pre-existing 
regime, and imposed judicial oversight upon legislative grants of authority 
to search houses in the name of avoiding arbitrary searches.354 
                                                                                                                          
346 Cf. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180-a (1966); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 43–44 (1968); 
see also Brief of National District Attorneys’ Ass’n, Amicus Curiae, in Support of Respondent at 8, 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), 1967 WL 113688.   
347 392 U.S. at 40. 
348 Id. at 60–61 n.20.  
349 Id. at 63–64 (quoting People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32, 35–36 (N.Y. 1964)).  This justification 
is endorsed by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Terry.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968) 
(Harlan, J., concurring).  
350 See Bator & Vorenberg, supra note 312, at 66 (noting the “limited case law bearing on th[e] 
question” of permissible standards for stop and frisks, and the “fairly general agreement that if a stop is 
to be authorized, the officer must be permitted to search the person stopped for concealed weapons”).  
This standard was similar to that adopted by the New York Court of Appeals and rejected in Terry and 
Sibron.  See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 43–44; Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.  
351 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
352 Id. at 534–39. 
353 See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of 
Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 385 (1988). 
354 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 532–33.  The Camera Court indicated:  
The practical effect of this system is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion 
of the official in the field.  This is precisely the discretion to invade private property 
which we have consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested 
party warrant the need to search.  We simply cannot say that the protections 
provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in this context; broad statutory 
safeguards are no substitute for individualized review, particularly when those 
safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of a criminal penalty. 
Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Eaton, 364 U.S. at 271–72.  The Eaton Court indicated:  
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In Camara, the Court rejected the argument that broad statutory 
safeguards could serve as an effective limit on official discretion.355  Like 
Terry, Camara precluded searches purely designed to turn up evidence of 
criminal activity,356 but permitted the departure from the traditional 
measure of probable cause based upon an urban safety rationale.357  As in 
Camara, the Terry Court extended the Fourth Amendment into a 
previously-unregulated area, and provided a limited justification for the 
intrusion: officer safety.358  
Both Terry and Camara extended the scope of the Fourth Amendment 
to searches and seizures that were formerly beyond its coverage.359  In 
Camara, that extension was to civil government officials enforcing 
administrative, statutory, regulations.  In Terry, it was to beat officers 
engaging in something more than an encounter based on officer safety.360  
The safety justification, thus, was one that the Court clearly envisioned as a 
check upon otherwise unconstrained police activity.361   
In Terry, the nature and justification of the officer’s right to stop 
remains obscure—the case is rather about the right to frisk.362  As the Court 
                                                                                                                          
[I]f we were to assume that the inspectors were proceeding according to a plan, and 
even if evidence of the plan were put in at the trial, we think that the result should be 
the same. The time to make such justification is not in the criminal proceeding, after 
the householder has acted at his peril in denying access. The time to make it is in 
advance of prosecution, and the place is before a magistrate empowered to issue 
warrants, which will put the seal of legitimacy—the seal the Constitution 
specifically provides for—on the demand of the inspector, if indeed it is a 
reasonable one. Such a warrant need not be sought except where the householder 
does not consent. 
Id. 
355 The Camara Court reiterated that the only proper style of regulation depended upon pre-
clearance by a magistrate.  Camara, 387 U.S. at 530, 538–40. 
356 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 537. 
357 The Camara test required the court to “focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly 
justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen,” and then 
to “balanc[e] the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.” 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968) (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 534–37). 
358 See id. at 19 n.15 (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment governs all public agents regarding 
“personal security”). 
359 See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, An Ode to Probable Cause: A Brief Response to Professors Amar 
and Slobogin, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1133, 1133–34 (1998) (“[T]he two watershed cases for the 
Supreme Court’s gradual movement towards an all-encompassing reasonableness balancing test—
Camara v. Municipal Court and Terry v. Ohio—were efforts to make the Fourth Amendment as 
expansive as the Court thought possible under the circumstances.  Camara, for the first time, brought 
housing inspections within the ambit of the Amendment, and Terry ensured that ‘stops and frisks’ were 
covered by the Amendment’s protections rather than left constitutionally unregulated.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
360 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 17 (“The danger in the logic which proceeds upon distinctions between 
a ‘stop’ and an ‘arrest,’ or ‘seizure’ of the person, and between a ‘frisk’ and a ‘search’ is twofold.  It 
seeks to isolate from constitutional scrutiny the initial stages of the contact between the policeman and 
the citizen.  And by suggesting a rigid all-or-nothing model of justification and regulation under the 
Amendment, it obscures the utility of limitations upon the scope, as well as the initiation, of police 
action as a means of constitutional regulation.”).  
361 Terry, 392 U.S. at 14. 
362 Kamisar, Warren Court, supra note 1, at 67. 
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puts it, in avoiding the stop issue, “[t]he crux of this case . . . is not the 
propriety of [the officer’s] taking steps to investigate petitioner’s 
suspicious behavior, but rather, whether there was justification for 
McFadden’s invasion of Terry’s personal security by searching him for 
weapons in the course of that investigation.”363  In Sibron, the Court 
confronted the legality of New York’s stop and frisk statute (loosely based 
on the Uniform Arrest Act), which sought to pre-authorize searches in an 
urban setting on less than probable cause.  The Court found that the stops 
were justified or not based on a standard of probable cause.364  Understood 
in light of Sibron, Terry does not provide some broad grant of power to 
engage in investigative stops and frisks.  Rather, it provides an emergency 
exception to the general prohibition on searches or seizures on less than 
probable cause.   
Indeed, taking its cue from Sibron, the Terry Court stated that: 
the limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a 
protective seizure and search for weapons . . . will have to be 
developed in the concrete factual circumstances of individual 
cases. . . .  Suffice it to note that such a search, unlike a 
search without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest, is not 
justified by any need to prevent the disappearance or 
destruction of evidence of crime.  The sole justification of the 
search in the present situation is the protection of the police 
officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined 
in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover 
guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the 
assault of the police officer.365 
Remember that, prior to Terry and Sibron, where the law did permit 
judicial control and scrutiny of field interrogations, it granted the police the 
right to detain and frisk suspects.366  Terry’s holding that (with one 
exception) all pre-arrest detention must be based upon probable cause, 
placed a drastic restriction on the police.367  Furthermore, the exception 
                                                                                                                          
363 Terry, 392 U.S. at 23. 
364 See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59–62 (1968). 
365 Terry, 392 U.S. at 29 (internal citations omitted). 
366 See, e.g., People v. Taggart, 229 N.E.2d 581, 585 (N.Y. 1967) (“Assuming that [the officer] 
did have at least a reasonably based suspicion that the defendant was committing a crime, not only 
warranting but requiring some kind of police action, it follows that under the present rules he had a 
right to ‘search’ [the] defendant . . . .”); People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32, 35 (N.Y. 1964) (“If we 
recognize the authority of the police to stop a person and inquire concerning unusual street events we 
are required to recognize the hazards involved in this kind of public duty.  The answer to the question 
propounded by the policeman may be a bullet; in any case the exposure to danger could be very great.  
We think the frisk is a reasonable and constitutionally permissible precaution to minimize that 
danger.”).  
367 This was re-stated the same day, in emphatic terms, in the companion case, Sibron, 392 U.S. 
40. 
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could not be justified by investigatory imperatives, but only by a 
reasonable, objective apprehension of an emergency caused by the 
presence of a dangerous weapon.368  A frisk was constitutionally 
impermissible where no emergency existed.369  Such a standard required 
probable cause for almost all field searches, including many searches for 
weapons,370 and so rendered unconstitutional statutes purporting to pre-
authorize warrantless field searches on less than probable cause where no 
emergency existed. 
Accordingly, to the extent that stop and frisk is a tactic of police 
investigation, Terry and Sibron make a huge difference.  All investigatory 
stop and frisks are now off limits unless the suspect consents or probable 
cause is established.371  The only exception is predicated upon officer 
safety.372  Accordingly, even programs of sweeping for weapons are 
regulated.  The sweep must be linked to some other indication of danger 
than simply the discovery of a weapon.  If the weapon was obvious, there 
would be probable cause to establish that a crime was being committed. 
Absent an obvious, dangerous weapon, there is no reason to search unless 
some other crime indicates dangerousness. 
Kamisar treats the Court’s “‘detour[] around’ the threshold issue of 
investigative ‘stops’”373 as a loss for the defense when it was, by definition, 
equivocal and may have been a victory had subsequent cases turned out 
differently.  That is, after Terry and Sibron, by Kamisar’s own lights, the 
path was open for the Court to drastically limit the justification for the stop 
and subsume both stop and frisk into the law of arrest.  Had the Burger 
Court done so in Robinson v. California, the law of arrest might have been 
more stringent than it is now; an arrest justified on probable cause would 
lead to a frisk, not of right, but only if justified by dangerousness.  
According to Kamisar himself, that possible world was at least as close as 
the actual world that resulted and, which under the Burger Court produced 
a much less rights-protective result.   
B.  Safety, Professionalism, and Terry’s Expansive Regulation of the 
Police 
A central issue in both Terry and Sibron is the issue of good police 
work.  The Court essentially separates order-maintenance from 
investigation, and requires probable cause to stop and reasonable suspicion 
                                                                                                                          
368 See id. at 60 n.20; Terry, 392 U.S. at 17–18 n.15. 
369 See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 60–61 n.20. 
370 See Taggart, 229 N.E.2d at 581.  Taggart was criticized by both Terry and Sibron.  See Terry, 
392 U.S. at 17–18 n.15; Sibron, 392 U.S. at 60–61 n.20. 
371 See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 11 (requiring “voluntary cooperation” in the usual case of searches 
absent probable cause); id. at 20 (insisting on probable cause and a warrant “wherever practicable”).  
372 Sibron, 392 U.S. at 60. 
373 Kamisar, Warren Court, supra note 1, at 67. 
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to frisk.  The probable cause requirement, present in Sibron, thus precludes 
the police from using order-maintenance or preventative policing as a 
technique of criminal investigation.  Both cases recognize that certain 
situations require the police to engage in more investigation.374  Terry and 
Sibron place limits on the style of such an investigation.  Where the police 
have no more than an inarticulate hunch, more work is required.  Even 
when such a hunch is confirmed by some further indicia of criminality, 
unless such evidence rises to the traditional level of probable cause, the 
police are limited to asking questions or obtaining consent to search.375  
The only exception to the prohibition on searches, absent traditional 
probable cause, is a very narrow and definite one: officer safety.   
The safety justification thus excludes and permits certain styles of 
policing.  Terry, in fact, constrains the police power to stop and frisk by 
requiring some “articulable” suspicion of dangerousness.376  The 
articulable suspicion standard does have some teeth.  It requires objective, 
“specific . . . facts which, taken together with rational inferences from 
those facts, reasonably warrant [a safety-based] intrusion” upon the 
defendant’s person.377  In other words, the officer “must be able to point to 
particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was 
armed and dangerous.”378   
The safety justification requires the police to engage in more detection 
and forbids targeting suspects based on guilt by association or prejudice.  
Sibron is a good example.  Patrolman Martin had engaged in lengthy 
observation of Sibron and some known drug dealers, but had not attempted 
to ascertain the content of Sibron’s conversation or otherwise establish that 
criminal activity was afoot.379  In Sibron, Patrolman Martin lacked the facts 
from which to make the armed-and-dangerous inference.380 
Two problems arise, however, with the Terry standard.  The first is 
probable cause: in the context of officer safety, the majority apparently 
sought to reformulate rather than to dispense with probable cause.  The 
second is whether the Court would evaluate “reasonableness” from the 
                                                                                                                          
374 Terry, 392 U.S. at 23 (“It would have been poor police work indeed for an officer of 30 years’ 
experience in the detection of thievery from stores in this same neighborhood to have failed to 
investigate this behavior further.”); Sibron, 392 U.S. at 65. 
375 See Bator & Vorenberg, supra note 312, at 64–67 (discussing the importance of consent as a 
justification for government action). 
376 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 27; David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. 
REV. 1699, 1737 (2005). 
377 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–21. 
378 Sibron, 392 U.S. at 64. 
379 Id. 
380 Id. at 65–66.  (“His testimony shows that he was looking for narcotics, and he found them.  
The search was not reasonably limited in scope to the accomplishment of the only goal, which might 
conceivably have justified its inception—the protection of the officer by disarming a potentially 
dangerous man.  Such a search violates the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment, which protects the 
sanctity of the person against unreasonable intrusions on the part of all government agents.”). 
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point of view of a reasonable man or a reasonable police officer.  This 
latter concern replicates the problem of scrutiny: who gets to decide what 
counts as good policing. 
Tracey Maclin emphasizes that Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the 
majority in Terry  
explains that an officer’s actions in this context must be 
judged by asking “whether a reasonably prudent man in the 
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety 
or that of others was in danger.”  This standard is taken from 
the Court’s cases discussing the meaning of probable 
cause.381 
The problem, as Maclin sees it, is that the majority failed to apply the 
traditional probable cause standard in assessing Officer McFadden’s efforts 
in Terry.382  Under this reading of Terry, McFadden engaged in a race-
based investigatory sweep seeking guns. McFadden’s lower court 
testimony and the nature of the charge certainly bolster this view of the 
case.383  But that is not the manner in which the Court assessed the 
evidence, rather indicating that Terry and Chilton’s comings and goings 
objectively indicated an intent to commit a potentially armed daylight 
robbery.384 
Read in this light, the Terry Court’s comment that “[t]he exclusionary 
rule has its limitations . . . as a tool of judicial control,”385 is no more than 
an acknowledgment of the limitations of this sanction to scrutinize and 
control certain types of searches.  Exclusion, as a tool for regulating the 
court-cop regulatory relation, operates effectively only where the purpose 
of police conduct is related to criminal prosecution, and so the exclusion of 
evidence will have an effect.  “Encounters[, however,] are initiated by the 
police for a wide variety of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated 
to a desire to prosecute for crime.”386  At that point, the exclusionary rule 
loses its coercive power.387    
C.  Regulating Preventative Policing Outside the Warrant Requirement   
All of this takes place in a context very different from Katz.  The 
                                                                                                                          
381 Maclin, supra note 18, at 1303 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). 
382 Id. at 1303–04. 
383 Id. at 1300–04 (discussing ways in which McFadden’s testimony failed to establish probable 
cause). 
384 Terry, 392 U.S. at 28. 
385 Id. at 13. 
386 Id. 
387 Id. at 14.  (“Regardless of how effective the rule may be where obtaining convictions is an 
important objective of the police, it is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights 
where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in 
the interest of serving some other goal.”). 
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police operating in the field engage in prevention as well as detection or 
investigation.  These roles promote a series of low-level encounters in 
criminogenic locations or with known criminals.388  Often, circumstances 
or lack of hard evidence preclude the police from obtaining consent or a 
warrant to search an individual for evidence or weapons.  
Accordingly, whereas in Katz the regulatory issue had been developing 
a procedure for third-party pre-authorization of police action, that option 
was foreclosed in the context of certain styles of street policing.  Given that 
field interrogations occur where there is no possibility for pre-clearance, 
the Court had to develop some alternative form of regulation from that 
used in Katz.    
The Court thus faced the same problem as in Camara: extending 
regulation to official activity formerly considered beyond the reach of 
criminal procedure.  The republican solution would entail determining non-
arbitrary and non-dominating reasons, such as officer safety (or other 
criminal investigation imperatives), for impinging upon personal security 
in public places.  As alternatives, the Court could have adopted Justice 
Douglas’s rejection of balancing,389 and simply implemented a unitary 
probable cause standard for all types of searches; or it could have decided 
to apply a balancing test on a case-by-case basis.  Adopting the probable 
cause standard would not increase regulation, but rather force the police to 
make a choice: to determine whether to arrest for some minor crime, such 
as vagrancy, or to stop and frisk for weapons or evidence and then release 
the suspect, transforming the stop and frisk into an intrinsic end-in-itself—
a form of sanction as part of aggressive policing—rather than an 
instrumental means to prosecute crime.     
The Terry majority considered whether voluntary cooperation was 
required for searches other than those pursuant to an arrest,390 and 
reiterated the requirement of pre-clearance and a warrant “whenever 
practicable.”391  The circumstances of street encounters, however, “as a 
practical matter could not be subjected to the warrant procedure.”392  The 
                                                                                                                          
388 See, e.g., id. at 20–23 (“[W]e deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily 
swift action predicated upon on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which historically has 
not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure.”); Tiffany, supra 
note 316, at 390–94 (“The failure of police to give adequate attention to the definition and justification 
of field interrogation results in part from the fact that it occurs on the street in the context of closely 
related police practices which are designed to prevent the commission of crime . . . .”).  
389 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 38–39 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s decision 
inappropriately gives a police officer more discretion than a judge).  
390 392 U.S. at 11; see also id. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“There is no reason why an officer, 
rightfully but forcibly confronting a person suspected of a serious crime, should have to ask one 
question and take the risk that the answer might be a bullet.”).   
391 Id. at 20 (majority opinion). 
392 Id. 
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regulatory issue addressed in Terry is no longer whether393 but how to 
engage in retroactive review of an officer’s actions.  Terry thus affords 
police officers an incentive to search primarily for investigatory rather than 
harassment purposes and to litigate the legality of the search.  If they can 
point to objectively reasonable facts indicating dangerousness, the search 
was legitimate.   
Harassment thus remains a live option whatever the outcome in Terry.  
Consistent with even a strong reading of probable cause and the 
exclusionary rule, the police could continue to harass minorities outside the 
“legitimate investigat[ory] sphere.”394  Where such harassment is the 
primary purpose of police behavior, the exclusionary rule is powerless to 
deter.395  Exclusion alone will not constrain the sort of on-the-street 
harassment that never makes it to court.  Exclusion can only touch conduct 
that constitutes investigative policing, that is, policing designed to detect 
crime.   
Terry provides some criteria to clearly separate what constitutes 
harassment from what does not, in part by demarcating investigation from 
prevention and order-maintenance.396  But Terry’s (and Sibron’s) failure to 
preclude malicious police activity does not really distinguish its regulatory 
regime from that of Miranda v. Arizona,397 one of the central cases of the 
rights revolution.  In both cases, Miranda and Terry, the Court excluded a 
practice or policy of physical and mental harassment on constitutional 
grounds, and instituted a regulatory regime designed to exclude the fruits 
of harassment from courts.  Both cases recognize that harassment can 
continue if the police do not want to use the evidence at trial.398  The 
constraint only works upon police officers primarily engaged in the activity 
of investigating crime, rather than those primarily engaged in harassing 
minorities.  Neither case seeks to exclude the form of evidence gathering 
entirely; each adopts a form of scrutiny that is less onerous for the police 
than it might have.399  From a regulatory perspective then, Terry and 
Sibron, as handed down in 1968, seem very similar to Miranda.  It is only 
from a privacy perspective that they differ. 
The second plank of the two-Warren-Courts thesis sought to provide a 
causal explanation for rights-contraction, that rights-contraction is the 
                                                                                                                          
393 See id. at 13–14 (“The exclusionary rule has its limitations, however, as a tool of judicial 
control.  It cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of legitimate police investigative 
techniques on the ground that much conduct which is closely similar involves unwarranted intrusions 
upon constitutional protections.”).  
394 Id. at 15. 
395 Id.  
396 Id. at 22–23. 
397 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
398 Terry, 392 U.S. at 14; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.  
399 That is, no requirement of counsel’s presence in or taping of interviews in Miranda, and no 
probable cause requirement in Terry.  
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Court’s response to public and political disapproval of its decision in 
Miranda, expressed through Richard Nixon’s tough-on-crime presidential 
campaign and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.  
The evidence for that contraction was Terry.  In other words, the evidence 
for contraction is in large part garnered from the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment case law. 
Two arguments seem to belie the rights-contraction thesis: first, that 
the rights-contraction thesis’s causal argument is flawed; and second, that 
Terry fits within the Court’s jurisprudence of overbreadth and vagueness 
that extended into the 1970s.  In this section, I advanced a regulatory 
explanation of Terry that suggested it did not contract, but rather expanded 
the dominant Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the Warren Court: 
republican regulation.  Accordingly, my causal argument rejects the 
orthodox view that Terry was a response to public outrage directed against 
the Warren Court.  In the next section I shall make a second, vagueness-
and-overbreadth argument.  Starting early and continuing throughout the 
1960s and into the 1970s, the Court adopted a republican jurisprudence of 
security through the rule of law that attacked law enforcement’s arbitrary 
use of statutes and ordinances to criminalize low-level conduct.  
Accordingly, a series of cases, including Coates v. Cincinnati400 and 
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,401 fill a policing gap left open by 
Terry, and suggest a Warren Court triumphant, rather than one cowed by 
public criticism. 
V.  SIBRON, VAGRANCY, AND VAGUENESS 
The argument in this section places the Court’s Terry decision within 
the context of a separate line of cases through which the Court limited the 
use of public order statutes and ordinances.  The Court’s republican, 
regulatory goal sought to preclude “discriminatory enforcement against 
those whose association together is ‘annoying’ because their ideas, their 
lifestyle, or their physical appearance is resented by the majority of their 
fellow citizens.”402  These cases employed the classic republican tools of 
clarity and specificty, anti-arbitrariness and non-domination to police 
public spaces, not private ones.  In so doing, they struck down a variety of 
local and state regulations devolving power to the police to “enforce[] . . . 
an ordinance whose violation may entirely depend upon whether or not a 
policeman is annoyed.”403 
                                                                                                                          
400 402 U.S. 611 (1971). 
401 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
402 Id. at 616 (footnote omitted).  
403 Id. at 614. 
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A.  Sibron’s Forgotten Importance 
The liberal, rights-contracting claim that Terry signaled a victory for 
the police, derived from Kamisar’s historicist version or Packer’s bipolar 
version, assumes that the police “won” in Terry.  Instead, the issue was, at 
best, a wash, and at worst, a loss for law enforcement.  There was not one 
case decided on June 10, 1968, but three: Terry, Sibron, and Peters.  The 
police won Peters on grounds even Justice Douglas could agree with: there 
was probable cause to believe the suspect had committed a crime.404  In 
Sibron, the Court held the stop and frisk to be unreasonable.405  Even if one 
agrees with the liberal reading of Terry, then, and thinks that it is a victory 
for the police, law enforcement drew the three-case series surrounding the 
practice of stop and frisk.  Worse for law enforcement was that state 
attempts to engage in a blanket statutory grant of power to engage in broad, 
low-level public-order policing were declared unavailing.406   
The orthodox reaction to Terry is exemplified by Kamisar’s claim that 
the Court “resolv[ed] an important and difficult issue [the police practice 
of stopping and frisking] in favor of law enforcement.”407  Neither Terry 
nor Sibron represented the outcome sought by law enforcement or the 
states of Ohio and New York.  In Sibron, the Court struck down a New 
York statute permitting precisely the regime of stops and frisks 
recommended by the Interstate Commission on Crime’s Uniform Arrest 
Act and the American Law Institute’s Draft Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure.408  One of the features of the orthodox liberal 
reading of Terry is the extent to which Sibron is confined to the dustbin of 
history. 
Sibron is incompatible with another orthodox claim, again exemplified 
by Kamisar, who suggests “that these Warren Court decisions [Terry and 
Sibron] must have been cause for celebration in more than a few precinct 
stations throughout the land.”409  Perhaps, but certainly not in New York, 
New Jersey, and Massachusetts, all of which had adopted a version of the 
Uniform Arrest Act’s law of pre-arrest detention that was laid to rest by 
Sibron.  Under those state statutes, as under the American Law Institute 
draft rules, the officer could simply remove the suspect from the street, 
take her to the stationhouse, and engage in two hours of questioning.  To 
                                                                                                                          
404 Sibron v. United States, 392 U.S. 40, 66 (1968) (“By the time Officer Lasky caught up with 
Peters on the stairway between the fourth and fifth floors of the apartment building, he had probable 
cause to arrest him for attempted burglary.”). 
405 Id. at 65. 
406 While the Court refused to declare the statute invalid on its face, it emasculated the statute by 
applying a case-by-case analysis of the validity of each decision to stop and frisk, a posture that erased 
the blanket grant of power under the statute.  See id. at 59–62. 
407 Id. 
408 Kamisar, Warren Court, supra note 1, at 65. 
409 Id. 
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see the Court’s decision in Terry as equivalent to this style of policing is 
myopic. 
The impact of Terry and Sibron was to regulate on-the-street policing 
that targeted urban order despite legislative attempts to remove it from the 
scope of the Fourth Amendment.410  The Fourth Amendment could not, 
however, preclude investigatory searches and seizures consequent to a 
lawful arrest.411  Accordingly, an effective law enforcement solution to the 
problem presented by Terry was to use vagrancy statutes criminalizing a 
vast array of street conduct to permit this type of investigation.   
The problem presented in both cases was precisely what the officer 
could do when seeking to engage in an encounter outside the Fourth 
Amendment which he had reason to believe could be dangerous.412  Had 
Terry come out the other way—that is, had the Court required the police to 
show probable cause, or even obtain a warrant, before frisking a suspect—
Kamisar, Butler, and other liberal theorists presumably believe that the 
police would simply decline to engage in these types of encounters.  
However, as Justice Douglas himself well knew, the police had another, 
even more invasive option than that provided by the New York statute, the 
Uniform Arrest Act, or the American Law Institute draft rules: arrest under 
vagrancy or loitering statutes.413   
The criminal law of vagrancy had been a hot topic during most of the 
Warren Court, and one that had received a lot of attention, both in the 
academy and in legal practice.  As early as 1953, the Harvard Law Review 
published an article on vagrancy,414 followed by the Hastings Law Journal 
in 1958,415 and Justice Douglas’s heavily-cited article, Vagrancy and 
Arrest on Suspicion, in the 1960 edition of the Yale Law Journal.416  The 
petitioner in Terry cited Douglas’s article, and the parties or amicii in 
                                                                                                                          
410 See Foote, supra note 334, at 630 (“A number of jurisdictions have tried to deal with this 
problem by enacting statutes whose elements are believed to be more reliable indicators of professional 
criminality.  Such statutes have had constitutional difficulties as they have strayed from the traditional 
patterns whose common-law vintage makes them acceptable to courts.” (footnote omitted)). 
411 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110–11 (1977) (finding that the additional 
order to “get out of the car” after a driver has been detained is a mere inconvenience when weighed 
against the safety interest of the police officer). 
412 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[I]f the frisk is justified in 
order to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional 
grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop.”). 
413 William O. Douglas, Law and the American Character, 37 CAL. ST. B.J. 753, 764 (1962) 
(discussing the origin of vagrancy statutes and their disproportionate impact on the economically 
disadvantaged); William O. Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1, 9 (1960) 
[hereinafter Douglas, Vagrancy] (“[A]rrests for vagrancy are often no more than ‘arrests for 
investigation.’  And in one of the few vagrancy cases to reach the Supreme Court it seemed plain that 
an ordinance was used to suppress unpopular speech which, in part at least, was critical of the police.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
414 Forrest W. Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARV. L. REV. 
1203, 1203–04 (1953). 
415 Rollin M. Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 237, 238–39 (1958). 
416 Douglas, Vagrancy, supra note 413, at 7–10.  
 
68 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1 
Terry and Sibron cited a variety of other articles discussing vagrancy in the 
context of the law of arrest, including the Foote article and LaFave book.417   
The general consensus was that vagrancy constituted an alternative 
means of engaging in the sorts of sustained investigative detention 
outlawed by Terry, but one that was fully covered by the law of arrest.  
Vagrancy operated then much as the combination of overcriminalization418 
and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista419 work now.  Because almost anything 
counted as vagrancy or one of the cognate crimes, such as loitering,420 the 
police always had the discretion to arrest a suspect, even a law-abiding 
one.   
The Court had faced the use of vagrancy statutes as a means of 
engaging in searches incident to arrest as early as 1964.  In Preston v. 
United States,421 the Court acknowledged that in arresting a suspect, the 
police could engage in the classic search incident to arrest—“the police 
have the right, without a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous 
search of the person of the accused for weapons or for the fruits of or 
implements used to commit the crime”422—an intrusion much broader than 
the safety search contemplated by Sibron and Terry.  In Preston, the Court 
considered the applicability of inventory searches of a vehicle after arrest 
in the context of a vagrancy statute.  The officers had “arrested the three 
men for vagrancy, searched them for weapons, and [taken] them to police 
headquarters,”423 precisely the sort of process permissible under the 
Uniform Arrest Act or the American Law Institute draft rules.  The Preston 
Court held the inventory search unconstitutional, in part because the search 
was unrelated to the crime (vagrancy) for which Preston was arrested.424  
In Cooper v. California,425 decided three years later—and so one year 
before Terry and Sibron—the Court again discussed the propriety of 
                                                                                                                          
417 Brief for Petitioner, Terry at 10, 19, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67), 1967 WL 
113684 [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner, Terry]; Brief of American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 14, 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Nos. 67, 74, 63), 1967 WL 113689; Brief for the N.A.A.C.P. Legal 
Defense and Education Fund, Inc. at 2, 5, 10, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (Nos. 63, 74, 
67), 1967 WL 113672 [hereinafter Brief for N.A.A.C.P.].    
418 No less a scholar than Sanford Kadish made the overcriminalization connection.  See Sanford 
H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 7 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 17, 30 (1968) (“Another costly misuse 
of the substantive criminal law is exemplified in the disorderly conduct and vagrancy laws. . . . [T]hey 
function as delegations of discretion to the police to act in ways which formally we decline to extend to 
them because it would be inconsistent with certain fundamental principles . . . .”). 
419 532 U.S. 318, 326–27 (2001) (finding that peace officers’ authority to make warrantless arrests 
for misdemeanors was not restricted at common law to “breach of the peace” cases). 
420 See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615–16 (1971) (invalidating a city 
ordinance prohibiting loitering on the sidewalk because it was unconstitutionally vague and violated the 
right of free assembly and association). 
421 376 U.S. 364 (1964). 
422 Id. at 367. 
423 Id. at 365. 
424 Id. at 367–68; see Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 60 (1967) (distinguishing Preston). 
425 386 U.S. at 60. 
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inventory searches, but this time distinguished between police use of 
vagrancy as a catch-all excuse to search, and a statute sufficiently closely-
related to the search to permit the inventory procedure.426  
Indeed, the use of vagrancy laws to arrest the law-abiding was a 
feature of the academic criticism of the doctrine made by Justice 
Douglas427 and Charles Reich,428 among others, both of whom were cited 
by the parties or amicii in Terry and Sibron.429  In the 1950s, Professor 
Caleb Foote had demonstrated the usefulness of vagrancy statutes for 
preventative policing: 
To the extent that the police actually are hampered by the 
restrictions of the ordinary law of arrest [and] by the illegality 
of arrests on mere suspicion alone . . . vagrancy-type statutes 
facilitate the apprehension, investigation or harassment of 
suspected criminals.  When suspects can be arrested for 
nothing else, it is often possible to “go and vag them.”430 
As late as 1965, Wayne LaFave included the operation of vagrancy 
laws as one of the police tactics to engage in pre-arrest detention: 
When there are not sufficient grounds to arrest for the 
offense suspected, police sometimes obtain custody by 
making an arrest for a lesser offense which the suspect has 
committed. . . .  One variation, observed in Milwaukee, is the 
so-called ten-day vag check. . . .  In some other Wisconsin 
communities, a conviction of vagrancy is always attempted in 
those cases. . . .  Somewhat similar practices, described 
earlier, are found in Kansas. . . .  The vagrancy statutes in the 
jurisdictions studied are representative of those found 
elsewhere.431 
The continued existence of vagrancy-style statutes precluded effective 
judicial regulation of pre-arrest detention and permitted end-runs around 
the safety justification.   
Vagrancy statutes were soon declared unconstitutional in Papachristou 
v. City of Jacksonville.432  The Court’s decision encompassed a series of 
cases in which the police used vaguely-worded vagrancy statutes to arrest 
Henry Edward Heath and Hugh Brown because they were reputed to be 
                                                                                                                          
426 Id. at 61–62. 
427 See Douglas, Vagrancy, supra note 413, at 4 (commenting on vagrancy statutes and ordinances 
that disproportionately affect the economically disadvantaged).   
428 Reich, supra note 333, at 1162 (discussing the author’s concerns with preventive police work).  
429 Brief for Petitioner, Terry, supra note 417, at 19 (citing Douglas, Vagrancy, supra note 413); 
Brief for the N.A.A.C.P., supra note 417, at 23 (citing Reich, supra note 333). 
430 Foote, supra note 334, at 614 (internal citations omitted).  
431 LAFAVE, supra note 316, at 354, 356 (internal citation omitted). 
432 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972). 
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thieves.433  Two others, Jimmy Lee Smith and Milton Henry, were arrested 
for “walk[ing] back and forth two or three times over a two-block stretch” 
without identification.434  There was thus less suspicion to arrest than in 
Terry; like the defendants in Terry, however, Smith and Henry were 
African Americans.  Similarly, as in Terry, the Court in Papachristou 
remained concerned about the effect of low-level preventative policing on 
minorities.435 
Upon being stopped, the police searched each individual prior to 
arrest.436  Accordingly, the vagrancy statutes permitted law enforcement 
officials to engage in low-level harassment of reputed criminals.  As in 
Sibron, the police appear to have targeted at least two of the suspects based 
on their criminal reputation rather than any specific activity, and in the 
absence of any evidence of dangerousness, engaged in an investigatory 
search of the type Sibron prohibited.  Papachristou can thus be read as 
expanding, or shoring up, the regulatory regime associated with Terry and 
Sibron.   
Re-emphasizing Sibron and linking it to the style of policing promoted 
by the vagrancy statute in Papachristou demonstrates the continuing 
extension of regulation despite the constriction of rights.  For example, in 
her recent article on vagrancy, Risa Goluboff notes that Papachristou is 
not a privacy case:  
The cornerstone of substantive due process as we have come 
to know it in the decades since Papachristou has been 
“privacy.”  But here, in the context of vagrancy laws, 
Douglas appears to suggest rights to engage in 
unconventional behavior—or simply to be an 
unconventional, even “undesirable,” person—precisely where 
others could, and likely would, encounter such behavior and 
such people.437 
If the vagrancy argument is correct, then the Court did not stand pat in 
1968, but expanded regulation outside the investigative sphere and into 
what had been regarded up to that point as preventative policing.438  Terry 
                                                                                                                          
433 Id. at 160 (discussing police justifications for the arrests of Henry Edward Heath and Hugh 
Brown).   
434 Id. at 159 (discussing the arrests of Smith and Henry).  
435 See id. at 162–63 (“The poor among us, the minorities . . . [are] not alerted to the regulatory 
schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume they would have no understanding of their meaning and 
impact if they read them.”). 
436 Id. at 159–60.  
437 Goluboff, supra note 29, at 1368–69. 
438 See TIFFANY ET AL., supra note 313, at 15–16 (“Although crime preventive programs are here 
distinguished from field interrogation in terms of their primary purpose, this should not be taken to 
imply that the sole function of field interrogation is arrest for prosecution. . . .  [P]olice administrators 
feel that stopping and questioning of suspects has a substantial crime prevention function . . . .”).  
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forcefully limited state and professional efforts to provide an expansive 
power to engage in pre-arrest investigative detentions.  Instead, the Warren 
Court drastically constricted the practice of weapons searches used 
primarily against minorities and other “undesirables.”439 
Accordingly, instead of a Warren Court cowering in the face of social 
disapproval, Terry represents a defiant Warren Court, thumbing its nose at 
popular opinion and the demands of law enforcement officials, and 
permitting only a minor officer-safety exception to the law of arrest.440  
Rather than the black sheep of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure 
jurisprudence, Terry should be celebrated alongside Miranda as one of its 
great—though flawed—cases. 
My reading of Terry is thus quite different from the orthodox liberal 
assessment of its current doctrinal importance.  Starting in the mid-1970s, 
cases cited Terry to permit investigative stops based upon suspicion of 
criminal activity rather than fear for officer safety.441  Terry has thus 
become emblematic of a much different style of policing and judicial 
oversight, while Sibron is now almost forgotten.  Yet as late as 1972 it 
might have seemed that Sibron would be the more important case.  Sibron 
demonstrated that legislative attempts to permit investigative stops and 
searches on anything less than probable cause would violate the Fourth 
Amendment.442  In Papachristou,443 the Court continued to close legislative 
loopholes, primarily connected with vagrancy statutes, used to permit 
investigative stops, thereby entrenching its expansion of police regulation. 
B.  Vagrancy and Racial Equality 
Another reason that the Court and the academy were preoccupied with 
vagrancy and public disorder statutes was the worry that the police were 
using low-level criminal ordinances to engage in brief, unsupervised 
detentions of minorities.  Vagrancy is thus linked to the Court’s right-to-
protest cases.  What they have in common is the use of low-level 
ordinances to control disorderly minorities and exclude them from public 
places.  Similarly, in Sibron, New York adopted a statute permitting the 
police, at their discretion, to engage in low-level sweeps of the public (and 
                                                                                                                          
439 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1968). 
440 Id. at 27. 
441 See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983) (“Terry and its progeny nevertheless 
created only limited exceptions to the general rule that seizures of the person require probable cause to 
arrest.  Detentions may be ‘investigative’ yet violative of the Fourth Amendment absent probable 
cause.”); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (“These cases together [Terry and 
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)] establish that in appropriate circumstances the Fourth 
Amendment allows a properly limited ‘search’ or ‘seizure’ on facts that do not constitute probable 
cause to arrest or to search for contraband or evidence of crime.”).  
442 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60–63 (1968).  
443 405 U.S. 156, 162–63 (1972). 
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primarily minorities) to check for weapons, particularly guns or knives.444  
In the context of on-the-street police conduct, these sorts of ordinances 
concentrated much of the Warren Court’s attention, rather than some 
Fourth Amendment equality right.   
Goluboff notices that the protection of undesirables in Papachristou 
mirrors language Justice Stewart used in Coates v. City of Cincinnati,445 to 
declare unconstitutional a statute permitting police officers to arrest anyone 
who happens to annoy them or any passerby.446  Justice Stewart sought to 
protect disapproved-of “lifestyles” from arbitrary police conduct—the type 
of “discriminatory enforcement against those whose association together is 
‘annoying’ because their ideas, their lifestyle, or their physical appearance 
is resented by the majority of their fellow citizens.”447   
Coates fits in with a series of cases, including Brown,448 
Shuttlesworth,449 and Edwards,450 decided under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments protecting public dissent.  To that extent, it is much closer to 
the cases that discuss the substantive right to dissent in the context of racial 
protest, and which do involve low-level criminal public ordinances.  These 
low-level ordinances accomplish much the same effect as the vagrancy 
statutes that they mimic or supplant. 
On a republican reading, then, Sibron, Terry, Coates, and 
Papachristou are quite straightforwardly race cases, and in their emphasis 
on security from arbitrary police action, they should be read together with 
Mapp:  
In each instance, police used these laws to demarcate who 
was out of place in a given community—who was denied full 
respect for their mobility, their autonomy, their lifestyle, or 
their beliefs.  Marginal people shared a vulnerability to 
regulation by vagrancy law.  That is, they shared a 
vulnerability to arrest at almost any time and place for any 
                                                                                                                          
444 Sibron, 392 U.S. at 43–44. 
445 Goluboff, supra note 29, at 1369. 
446 See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (“[T]hey must conduct themselves 
so as not to annoy any police officer or other person who should happen to pass by. . . .  [The city] 
cannot constitutionally . . . enact[] and enforce[] . . . an ordinance whose violation may entirely depend 
upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed.”). 
447 Id. at 616.  In reaching this conclusion, Justice Stewart cited to the report of a riot, noting “the 
serious civil disturbances that took place in Cincinnati in June 1967.”  See id. at 616 n.6 (citing NAT’L 
ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT ON CIVIL DISORDERS 26–27 (1968)).  Rather than retreating in the face of 
riots and civil disorder, Justice Stewart appeared willing to plough ahead with striking down statutes 
that would protect against civil disturbance. 
448 383 U.S. at 143–44 (Brennan, J., concurring) (finding a breach-of-the-peace statute overbroad 
for prohibiting the assertion of First Amendment rights). 
449 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 93 (1965) (finding a Birmingham loitering 
ordinance unconstitutional on vagueness grounds). 
450 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 233 (1963) (finding that defendants’ “boisterous,” 
“loud,” and “flamboyant” conduct resulted in their arrest by police authorities). 
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behavior or for no behavior at all.451 
Vulnerability, in this sense, is a security issue, and therefore a 
republican one.  Liberals, focused on fundamental rights, have missed 
republican import of these cases, and so their full racial and law 
enforcement import. 
In a variety of civil rights cases, the Court has developed the doctrines 
of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth to place limitations on substantive 
criminal law statutes that prohibited constitutionally protected activities 
and that have been used by states and municipalities to target minorities 
and other excluded groups for various public order offenses, like vagrancy.  
Perhaps because many of these limitations arose in the context of civil 
rights protests,452 rather than primarily under criminal law,453 the broad 
sweep of the Court’s limits on substantive criminal law has been 
commented on relatively little.  
The contrast between the Court’s language in, on the one hand, low-
level criminal offense cases arising as part of its civil rights jurisprudence 
and, on the other hand, the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, is 
stark.  Had the Court chosen to use criminal procedure to pursue an anti-
discrimination agenda, it would have felt free to discuss the racial impact 
of policing in this context as much as in the civil rights context.  Moreover, 
if the liberal egalitarian claim is that the police are applying one set of rules 
to minorities and another to everyone else, we should expect the Court to 
adduce some sort of argument similar to that propounded in Yick Wo v. 
                                                                                                                          
451 Goluboff, supra note 29, at 1371.  
452 See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 316–17 (1967) (upholding criminal 
contempt conviction for violation of temporary injunction but suggesting that constitutional issue of 
vagueness may have been present in city parade ordinance); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 143–44 
(1966) (Brennan, J., concurring) (finding that Louisiana breach-of-peace statute is overbroad and 
posing a serious threat to the exercise of constitutional rights); Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 90 (finding a 
city ordinance leaving use of public sidewalks entirely within the discretion to the “whim of any police 
officer” to be overly broad); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491–92 (1965) (striking down the 
Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law and Communist Propaganda Control 
Law as vague and overbroad); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551–52 (1965) (“For all these reasons 
we hold that appellant’s freedoms of speech and assembly, secured to him by the First Amendment . . . 
were denied by his conviction for disturbing the peace.”); Cox, 379 U.S at 573–75 (“There is an equally 
plain requirement for laws and regulations to be drawn so as to give citizens fair warning as to what is 
illegal; for regulation of conduct that involves freedom of speech and assembly not to be so broad in 
scope as to stifle First Amendment freedoms . . . .”); Edwards, 372 U.S. at 237 (“The Fourteenth 
Amendment does not permit a State to make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views.”).   
453 See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162–63 (1972) (“This ordinance 
is void for vagueness. . . .  [It] makes criminal activities which by modern standards are normally 
innocent.”); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (invalidating a California statute that 
criminalized status of addiction without the requirement of some wrongful act).  The vagrancy statutes 
were often characterized as criminalizing a person’s status.  See Douglas, Vagrancy, supra note 413, at 
6, 8 (commenting on the enactment of vagrancy statutes to prevent crimes that were thought to most 
likely be committed by a vagrant). 
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Hopkins,454 to the effect that the police were engaged in a process of 
racially selective arrests.   
Instead, the sort of cases the Court addresses under the Fourth 
Amendment do not have the sort of disparate impact of Yick Wo or other 
race cases.  The lack of disparate treatment is reflected in the types of 
defendants prosecuted in many of the most significant Fourth Amendment 
cases.  Only Mapp and Terry prominently feature minorities.  Most of the 
other cases feature organized crime or drugs, such as bookkeepers455 and 
drug dealers456—without any suggestion that these defendants are 
minorities or that they have some disparate impact.   
Once we turn to the pretext and lifestyle cases, however, we see 
statutes much like those at issue in Sibron, and police conduct much like 
that at issue in Terry.457  Like Sibron and Terry, these cases involve grants 
                                                                                                                          
454 118 U.S. 356, 372–73 (1886) (finding that a municipal ordinance to regulate public laundries 
was so broad as to allow unjust and unequal discrimination in its application). 
455 From 1961 to 1969, organized crime cases were defined broadly as cases involving gambling, 
illegal union activities, or illegal distilling activity.  See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 
418 (1969) (illegal interstate gambling activities); Recznik v. City of Lorain, 393 U.S. 166, 167–68 
(1968) (convictions for keeping a gambling place and exhibiting a gambling device); Mancusi v. 
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 370 (1968) (illegal union activity); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 
(1967) (wagering in violation of a federal statute); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967) 
(conspiracy to bribe chairman of the New York State Liquor Authority); Osborn v. United States, 385 
U.S. 323, 324 (1966) (attempted bribery of a juror in a prospective criminal trial); Hoffa v. United 
States, 385 U.S. 293, 294–95 (1966) (attempted bribery of members of a jury); Riggan v. Virginia, 384 
U.S. 152, 153 (1966) (Clark, J., dissenting); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 104 (1965) 
(illegal distillery operation); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96–97 (1964) (warrantless search and arrest 
based on the defendant’s previous record of arrests or convictions for violations of the clearing house 
law); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616–17 (1961) (unlawful manufacture of distilled 
liquor); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961) (convictions of gambling offenses under 
the District of Columbia Code).  None of these cases would be considered an anti-discrimination case.  
Yet they constitute almost a quarter of the Fourth Amendment cases decided from 1961 to 1969.   
456 From 1961 to 1969, the Supreme Court decided a number of narcotics cases.  Desist v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 244, 244 (1969) (conspiracy to import heroin); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 44 
n.1 (1968) (unauthorized heroin possession); Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 586 (1968) 
(illegal importation of cocaine); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 301 (1967) (narcotics possession); 
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 58 (1967) (the seizure and forfeiture of vehicles used in violation of 
narcotics laws); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 207–08 (1966) (the illegal transfer of 
marijuana); James v. Louisiana, 382 U.S. 36, 36 (1965) (narcotics possession); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 
U.S. 108, 110 (1964) (illegal possession of heroin); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 24 (1963) 
(marijuana possession); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 473 n.1 (1963) (the illegal 
transportation of narcotics).  Of these cases, perhaps Wong Sun and Aguilar could be characterized as 
race cases, yet they are not usually discussed in these terms.  Accordingly, almost half the Fourth 
Amendment cases from 1961 to 1969 were either organized crime or narcotics cases.  The major Fourth 
Amendment race case is Terry, although Mapp may also be characterized as a race case.   
457 See, e.g., Brown, 383 U.S. at 143–44 (Brennan, J., concurring) (finding breach-of-the-peace 
statute overbroad as it prohibits asserting First Amendment rights); Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 93 
(finding Birmingham loitering ordinance unconstitutional on vagueness grounds); Cox, 379 U.S. at 
573–75 (finding unconstitutional a statute prohibiting picketing near a courthouse due to reliance on 
discretion of public officials in implementation); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551–52 (1965) 
(finding that a breach-of-peace statute was unconstitutionally vague because it would allow persons to 
be punished merely for expressing unpopular views); Edwards, 372 U.S. at 233 (finding that 
defendants’s “boisterous,” “loud,” and “flamboyant” conduct resulted in their arrest by police 
authorities). 
 
2010] WARREN COURT’S REGULATORY REVOLUTION IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 75 
of unfettered discretion to the police.458  And, as in the pretext and lifestyle 
cases, the Court struck down the statute in Sibron, and precluded arbitrary 
justifications for interference in Terry.  The demand for reasonable 
articulable suspicion in the latter case, based on a demonstrable fear of 
violence, is both a central feature of republican rule-of-law concerns and 
perhaps a criminal corollary of the vagueness and over breadth doctrines.  
Both doctrines, as Goluboff notes in the vagrancy context, fail to carve out 
a space of immunity through fundamental rights.459  Instead, both doctrines 
permit the police or the legislature to interfere with public freedoms so 
long as they can articulate some sufficiently specific reason for so doing. 
One reason law scholars have not focused on such rulings may be that 
they do not fit the liberal rights revolution orthodoxy.  After all, the 
Court’s attack on the racially biased misuse of public order statutes, while 
it fits squarely within the liberal egalitarian framework, is very different 
from its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.   
Thus, while Goluboff looks forward to the Court’s protection of 
privacy-as-lifestyle in Roe v. Wade, she mostly misses or ignores the 
voluminous criminal procedure writings on vagrancy, and the connection, 
through Coates, to the First Amendment race cases.460  In other words, 
Papachristou, though written by the exemplary liberal on the Court, fits 
within the regulation revolution—one that is concerned, from a republican 
perspective, with equality as an aspect of non-domination. 
But this is not, as Goluboff suggests, merely a matter of “words.”  It is 
rather a matter of rules, and in particular, the republican prioritization of 
the rule of law over the rule of men.  That Goluboff would dismiss this 
protection so lightly—and in so doing, miss the connection between the 
Court’s race-and-protest jurisprudence and the Court’s criminal procedure 
jurisprudence—is endemic to liberal histories focused on fundamental 
rights as immunities.461  Such histories serve to recreate a republican 
doctrine in egalitarian or libertarian immunity terms, and so minimize or 
reject protections that do not fit that mold. 
                                                                                                                          
458 See Brown, 383 U.S. at 143 (“[A State] may not invoke regulations as to use—whether they 
are ad hoc or general—as a pretext for pursuing those engaged in lawful, constitutionally protected 
exercise of their fundamental rights.”); Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 90 (“[T]his ordinance says that a 
person may stand on a public sidewalk in Birmingham only at the whim of any police officer of that 
city.  The constitutional vice of so broad a provision needs no demonstration.”); Cox, 379 U.S. at 579 
(Black, J., concurring) (“Louisiana has by a broad, vague statute given policemen an unlimited power 
to order people off the streets . . . whenever a policeman makes a decision on his own personal 
judgment that views being expressed on the street are provoking or might provoke a breach of the 
peace.”); Cox, 379 U.S. at 557–58 (majority opinion) (“It is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public 
official to determine which expressions of view will be permitted and which will not . . . .”). 
459 Goluboff, supra note 29, at 1383. 
460 See id. at 1369. 
461 Id. at 1375. 
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C.  The Real Rights Revolution 
In my view, the real rights revolution occurred under the Burger Court, 
as that Court transformed a series of republican, regulatory decisions into 
rights-based ones, and at the same time undermined the regulatory basis of 
these decisions.  In Papachristou, then, Justice Douglas embraces not only 
the “lifestyle” language of Justice Stewart,462 but also, in part, a republican 
emphasis on the rule of law—one that he had acknowledged in his 1960 
article on privacy.463  
My view reverses the argument, propounded by Carol Steiker, that the 
Warren Court’s rights revolution was undone by an emphasis on 
regulation.464  That argument grants too easily the existence of a rights 
revolution.  While the broad thrust of Steiker’s argument is undoubtedly 
correct—the Burger Court emphasized rights to the detriment of 
regulation465—the Burger Court did not so much preserve rights-talk as 
shift it from the Warren Court’s regulatory focus to a rights one.  Under the 
Burger Court, the emphasis on fundamental rights, such as granting 
immunity from government intrusions, so conducive to liberals, took the 
focus off regulation.  Granting or expanding rights, even in fits and starts, 
permitted conservatives on the Court to provide a sop for liberals, at the 
same time as undermining the Warren Court’s regulatory regime.  The hard 
fact about the Burger Court’s (and subsequent courts’) jurisprudence is that 
liberals are complicit in this move.  Left-liberals are generally uninterested 
in regulation except as a sanction for trenching on immunities understood 
as fundamental rights.  They never understood the regulatory revolution, 
and were willing to pay the regulatory cost in order to advance their 
emphasis on rights. 
VI.  POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE THEORIES OF POLICING 
The central problem with left-liberal theories of policing is that they 
are too negative, providing no real account of good policing practices. 
                                                                                                                          
462 See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971) (“[S]uch a prohibition, in addition, 
contains an obvious invitation to discriminatory enforcement against those who association together is 
‘annoying’ because their ideas, their lifestyle, or their physical appearance is resented by the majority 
of their fellow citizens.”); Goluboff, supra note 29, at 1369 (discussing the language of “lifestyle” in 
the Coates and Papachristou cases).  
463 See Douglas, Vagrancy, supra note 413, at 7 (“One who thumbs through these vagrancy 
statutes may often wonder whether, apart from everything else, some of the provisions are too vague to 
satisfy constitutional tests.”). 
464 See Steiker, Counter-Revolution, supra note 54, at 2467–71 (“The Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts have not altered radically . . . the Warren Court’s constitutional norms regarding police 
practices. . . .  Rather than redrawing in any drastic fashion the line between constitutional and 
unconstitutional police conduct, the Supreme Court has revolutionized the consequences of deeming 
conduct unconstitutional.”).  
465 See id. at 2470 ([T]he Burger and Rehnquist’s Courts have accepted to a significant extent the 
Warren Court’s definitions of constitutional ‘rights’ . . . .”).  
 
2010] WARREN COURT’S REGULATORY REVOLUTION IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 77 
Left-liberals are no more than minimally interested in the process of 
criminal investigation, because police investigation undermines immunity 
from state coercion.  Instead, left-liberals focus on tightly restricting police 
discretion, which is usually characterized as, at most, one step away from 
race or class discrimination.466  Lacking a positive theory of policing, left-
liberals surrender the discussion of police practices to centrists and 
conservatives.  Left-liberals are left on the fringes seeking to reduce 
policing as a means of combating state repression.   
To the extent that left-liberals are focused on non-interference, they are 
vulnerable to a classical liberal response.467  Classical liberals provide a set 
of radical but powerful solutions.  For example, Hobbesian-style liberal 
theories argue that, in order to preserve peace and promote security, there 
must be some omnipotent sovereign power, perhaps located in the 
executive branch;468 because of the extreme nature of the sovereign’s 
power, its sphere of competence must be limited to a public realm.  
Similarly, Lockean-style libertarians limit the nature of political power to 
preserving life, liberty, and property.469 Accordingly, both the Lockean and 
Hobbesian forms of liberalism are deeply concerned with negative liberty 
as non-interference. Both seek to protect individuals from the government 
and from each other.   
Furthermore, the Hobbesian view provides a persuasive positive vision 
of government power.  That is, Hobbesians have a simple, straightforward 
explanation of executive power in general, and police power in particular.  
It is an explanation that looks distinctively like Herbert Packer’s crime-
control understanding of policing, and one that receives its modern form in 
the type of separation of powers argument that rejects interbranch limits 
and instead argues for consolidation of police power within the executive 
                                                                                                                          
466 For examples from the work of two of the most prominent liberal scholars in the field see, 
David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal 
Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1062 (1999); David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A 
Comment on Randall Kennedy’s “Politics of Distinction,” 83 GEO. L.J. 2547, 2555–62 (1995) 
(questioning whether increased law enforcement constitutes a public good); Tracey Maclin, The 
Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 201 (1993) (“[T]he central 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust of police power and discretion.”); Tracey Maclin, The 
Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 926 (1997); Tracey 
Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 1271, 1277–78 (1998) (linking police discretion to racial discrimination). 
467 For two versions of classical liberalism, see generally HOBBES, supra note 67, at 117–29; 145–
54 (discussing sovereign power and individual liberty); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT 269–78; 350–53 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (discussing 
natural liberties and political powers of government). 
468 See, e.g., HOBBES, supra note 67, at 120 (describing sovereign as “mortall god” whose 
judgment on public matters supersedes those of his subjects). 
469 See, e.g., LOCKE, TWO TREATISES, supra note 467, at 268 (discussing political power); see also 
id. at 269, 330–32 (discussing natural rights); id. at 330–32 (discussing powers citizens hand over to 
government). 
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branch of government.470  It is, in other words, the type of theory put 
forward by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Armstrong v. United States and by 
Justice Scalia in his concurrence in Morrison v. Olsen.471  This 
consolidating aspect of much of the discussions472 of the police by the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts is the antithesis of republicanism.  It does, 
however, represent a powerful form of liberalism, and one to which 
egalitarian and libertarian-liberalism has found no answer in the criminal 
justice context. 
In fact, left-liberals writing in the criminal justice arena are often 
uninterested in producing a positive account of policing.  Their goal, 
structured by the liberal emphasis on non-interference, is to engage in the 
project—one they share with Hobbesian-style criminal justice theorists—
of circumscribing the range of police powers.  They operate, however, 
from Packer’s opposite pole.  They emphasize the limitations on 
government as consisting in a set of “due process” rights that seek to limit 
government power.  Although Packer expresses the due process model in 
terms of checks or hurdles placed by the judiciary on government action, 
that process is at best minimally republican.473  Simply put, for any rights-
based theory, including republicanism and fundamental rights liberalism, 
some form of justiciability is necessary to enforce individual rights.  By 
emphasizing freedom from police interference, left-liberalism becomes 
trapped in a primarily or exclusively negative theory of policing, one that 
views any form of police discretion as a license to engage in malicious, 
that is, usually racist or classist, interference with the public.    
The conservative account of policing is more developed, aiming to 
remove inter-branch checks on executive officials in the name of electoral 
accountability.  Conservatives favor a strong, unitary sovereign as 
necessary to preserve social order, within the limits permitted by 
fundamental rights.474  Since liberty is generally limited to the home,475 
conservatives seek to free the executive of interbranch checks and instead 
empower law enforcement to establish security and protect public order.  
Law enforcement is primarily understood as self-regulating, subject only to 
                                                                                                                          
470 See Packer, Two Models, supra note 34, at 9–13 (discussing Packer’s crime control 
understanding).  
471 487 U.S. 654 (1988).  Both Armstrong and Morrison discuss the power of the prosecutor as 
member of the executive branch and requiring that she be freed from interference by other branches of 
government.  
472 See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 703 (2009); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 
586, 592 (2004); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 (1984).   
473 PACKER, LIMITS, supra note 34, at 149–246 (1968); Packer, Two Models, supra note 34. 
474 Compare, e.g., HOBBES, supra note 67, at 145–50, with Justice Scalia’s view of the executive 
power in his concurrence in Morrison, 487 U.S. 654, 728 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that 
the primary check upon prosecutorial power is a political one). 
475 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 584–85 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting 
that search warrants should only be required for searches inside the home). 
 
2010] WARREN COURT’S REGULATORY REVOLUTION IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 79 
populist political accountability.476   
Republicanism does not oppose the police or government to the public 
in the manner of Packer, one of the Warren Court’s liberal apologists.  
Instead, republicanism makes room for both to operate together, and so 
avoids a barren and simplistic attitude towards the police, one that 
emphasizes anti-discrimination immunity from government intrusion to the 
exclusion of all other concerns.  Republicanism makes space for a complex 
relationship between police and public, government and liberty that 
Kamisar, in his earlier and later versions of the two-Warren-Courts thesis, 
finds either confounding or antithetical to his vision of the Warren Court as 
protecting fundamental rights. 
A central worry about left-liberal theory is its vulnerability from within 
to an attack from the conservative right based upon a more stringent—
perhaps one might call it quasi-Hobbesian—understanding of liberalism.  
This quasi-Hobbesian approach emphasizes the necessity of a sovereign 
executive to enforce the criminal law, and so seeks to free law-enforcement 
from inter-branch, and in particular judicial, oversight.  The quasi-
Hobbesian approach, like left-liberalism, rejects the intrinsic value of 
diffusing power among government agents.477  Given, however, the left-
liberal disinterest in regulating the police but only in immunity from police 
conduct, left-liberals concede a regulatory interest in policing to the quasi-
Hobbesians.  What is left is a consensus over the unregulated and 
discretionary nature of much of police activity, and an abstract and barren 
disagreement over whether this is a good or bad thing. 
I shall briefly indicate a liberal solution to the problem of policing: 
popular democratic participation in the process of policing.  In general, that 
solution was considered in the 1960s under the title of consent.  For 
example, in an important article discussing the findings that were to form 
the basis of the American Law Institute’s report, Bator and Vorenberg 
conclude that consent fundamentally legitimizes police activity.478 
Famously, the opportunity to engage in consensual policing was lost in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,479 a decision authored by Justice Stewart, 
otherwise the hero of the regulatory revolution.  Whether Schneckloth was 
a missed regulatory opportunity—the interpretation I favor—or a failure of 
the republican ideal, that decision may provide an opening through which 
                                                                                                                          
476 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598–99 (2006) (discussing police professionalism as 
reinforced by internal discipline). 
477 Left-liberals may like to retain the diffusion of power as an instrumental value.  See Packer, 
Courts, Police, supra note 34, at 239; Packer, Two Models, supra note 34, at 6–23.  The prime intrinsic 
left-liberal values, however, are liberty and equality. 
478 See Bator & Vorenberg, supra note 312, at 77–78 (discussing the importance of consent as 
justifying government action). 
479 412 U.S. 218, 281–83 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that something equivalent to 
Miranda warnings should be provided prior to obtaining consent to search to forestall implication of 
coercion). 
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liberalism can counter-attack republicanism.  Accordingly, despite its 
current unavailability as a constitutional basis for regulating police 
conduct, demands for videotaping of police interaction with the public, 
often as a matter of state law, suggest the continuing vitality of the 
consensual concept. 
Populist participation has liberal and communitarian antecedents.  One 
version might be John Rawls’s demand that public agents, including the 
police, rely on “public reasons”—“the reason of equal citizens who, as a 
collective body, exercise final political and coercive power over one 
another in enacting laws and in amending their constitution.”480  Here, the 
idea of equality transforms political power from hierarchical to egalitarian 
by virtue of the type of justification state authorities are permitted to use 
when considering “those [political questions] involving . . . ‘constitutional 
essentials’ and basic justice”481—the very subject matter of criminal 
procedure.  A theory of policing-based reasons each may “reasonably be 
expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them 
as reasonable and rational”482 may provide the sort of content that much of 
political liberal discussions of policing presently lack. 
Populist public deliberation portends a positive engagement with 
police, not simply to preclude their entrenchment on private spaces, but to 
provide a positive account of the manner in which the police, as a 
government agency, can justify their actions.  No longer are liberals 
consigned to knee-jerk anti-police rhetoric, in which any police discretion 
is regarded as the road to racism.  Rather, liberals are provided an 
opportunity to discuss what good policing looks like.  That it may look 
radically different from today’s dominant styles of policing, or those 
promoted by the current Supreme Court, is not a reason for neglecting this 
challenge.  But the failure to detail positive policing practices is liberal 
negligence—it cedes the field to the very forces liberals wish to resist and 
harms the very people they wish to protect.  At the very least, that was not 
the practice of the Warren Court or its republican agenda, and it suggests 
the superiority of republicanism over immunities-based liberalism.  The 
challenge for liberals is to develop a populist alternative to the left-
republican theory of police and policing. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The liberal story of the Warren Court’s limited rights revolution, with 
its ignominious and cowardly end in the face of populist political pressure, 
cannot be supported by the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence upon which 
                                                                                                                          
480 RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 122, at 214. 
481 Id.  
482 Id. at 217. 
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it relies.  Instead, the two planks of the rights revolution story—rights 
expansion before Terry, and rights contraction in Terry—are mistaken and 
misleading.  The Court never embraced Fourth Amendment egalitarianism, 
and spent a large part of the rights-revolution attacking the central 
libertarian-liberal right: privacy.  Accordingly, the Warren Court should be 
understood as a rights-contracting court—or at the least, strongly limiting 
pre-existing categorical libertarian-liberal privacy doctrines.   
Terry, rather than limiting privacy, extended regulation outside the 
normal investigatory sphere into preventative policing.  Two major aspects 
of regulating preventative policing were to bring stop and frisks under the 
Fourth Amendment, and prevent end-runs around the regulatory scheme by 
police or legislatures relying on vagrancy laws.  That means that the 
second prong of the rights revolution argument fails, too.  Rather than a 
Court on the retreat, Terry, Sibron, and Papachristou evidence a Warren 
Court triumphant. 
What triumphed was a demand for policing regulated by an 
individualized judicial pre-authorization regime.  This theory of 
permissible investigation based on inter-branch authorization provided a 
positive theory of policing, and a cure for police lawlessness and 
capriciousness.  That the theory did not outlast the Warren Court is cause 
for regret; nonetheless, it also provides the basis for a progressive political 
theory accounting for the role and justification of the police in a modern 
regulatory state.  
The Court consistently rejected self-regulation as the appropriate mode 
of self-governance,483 and instead “‘[o]ver and again . . . emphasized . . . 
adherence to judicial processes,’ and that searches conducted outside the 
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”484  In Katz, the Court 
demanded a warrant not because the federal agents invaded the defendant’s 
privacy, but because they did so without the proper individualized 
authorization from another branch of government.  In Camara, the Court 
required individualized authorization of legislative justifications for 
administrative searches.  In Terry, the Court tried to come up with a fix by 
extending judicial scrutiny to the police officer’s individualized policy 
decision about who to search and who to let go free. 
The legality of government searches and seizures turns upon whether 
to believe the executive branch’s factual claim that there existed sufficient 
evidence that a particular individual was likely engaged in criminal 
                                                                                                                          
483 See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964) (“If subjective good faith alone were the test, 
the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects,’ only in the discretion of the police.”). 
484 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 
(1951)); see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 758, 761 (1969) (emphasizing the importance of 
the warrant process). 
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activity.  Inter-branch scrutiny, justified under the separation of powers, 
prevents the executive from amassing unrestrained power to engage in 
investigative activity.  It thus prevents the sort of lawless government 
behavior that so worried Justice Brandeis in his Olmstead dissent.  While a 
political theory of inter-branch scrutiny may not be the only acceptable—
or even the most persuasive—liberal theory of legitimate police activity, it 
provides a positive account of police authority, and so is better than the 
negative and partial egalitarian or libertarian-liberal discussions of 
policing.  Accordingly, the Warren Court’s regulatory jurisprudence 
provides a better place to start the conversation about what constitutes 
good policing than the liberals’ rights-based jurisprudence. 
